OMAN - FM'S VIEWS ON IRAN ISSUES

S E C R E T MUSCAT 001067 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/07 TAGS: PREL PARM IR MU SUBJECT: OMAN - FM'S VIEWS ON IRAN ISSUES REF: (A) STATE 120288; (B) MUSCAT 1049 CLASSIFIED BY: Richard J Schmierer, Ambassador, State, Exec; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (S) Summary: Omani Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi (YbA) called in the Ambassador on December 6 to follow up the Ambassador's November 24 request concerning the three detained American hikers in Iran (see ref A). The meeting entailed a broad discussion of the Iran/Western dispute over Iran's nuclear program. The Foreign Minister was more sympathetic to the Iranian position than the Sultan's foreign affairs advisor had been in the November 24 meeting with the Ambassador. However, when thanked by the Ambassador for Oman's ongoing advice to Iran to work with the West, YbA offered Oman as both an organizer and a venue for any meeting the U.S. would want with Iran - if kept quiet. End Summary. ¶2. (S) The Ambassador had presented ref A demarche to the Sultan's Foreign Affairs Advisor Omar Zawawi immediately prior to his departure for the NEA Chiefs of Mission Conference, reported ref B. On December 6, directly upon return from that conference, Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdulla (YbA) called in the Ambassador to follow up. Unlike Zawawi, who understood the U.S. frustration at Iran's unwillingness to respond to the U.S., YbA maintained his Iran-centric approach, lamenting U.S./Western pressure on Iran and repeating that Iran needs reassurance from the West. YbA stressed that, if Iran would be "accepted" by the West, it would not be agitating so much over the nuclear issue. "Acceptance [Note: Including as a regional power. End Note] is their strategic objective and their greatest fear is regime change," he said. ¶3. (S) The Ambassador repeatedly stressed that the United States has been open to dialogue with Iran, and had thought that there were the beginnings of an understanding in October. However, Iranian intransigence is causing Washington to begin to focus on ensuring that Iran sees the concept of consequences - further sanctions - as credible. YbA repeatedly answered that Iran needs reassurance and that sanctions and threats will not work. ¶4. (S) YbA added his opinion that Iran doesn't actually want nuclear weapons and that the weapons would require an infrastructure beyond Iran's capabilities. He cited Pakistan as a country with nuclear weapons but no idea as to what to do with them. He continued with his opinion that, even if Iran developed nuclear weapons, this action would not destabilize the region, a point vigorously countered by the Ambassador. ¶5. (S) When the Ambassador turned the topic back to USG appreciation for Oman's longstanding counsel to Iran to deal with the West, YbA offered that if the U.S. wants it "Oman can arrange any meeting you want and provide the venue - if it is totally discreet." Schmierer