ASSESSMENT OF OMANI GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO LOCAL IRE OVER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000055 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-01-21 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KPAO KWBG MU SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF OMANI GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO LOCAL IRE OVER GAZA REF: a) A. 08 MUSCAT 879, b) B. MUSCAT 006, c) C. MUSCAT 013 d) D. MUSCAT 019, e) E. MUSCAT 027, f) F. MUSCAT 035, g) G. MUSCAT 037 h) H. MUSCAT 048 CLASSIFIED BY: Gary A. Grappo, Ambassador, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy - Muscat; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Omani government's response to events in Gaza indicates an increasing awareness of and concern about public opinion. By permitting numerous demonstrations and media content outside the bounds of official positions on Egypt and Hamas, the government has given freer rein to popular sentiments on the street, though it remains cautious in its own public statements concerning Gaza. The recently concluded Gulf Cup soccer tournament in Muscat likely helped the government manage public anger over Gaza by diverting attention to a much more upbeat subject. While Israel's operations in Gaza may have further soured official opinions on U.S.-led Middle East peace efforts, the government will likely seek to be supportive of engagement by the new U.S. administration to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The Omani government has traditionally employed a paternalistic approach towards issues of public concern. While cognizant of popular opinion, officials normally make decisions on most matters without giving much weight to potential reaction from the street. Expressions of disagreement with government policy are tolerated only to certain limits. Public demonstrations, which require prior government approval, are infrequent mostly due to public apathy, but also because security officials rarely permit them. ¶3. (C) The government's handling of local sentiment on the crisis in Gaza, however, demonstrates a marked departure from this model. For example, the number of demonstrations over Gaza permitted by Omani authorities, which have been held nearly every weekend since late December 2008 in multiple cities, is unprecedented (refs A, B, E, H). While security forces have been careful to monitor the demonstrations and keep them under control, they have also allowed protestors to display symbols and banners supporting HAMAS and Hizballah that are normally not tolerated in public. ¶4. (C) Aside from the demonstrations, the moribund local press, hobbled by heavy self-censorship and government redlines over content, has uncharacteristically printed editorials beyond the boundaries of official foreign policy views. These articles have lauded HAMAS -- which is viewed warily at best by the security establishment -- for its "resistance" and have criticized Arab governments (though never mentioning Oman) for their failure to act decisively to end the fighting in Gaza. Interestingly, it is the state-owned press which has pushed the bounds most, as these papers, by virtue of their government affiliation, may be more knowledgeable of and comfortable with newly acceptable limits on Gaza-related content. It was state-owned Arabic daily "Oman," for example, that published a full-page article attacking Egypt for cooperating with Israel, despite Oman's support for Egyptian efforts to mediate a ceasefire in Gaza (ref G) and the Sultan's close relationship with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. ¶5. (C) Behind this new-found tolerance for popular public expression, at least with regards to Gaza, is the government's growing awareness of and concern over public opinion. As Oman's foreign minister, Yusef bin Alawi, told the Ambassador in discussing widespread anger over events in Gaza flamed by the Arabic media, "I don't know how much longer we can control this" (ref C). [Note: Bin Alawi later clarified through his Political Affairs Director that this comment referred collectively to Arab populations as a whole. End Note.] Bin Alawi also confirmed for the Ambassador that the attempted emergency Arab League summit in Doha on Gaza, in which he participated, was called in response to increasing criticism of Arab governments by their publics for failing to act decisively to end Israeli operations in Gaza (ref G). ¶6. (C) The government's desire to accommodate the street's opinion on Gaza has not resulted, however, in a slew of official public statements catering to local sentiments. The Deputy Prime Minister did issue a statement strongly condemning Israel on December 28, 2008 (ref A),and local press widely publicized remarks by Minister bin Alawi criticizing the UN Security Council for not ending civilian deaths and suffering in Gaza (ref C) and calling for a ceasefire during the visit to Muscat of the Chinese Foreign Minister (ref F). Oman's Deputy Permanent UN Representative in New York also delivered a stinging rebuke of Israel during the January 16 extraordinary UN General Assembly meeting on Gaza (ref H). Otherwise, outside the final statement for the December GCC Summit in Muscat, the government has been conspicuously silent on events in Gaza, reflecting its customary reluctance to take a high-profile stage on hot-button issues. ¶7. (C) As angry as the Omani public may have become over daily images of death and destruction in Gaza, the government was nevertheless fortunate that the Muscat-hosted Gulf Cup soccer tournament diverted considerable public attention and emotion from the situation in Gaza. In winning all but one of their games and capturing the tournament championship for the first time on January 17, Oman was much more in the mood to celebrate than to somberly focus on the suffering of Palestinians. ¶8. (C) Comment: As indicated by bin Alawi's impassioned lecturing on Gaza to the Ambassador and other diplomatic corps members (ref C),the Israeli military campaign in the Gaza Strip has likely soured Oman's foreign minister even more on U.S.-led prospects for achieving a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinians conflict. The perceived and hopeful opportunity for progress presented by a new U.S. administration in Washington, however, should help ensure continued firm Omani cooperation on Middle East peace efforts in the near future. End Comment. GRAPPO To view the entire SMART message, go to URL http://repository.state.sgov.gov/_layouts/OSS SearchResults.aspx?k=messageid:e238a227-ca60- 4cbe-8ca0-675fc6936ebf