SCENESETTER FOR CODEL ISAKSON (MAY 23-31)

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 001002 SIPDIS AF/E FOR SUSAN DRIANO E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2018 TAGS: ASEC OREP AMGT AFIN GH IT PGOV PREL RW SU TZ, XA, XG SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL ISAKSON (MAY 23-31) REF: SECSTATE 49253 Classified By: A/DCM David Abell, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Welcome to Kenya. Your visit comes 18 months after the disputed December 2007 general elections, when the controversial announcement of the victory of incumbent President Mwai Kibaki led to widespread violence, the deaths of 1,500 people and displacement of 500,000 Kenyans. Over the past 18 months, Kenya has made some progress in recovering from the aftermath of the crisis, but serious challenges remain, especially in advancing the ambitious reform agenda laid out in the Kofi Annan-brokered power sharing agreement. While allegations of electoral fraud sparked the violence, the crisis revealed serious flaws in the institutions of governance and deep-seated tensions among Kenya,s ethnic groups. The security situation has largely returned to the pre-election status quo, although the economic downturn has contributed to an increase in crime and poverty. Roughly 50 percent of Kenyans now struggle to meet basic needs. Food insecurity caused by drought, corruption, and post-election violence has contributed to instability, and the deteriorating situation in Somalia has created new humanitarian and security problems in Kenya,s Northeastern province. Reconciliation and reconstruction efforts in the areas hardest hit by the post-election violence are being implemented, but tensions in some areas remain high. ¶2. (C) Summary, cont. The coalition government has undertaken some reforms, but much work lies ahead to create a stable long-term framework for governance and growth. Kenya,s economy took a serious hit as a result of the post-election crisis, especially in the agriculture and tourism sectors. This damage was then compounded by double digit inflation, drought, and continued high levels of corruption. The global economic crisis has further exacerbated economic problems by negatively impacting remittances, tourism, and horticultural exports. Per capita GDP growth will likely be negative in ¶2009. As a longstanding partner of Kenya, the U.S. has been instrumental in advancing political dialogue, responding to humanitarian crises, and supporting the coalition government. Our continued support for the stabilization, reform, and reconciliation process will be critical over the next two years. The United States played a decisive role in helping Kenyans to resolve the crisis, and the Kenyan people -- as well as both Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga ) are extremely appreciative of this role. Kenyans also have high hopes that the Obama presidency may bring additional resources and attention to the country. These expectations present both a challenge and an opportunity, as we seek to inject some realism while at the same time leveraging President Obama,s popularity here to press for continued progress on the reform agenda. End summary. -------------- Overview of U.S.-Kenya Partnership -------------- ¶3. (U) The U.S. has spent the last 15 years strengthening our partnership with Kenya as an emerging multiparty democracy. U.S. foreign assistance, trade, investment and private remittances to Kenya total at least $1.5 billion. Bilateral trade in 2007 amounted to $909 million, with a U.S. trade surplus of $250 million. U.S. direct investment in Kenya totals about $68 million (2006 estimate). About 10,000 Americans live in Kenya. We have leveraged our close partnership with Kenya to encourage dialogue and cooperation between Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga. We have been clear in delivering the message that the success of our bilateral relationship currently rests in the success of the coalition government and the full implementation of key reforms. Kenyans across the political, social, and ethnic spectrum continue to express their deep appreciation of the decisive role the U.S. played in ending the political crisis. ¶4. (U) The U.S. Mission in Kenya serves as a vital regional platform to promote U.S. interests throughout much of Africa. It is the largest U.S. diplomatic mission in sub-Saharan Africa, comprising 19 federal government agencies or offices, many of which have regional mandates. Among these agencies are the U.S. Agency for International Development, Peace Corps, the Library of Congress, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, Homeland Security, Treasury, and Justice. U.S. Mission Kenya also represents the United States to United Nations bodies headquartered in Nairobi (the UN Environmental Program and U.N. Habitat). ¶5. (U) The U.S. has also led the international response to the humanitarian crisis and provided more than $100 million in humanitarian assistance in 2008. Much of this was for immediate assistance to those affected by the post-election violence, but also for refugees and those affected by the current drought. We have provided support to the Kenyan Red Cross Society, various UN agencies, and numerous NGOs for rapid response activities, water and sanitation programs, distribution of emergency relief supplies, women and children,s protection programs, nutrition and health projects, and support for community-based peace and reconciliation initiatives. We continue to provide increased support for food aid to drought-affected regions of Kenya. -------------- -------------- Reform, Corruption Challenges Dominate Political Scene -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Under the Kofi Annan-brokered power sharing agreement signed in February 2008, a coalition government was formed with President Kibaki keeping his position and Odinga filling the newly-created role of Prime Minister. Cabinet portfolios are divided between members of Kibaki and Odinga,s political parties. This coalition government has been charged with implementing a host of structural and institutional reforms, including passing a new constitution, and addressing judicial, police, land, and electoral reforms. The government must actively address corruption, which continues to impact negatively on Kenya,s recovery. Kenyans involved in fighting corruption routinely refer to a &feeding frenzy8 from all sides of the political spectrum within the coalition government, fueling cynicism among the public about the coalition,s commitment to reform. Senior members from both of the main political parties continue to posture against one another over sensitive issues such as holding accountable perpetrators and organizers of post-election violence and those involved in recent corruption scandals regarding maize and oil imports. There is also considerable jockeying for influence within each of the parties themselves. Since this is President Kibaki,s final presidential term, rivalries within his Party of National Unity are particularly strong as key figures strive to position themselves for presidential candidacies in 2012. ¶7. (C) The coalition government also promised to create a domestic special tribunal, as recommended by the commission investigating the post-election violence, to try high-level political figures suspected of inciting and/or financing post-election violence. Several influential ministers (including the current ministers of finance and agriculture) are likely to face prosecution if the commission,s recommendations are implemented. Parliament rejected legislation to establish the tribunal in February. The government has promised to re-introduce the legislation meaning the issue remains a potential cause of instability in the coalition. Parliament has adopted a law outlining the process for drafting a new constitution, which may be put to a referendum in 2010. The former electoral commissioners have been dismissed, and the government has appointed an interim electoral commission to undertake steps toward electoral reform. -------------- Kenyan Economy Shrinking -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The Kenyan economy grew by seven percent in 2007, the highest rate in 30 years. However, the post-election violence greatly reduced agricultural and tourism sector production, and the economy grew only about two percent in ¶2008. Given that the population is growing at a rate of 2.9 percent, this represents a per capita contraction and has prompted recession forecasts for 2009. Double-digit inflation in most of 2008 and early 2009 was caused by sharply rising food and fuel prices as well as a weakening shilling. The global economic crisis will further slow Kenya,s economic recovery as remittances and demand for tourism and key exports (cut flowers, tea, coffee) decline. In many regions of Kenya, the fall rains largely failed, creating drought conditions in many areas and compounding food shortages caused by the post-election violence,s disruptive effect. Kenya is also likely to experience a decline in foreign direct and portfolio investment (the result of a weak stock exchange and the global crisis). In 2009, harsh economic conditions combined with latent political and ethnic tensions could bring about serious social unrest throughout the country. ¶9. (SBU) To pull the vast majority of Kenyans out of poverty and fully realize its economic potential, Kenya needs to reduce the cost of doing business and attract more investment to create more jobs. This will require Kenya to rebuild the country,s decrepit infrastructure, punish corruption, improve security, and provide more affordable and reliable energy. Kenya continues to benefit from the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA),but must diversify out of the apparel industry if it hopes to avoid losing out to its global competitors. Kenya is currently scheduled to host the next global AGOA Forum in August 2009. -------------- Security Challenges and Programs -------------- ¶10. (C) In addition to the post-election violence, Kenya faces a number of other security challenges, particularly in its least-developed areas along the borders with Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda as well as along its coastline. Piracy attacks in the area are increasing and have attracted international concern. In January 2009, the United States and Kenya signed an MOU in which Kenya agreed to accept and prosecute pirates captured off the coast of East Africa. In 2008, security along Kenya,s border with Somalia deteriorated steadily. Militia incursions and refugee flows across the land border from Somalia into Kenya have spiked and the refugee camp at Dadaab in northeastern Kenya is seriously overcrowded. This is straining an already overstretched ecosystem and underemployed, undereducated host population and will likely increase the appeal of recruiters from Somalia-based militia and terrorist organizations. ¶11. (C) In Kenya,s arid north, the age-old cycle of livestock raids and revenge killings is worsening. The increased frequency and duration of global warming-related drought, the unchecked flow of small arms, and the commercialization of livestock raiding have all contributed to this trend of insecurity. Communal concepts of responsibility mean that women and children are frequent targets of revenge attacks in these areas. Kenya,s security forces are poorly equipped to deal with these challenges. In recent operations in western and northeastern Kenya, they have responded to insecurity with excessive force. Local and international human rights organizations have accused both the military and police of committing serious abuses. In northern areas like Marsabit and Turkana, communities are left largely to their own devices when confronting threats to their security. ¶12. (SBU) Kenya is a key nation in the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI),which was established to coordinate U.S. counterterrorism (CT) efforts throughout the Horn of Africa and Yemen under the 3D (Diplomacy,Development, Defense) concept. A key component of our CT effort with the GOK is the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, run by the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Kenya is one of six countries with an in-country ATA program. ATA is intended to improve the capability of law enforcement officers and agencies to predict, prevent, deter and react to terrorist acts. Other CT assistance and coordination efforts with Kenyan law enforcement and judicial agencies are carried out by the offices of the Resident Legal Advisor, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Legal Attache. ¶13. (SBU) The Kenya U.S. Liaison Office coordinates training and assistance to the Kenyan armed forces and a liaison office of the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa is responsible for the activities of military Civil Affairs teams operating within Kenya. These efforts center on the development of a more robust border security capability and capacity building for Kenya,s maritime forces. ¶14. (SBU) Kenya has received 1207 funding to help decrease the risk of extremism along the Somali border and to help stabilize the political environment in the wake of the post-election violence. AFRICOM and its components will be vital to the success of these programs, which include a focus on youth who are vulnerable to exploitation by advocates of violence and extremism. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶15. (C) At this critical juncture in Kenya,s history, we are standing together with the Kenyan people and echoing their calls for peace, reconciliation, and reforms to redress the structural and social inequalities that fuelled the recent crisis. The coalition government has a very narrow window in which to work: if they do not produce meaningful reforms by the end of 2009, the positive momentum generated by fear of re-igniting the post-election conflict will be lost. While drafting and voting on a new constitution that will better address the balance of power and other key issues remains the top priority, the government must also act decisively to hold those implicated in post-election violence and high-level corruption scandals accountable. Failure to act decisively could trigger a return to violence before the next elections. End Comment RANNEBERGER