Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MUSCAT845
2009-08-05 12:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Muscat
Cable title:  

OMAN ESTABLISHES PROCESS TO TRANSIT WEAPONS TO EMBARKED

Tags:  EWWT MARR PHSA KHLS PREL MU 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMS #0845/01 2171239
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 051241Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0672
INFO RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000845 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/08/05
TAGS: EWWT MARR PHSA KHLS PREL MU
SUBJECT: OMAN ESTABLISHES PROCESS TO TRANSIT WEAPONS TO EMBARKED
SECURITY TEAMS

REF: A. IIR 6 897 0108 09; B. IIR 6 874 0166 09; C. SANAA 1123

D. STATE 45331; E. MUSCAT 735

CLASSIFIED BY: Victor Hurtado, CdA, Department of State, Embassy
Muscat; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000845 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/08/05 TAGS: EWWT MARR PHSA KHLS PREL MU SUBJECT: OMAN ESTABLISHES PROCESS TO TRANSIT WEAPONS TO EMBARKED SECURITY TEAMS REF: A. IIR 6 897 0108 09; B. IIR 6 874 0166 09; C. SANAA 1123 ¶D. STATE 45331; E. MUSCAT 735 CLASSIFIED BY: Victor Hurtado, CdA, Department of State, Embassy Muscat; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Driven by private industry interest, Embassy civilian and military engagement with the public and private sector, and the encroachment of the piracy threat into Omani waters (ref A, B, C),Oman has established a process to transport both lethal and non-lethal equipment through the country for use by security teams under contract to merchant carriers. The convergence of these factors and the potential negative impact on the country's economy and diversification plans caused faster than anticipated action by the Omanis. As the newly announced processes evolve and mature, the Embassy will continue its monitoring of the dialogue occurring between commercial interests and the Government of Oman. In light of these developments, Post does not see a need to negotiate a formal agreement with the Government of Oman. End Summary. Scope of Process as of 3 August -------------- ¶2. (C) In the course of several communications between management of Inchcape Shipping Services and the Embassy Naval AttachC) over the past week, and supported by statements made by Col Badr Khalfan al-Zadjali, Royal Oman Police Coast Guard Deputy Commander, details have emerged regarding a newly authorized process for moving equipment in support of security teams through the Sultanate. This process is set to begin on or about 15 August, though it is the stated intent of Inchcape management to begin earlier if allowed. The agreement reached is solely between Inchcape Shipping Services (ISS),one of the two biggest shipping husbanding agents in Oman, and the Royal Oman Police (ROP) and specifically refers to security teams and their associated equipment entering and exiting Oman by ship through Salalah; Muscat is not covered at this time. [Note: ISS believes it is the only entity with such an agreement; however, al-Zadjali noted that a UK-based security company has an existing, similar agreement. End Note.] If Muscat is desired as a point of embarkation/debarkation for ship security teams, an entirely new agreement will need to be worked out between ISS and ROP, and is likely to require a 5,000 Omani Rial (US$13,000) bond to be paid throu
gh ISS to the ROP. ISS states that they currently are working with 10-12 security companies who are ready to execute escort duties through the Port of Salalah, and more are expected by ISS management. Execution of Movements -------------- ¶3. (C) Each vessel owner or security company desiring to move a security team through Oman will provide to ISS an appointment letter complete with personal details for all team members, and detailed information on all equipment and ammunition to be moved. This equipment can range from non-lethal communications devices, to body armor, rifles and pyrotechnics. All equipment and teams entering Oman by air will do so via Muscat International Airport before transiting to Salalah via Oman Air, the only carrier on this domestic route. During any cargo transfers within Oman, all security equipment will be under the control of the ROP Security and Safety Services (ROP/SSS). Equipment will be stored in ROP/SSS depots during any delay or in port periods experienced by transiting teams, with all concerned equipment being delivered to the team leader on board the vessel at an agreed upon time. For a team arriving by sea, the reverse of this process will occur, with the team being met at the vessel by ISS and ROP/SSS representatives which will inventory and take custody of the equipment in order to move it through Oman and onto the appropriate international flight in Muscat when the team departs the country. Equipment stored in ROP/SSS custody will be retained for one month with no additional charges. After one month, demurrage charges of 5 Omani Rials (US$ 13) per day will be charged per box. After two months in storage however, the equipment owners forfeit all claims of ownership of the relevant property. Restrictions noted and left unclear -------------- ¶4. (C) Initial documents received by ISS from the ROP/SSS stated that no automatic weapons or explosives would be allowed to transit Omani territory. Embassy Naval AttachC) queried ISS as to whether this truly meant that all automatic weapons were disallowed or whether the restriction was more specifically against belt-fed or crew-served weapons, and also sought a clarification of what constituted prohibited explosives. The response from the ROP/ISS was that both automatic and semi-automatic weapons were not allowed, but that regular pyrotechnics such as parachute flares and star clusters were permissible as long as no high explosive destructive ordnance was included with them. It is likely that the statement of semi-automatic weapons not being allowed is an error or misunderstanding of weapons or translation and that such weapons are likely to be allowed in actual execution of this policy. ISS is currently speaking with ROP/SSS in order to clarify this point. Weapons allowed to remain onboard ships in Omani waters -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Ships weapons not intended to go ashore at any point during a stay in Oman must be declared to ISS by the vessel's master in a separate bond manifest. Once in port, ROP Customs officials will inspect the weapons and declaration statement before sealing the container in which the weapons are stowed. This seal will then be removed by ROP Customs prior to the vessel's sailing. Timeline for execution -------------- ¶6. (C) As stated in correspondence between ISS and ROP/SSS regarding the process in question, the requirement for notification is that ROP be in receipt of all required information 48 hours prior to the arrival of a team to Oman. Regarding the declaration of weapons and equipment to ROP customs in cases where these items will remain onboard ship during an entire port visit, the timeline for notification of authorities is currently unclear, though it may be as much as 7 days in advance of a vessel's arrival. Notification would be done through the shipper's agent ashore. Moving weapons by air within Oman -------------- ¶7. (C) Embassy RSO met with the chief of Security for Oman Air and discussed its regulations for transferring weapons onboard commercial aircraft prior to the announcement of the agreement between ISS and ROP/SSS. Oman Air transports weapons and ammunition in locked boxes on a regular basis for the Omani police and military. The security chief thought it would not be an operational problem to transport firearms for others, provided the Government of Oman granted it permission to do this and the proper procedures were followed. The process as laid out by ISS and ROP/SSS appears to meet these requirements. Direct Economic Impact -------------- ¶8. (C) The attempted piracy attack on June 11, in international waters, off the coast of Duqm, in Oman (ref A),followed by the successful June 12 taking of the MV Charelle in Oman's territorial waters near the tip of the Arabian Peninsula (ref B, C),made clear to the Omanis that they were not in the "safe zone" from piracy, as they had previously maintained. Press reported that fishermen near the attacks were hesitant to venture far from shore after these events, and economically more significant, Omani press reported on July 15 that Fred Olsen Cruise Lines had re-routed its 106-night cruise to avoid stopping at Gulf countries, including Oman, in response to piracy attacks. Olsen has been sailing to Omani waters since 1990. Although no other companies have cancelled, industry experts believe that more could follow. With an estimated 150 cruise ships docking in Oman each year between October and April, further cancellations would impact Oman's fledgling tourism industry, one of the primary sectors Oman intends to use to diversify its economy away from oil and gas. Background - Initial Official Response -------------- - ¶9. (C) Embassy DAO and OMC officers had frequent engagements, too numerous to enumerate, with the public and private sectors on this issue. In response to ref D demarche request related to Omani regulations regarding armed security teams transiting Oman, Mohammed al-Hassan, Political Affairs Director for Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusef bin Alawi, told the DCM and poloff in a May 31 meeting that the Foreign Ministry would work to coordinate an interagency response to our inquiries. On July 12, the Charge and Pol Chief met with Ambassador Muhammad bin Ali bin Thani al Khusaibi, the Chief of the American Affairs Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who acknowledged that two months had passed since the MFA had received our request for information on the transit of weapons through Oman and said he would continue efforts to collect the information (ref E). Based on past experience and given the requirement for Omani interagency discussions to respond to our questions, it is possible that no response will be forthcoming. In an effort to focus attention on the matter, in a June 27 meeting, the CdA briefed Special Advisor to the Sultan, Dr. Omar al-Zawawi, on this issue as well. [Note: Although he appeared disinterested, al-Zawawi, an oligarch who owns at least 83 companies in Oman, may have seen the security connection and intervened from behind the scenes to protect his own commercial interests. End Note.] ¶10. (C) Comment : Although difficult to pinpoint the exact cause, it appears that the convergence of multiple elements caused Oman to act more swiftly on this issue than anticipated. At this point, although Post will continue to monitor the process closely, it appears that commercial forces have created an appropriate solution. Post sees no reason to continue to seek a formal response to ref D demarche, nor is there a need to negotiate a formal agreement. Post will remain engaged as this process is implemented. End Comment. HURTADO

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