MAHARASHTRA OFFICIALS WELCOME TRAINING TO PREVENT ANOTHER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MUMBAI 000403 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2019 TAGS: ASEC PTER PGOV PINR IN SUBJECT: MAHARASHTRA OFFICIALS WELCOME TRAINING TO PREVENT ANOTHER TERRORIST ATTACK REF: A. MUMBAI 000233 ¶B. 08 MUMBAI 000296 ¶C. 08 MUMBAI 000518 MUMBAI 00000403 001.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY: Michael Newbill, Consul for Economic and Political Affairs, Pol/Econ, State. REASON: 1.4 (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Maharashtra state Home Secretary Chandra Iyengar and senior police officials discussed security enhancements since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks and expressed interest in pursuing in-country USG training, during a recent meeting with visiting Embassy Political Counselor and Congenoffs. While the officials praised the performance of Mumbai's police during the attack, they recognized the need for improved response capabilities. The creation of a new crisis response team is taking shape, but the state seeks additional specialized training for the unit on multiple fronts. Iyengar suggested that a U.S.-India memorandum of understanding on counterterrorism (CT) cooperation could facilitate Maharashtra's pursuit of USG training opportunities. In the meantime, Post's Regional Security Office (RSO) is working with the police to promote training and cooperation, but remains concerned that Mumbai still lacks the response capability to deal with another 26/11 type attack. End Summary. MUMBAI SECURITY OFFICIALS PROUD OF POLICE, BUT MORE TRAINING IS NECESSARY ¶2. (SBU) Chandra Iyengar, Maharashtra's Additional Chief Secretary in the Home Department (Public Safety),D. Sivanandan, Commissioner of Police - Mumbai City and Himanshu Roy, Joint Commissioner of Police-Law and Order, discussed steps taken since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks (known in India as "26/11") to enhance the state's prevention and reaction capabilities in a September 24 meeting with visiting Embassy Political Counselor and Congenoffs. Iyengar, who took office in April 2009, five months after the attack, said her officers performed well during the Mumbai attacks, remarking, "We should be proud of the city police. They did the best they could under the circumstances." Noting that the police are trained to address crowd control and street level crimes, not terrorism, Iyengar acknowledged that additional training is needed to better prepare them for future attacks. ¶3. (SBU) Iyengar explained that the state's greatest "lesson learned" from 26/11 was the realization that India was vulnerable to significant, military-style attacks anywhere in the Indian heartland. Prior to 26/11, these kinds of attacks were limited to border areas in Kashmir and Northeast India, where the army was equipped to handle them. She said it was a stark awakening to realize that "bad guys" could enter Mumbai without the army knowing about it or being prepared to prevent it. Accordingly, the police needed to learn to respond to these kinds of attacks because "the army could not be everywhere." Nevertheless, despite calls for a more robust police force from some critics, Iyengar asserted that Indians did not want a militarized police presence in their communities, and policymakers must strike a balance between increasing security and maintaining free and open societies. POLICE PLAN "THREE-TIERED" RESPONSE STRUCTURE ¶4. (SBU) Iyengar claimed that the Maharashtra government had improved the city's readiness and response capabilities since the attack. Introducing the most recent security enhancements in the state, Iyengar pointed to the establishment of "Force One," an elite strike force, as a major step. Sivanandan explained his implementation of a "three-tiered" response structure. The first tier is the local police officers, who will continue to address normal public disruptions. The second tier is policing units known as Quick Response Teams (QRT), which will be given more sophisticated weapons and specialized crisis response training. Currently, 682 men have completed the QRT training and 1100 are partially trained, he said. (Note: QRT forces participated in the Consulate's Crisis Management Exercise (CME). RSO advises that while the QRTs are more MUMBAI 00000403 002.2 OF 004 prepared than regular police units, they would not be able to deal with a 26/11-style attack. End Note.) Sivanandan indicated that the police have purchased new weaponry from the U.S. for the QRTs, and a U.S. private firm, AimPoint, provided training in using the sights on the weapons. ¶5. (C) The third tier of the state's crisis response structure is known as Force One, an elite, highly trained squad. Sivanandan said he hoped for a fully-trained Force One strength of 200-250 officers. When fully implemented, Force One would have hubs across the state, Iyendar added. Iyengar said her office was planning a large training center in Pune to give state police working in urban areas specific anti-terrorism training, but that proposal had yet to be presented to the legislative assembly. (Note: Two Israeli security and training consultants who have trained Force One recruits in Pune told Congenoff that these units are unlikely to ever be a well-trained, effective force. As an example, they pointed out that the police had purchased new Glock guns, but wrong-sized holsters. Once stuck inside the holsters, the police could not remove the guns, but continued to train with the weaponry anyway. End Note.) COASTAL SECURITY STILL A VULNERABILITY ¶6. (C) While the state is working to improve its forces, Iyengar was frank about areas that still need to be addressed. The risk of terrorist infiltration from the sea is of great concern to Maharashtra's security forces, Iyengar said. While security along the coast is the responsibility of her office, she noted that they cannot patrol in international waters and must rely on the nation's coast guard for that protection. Iyengar said her office is training local fishermen to be vigilant and report suspicious activity, and she reported that they are issuing identity cards to Maharashtrians working on boats. Deflecting a suggestion of joint cooperation on port security measures, Iyengar evinced less concern with security threats at major ports in Maharashtra, explaining that terrorists were more likely to come ashore undetected at smaller ports or inlets along the coast. CENTER-STATE RELATIONS HAVE IMPROVED SINCE 26/11 ¶7. (C) Iyengar claimed that relations with the central government had grown closer since 26/11, with improved information-sharing and responsiveness. While some detractors criticized the central government for not taking a more proactive role to protect the states, Iyengar insisted that centralizing counter-terrorism efforts would not work. Under the Indian constitution, law enforcement is a state issue; with India's diverse language and customs, a truly centralized law enforcement structure would be hampered by its inability to properly analyze and prioritize intelligence reports and inputs originating at the state level, where knowledge of local conditions, personalities, and practices is key. ¶8. (C) Nevertheless, Iyengar, Sivanandan and Roy voiced some concern over the inability to get immediate, credible information relevant to potential terrorist threats. They lamented that Maharashtra has no independent intelligence gathering entity and must rely on information that is gathered, analyzed, filtered, and supplied by the central government. Given the vastness of India, Sivanandan was skeptical that the central authorities could have detailed information on all the possible threats. He noted that Mumbai alone has 1,400 vital installations. (Note: Those would include infrastructure such as bridges, two airports, the Bhabha Atomic Research Center, two stock exchanges, diplomatic missions, government offices and numerous other targets. End note.) MUMBAI 00000403 003.2 OF 004 ¶9. (SBU) In discussing national/state level cooperation, PolCouns relayed actions taken by the U.S. since 9/11, including forming the National Counter Terrorism Center to coordinate information sharing among the various law enforcement and investigative agencies. Iyengar responded that there is a newly created National Investigative Agency charged with investigating terrorism and counterfeiting; some state police have been "deputed" to serve with the agency for the next several years. She also said that Union Minister for Home Affairs, P. Chidambaram, is working on a national law that would allow the central government to act in the event of a terrorist attack, but without compromising states' rights. MAHARASHTRA POLICE WELCOME TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES ¶10. (SBU) Sivanandan and Roy enthusiastically welcomed the possibility of having their forces receive USG critical incident training in India, noting the difficulty of sending large numbers of trainees abroad. Sivanandan specifically requested training in hostage negotiation, information sharing, terrorist financing, hijacking situations, post-blast investigation and cargo transportation safety. Sivanandan said that crisis training in a broad range of potential threat scenarios is essential, as the terrorists are unlikely to use the same means of attack twice. He posited that the next attackers might be suicide bombers, or could target schools. Sivanandan urged that any training be done in Mumbai to maximize the number of officers that can participate in the training. ¶11. (C) Iyengar noted that the state has gratefully accepted training from other countries - such as Israel -- and would be pleased to receive training from U.S. specialists. Echoing Sivanandan, Iyengar recommended that the training be done in Mumbai, where the conditions are most appropriate for the challenges. Offering an example, she explained that while surveillance cameras are often used in other cities, the railway stations in Mumbai are so crowded that other methods must also be used to monitor movements and threats. IYENGAR PROPOSES TRAINING MOU FOR COUNTER TERRORISM ¶12. (C) PolCouns welcomed the training suggestions, and noted that such law enforcement cooperation is a major U.S. priority. However, Mumbai Pol/Econ Chief reminded Iyengar that the Los Angeles Police Department had wished to send a training team to Mumbai, but could not get permission from the Minstry of External Affairs (MEA). Iyengar suggested working with the central government to establish a memorandum of understanding which would allow for a host of training opportunities -- a "large shopping list" - which states could select and pursue as needs and opportunities arose, without seeking central government approval on a case-by-case basis. (Comment: As a deliverable for PM Singh's November 23-25 state visit, Post is pursuing a U.S.-India law enforcement and security initiative which should facilitate training in the areas sought by Iyengar and Sivanandan. End comment.) COMMENT: LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING MOU WORTH PURSUING ¶13. (C) Comment: Maharashtra leaders have been criticized since the Mumbai attacks for failing to take visible steps to improve the city and state's security. Efforts to build Force One are still in their infancy, and the state police will continue to stumble due to corruption, political apathy, a lack of coordination, and poorly trained, staffed, and paid personnel, challenges faced by police forces throughout India. Nevertheless, there are good opportunities to engage with the MUMBAI 00000403 004.2 OF 004 Maharashtra police in order to boost their capabilities - and raise their comfort level in working with U.S. security officials and experts. At the invitation of the RSO, Mumbai police participated in a recent Consulate Mumbai crisis management training exercise for the first time, hopefully setting the stage for additional joint training exercises. RSO at post continues to work with local authorities to bring training specialists to Mumbai in the specific areas identified during this meeting. End Comment. FOLMSBEE