A USER'S GUIDE TO THE RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND THE INDIAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 MUMBAI 000373 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USTR TREAS PLEASE PASS TO FED E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EFIN EINV IN SUBJECT: A USER'S GUIDE TO THE RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND THE INDIAN BANKING SYSTEM MUMBAI 00000373 001.2 OF 008 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Over the last decade, the Indian banking sector has deepened, matured, and grown, and many of its banks have become leaders in the new Indian economy. Moreover, foreign banks have also succeeded in expanding in the Indian market, and have become a significant part of the banking landscape, though their expansion has been limited by restrictions. Nevertheless, with a few notable exceptions, the Indian banking sector is dominated by major state-run banks which were nationalized almost 40 years ago in order to ensure that credit and banking policies served social and development goals. The central bank and banking regulator, the Reserve Bank of India, remains conscious of this mission, and continues to prize price stability over growth in its monetary and banking policies. The RBI has also proved extremely cautious in liberalizing the banking sector, firmly restricting the participation of foreign banks and the introduction of more complicated financial products. While there are differences between the RBI and the Finance Ministry over the pace of banking sector reforms, the RBI is likely to continue a slow, gradualist reform agenda, giving prominence to minor tinkering instead of major policy changes. Given that the RBI's reluctance to liberalize is now widely seen as a prescient step that enabled India to avert some of the most dire effects of the global financial crisis, the ideological arguments for more financial liberalization have less currency than they once did, making it more difficult for governments and the private sector to press for additional reforms. End Summary. Indian Banks: The Legacy of Nationalization -------------- ¶2. (U) After Indian independence, the Indian banking industry was largely controlled by a number of business houses who used banks to apportion credit to select industrial enterprises. The banking sector grew slowly, and according to then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, was insufficiently responsive to the development needs of India, especially for India's rural masses. Mixing socialist rhetoric and shrewd politics, Prime Minister Gandhi ordered the nationalization of 14 major private commercial banks in 1969, and six more in 1980. Arguing that banks were not fulfilling social and developmental goals, Gandhi directed banks to extend credit and provide banking services to the rural and urban poor, farmers, and small industries to promote economic development. By the 1990s, the government controlled around 91 percent of the assets of the total banking sector. ¶3. (SBU) Up to the 1990s, the nationalized, or public sector, banks (PSBs) grew at around four percent, mirroring the growth rate of the Indian economy. The banks opened up thousands of branches and operations in rural areas; regional banks, now under a national mandate, expanded into other parts of India. Under government direction, these banks continued to follow largely social and industrial policies, rather than economic ones, lent to rural borrowers and favored industrial projects, and offered high interest rate savings accounts to attract savers. The number of bank branches increased from about 7,000 in 1969 to more than 60,000 in 1994. The deposit base rose from USD 1.04 billion in 1969 to around USD 71.6 billion in 1994. However, by 1991, with non-performing loans, bloated labor pools, a lack competition and allergic to technology, the Indian banking system was saddled with inefficient and financially unsound banks. ¶4. (SBU) Beginning in 1992, the Indian government carried out a wide range of economic and financial reforms, including gradualist measures to make the banking system stronger, more efficient, and competitive. Some state-run banks, such as ICICI and HDFC, were effectively privatized, and began to grow quickly. Some new private banks were licensed. The Indian government sold equity in PSBs, and divested its ownership to raise capital (though current law requires that the Indian MUMBAI 00000373 002.2 OF 008 government own at least 51 percent). India now has 27 public sector banks (where the government owns a majority stake),22 private Indian-origin banks, and 32 foreign banks. (Note: There are also several hundred smaller, regional commercial banks and rural and urban credit cooperatives. End Note.) Currently, the Indian banking system has a deposit base of around USD 837 billion with more than 77,700 bank offices. (Note: The U.S. has a deposit base of about USD 10 trillion. End Note.) State-Run Banks Dominate the Financial Landscape -------------- --- ¶5. (SBU) The banking sector in India continues to be dominated by PSBs. In March 2009, PSBs accounted for 74 percent of total deposits, of which 24 percent came from just the State Bank of India (SBI) and its associate banks. PSBs also account for about 74 percent of all bank credit, with SBI holding 23 percent. Nevertheless, the Indian banking sectors, and its major banks, are small compared internationally. According to "The Banker," a Financial Times publication that rates the world's top 1,000 banks, SBI is the world's 64th largest bank based on tier I capital and ranks 76th in terms of assets. ICICI Bank, India's second largest lender by assets, is the world's 81st largest bank based on tier I capital and ranks 127th based on assets. Among the top 25 Asian banks (excluding Japan) on the basis of tier I capital, SBI ranks 11th and ICICI Bank ranks 15th. ¶6. (SBU) Over the last decade, the health of most Indian banks has improved significantly. For instance, banks have introduced new technologies and made significant progress in lowering the rates of non-performing loans from a high of 14.78 percent in 1998, to 2.42 percent in 2009 (sometimes through advantageous reclassifications). Nevertheless, PSBs are still often accused of being inefficient, slower and less technologically savvy than their private sector rivals, and, sometimes, politically pliable, all of which is largely true. However, there is a wide range of health among the PSBs. Some banks, such as SBI, Punjab National Bank, and the Bank of Baroda, are at the forefront of modernization efforts. They now offer more sophisticated products to clients, and have a reach into the country side and into different income classes that cannot be matched by private sector banks. Moreover, with explicit government ownership and patronage, most Indians have grown up believing that PSBs are safe and secure places to bank, a feeling confirmed when savers returned to PSBs during the first shocks of the financial crisis. Even the most dynamic private sector banks are still small compared to the PSBs. ¶7. (SBU) Despite this growth, however, only 40 percent of Indians have a bank account. Only 5.2 percent of villages have a bank branch. India's economic policymakers, including the central bank and banking regulator, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI),have recognized the importance of microfinance and microcredit initiatives, and these sectors have grown dramatically in the last decade, largely through the efforts of dynamic social entrepreneurs. This large, unbanked population makes it difficult to establish identity, target payments, reduce corruption, build up credit history, and marshal India's high savings rates into productive investments. Requirements for Banks in India -------------- MUMBAI 00000373 003.2 OF 008 ¶8. (U) The continued dominance of state-owned banks ensures that the GoI can carry out its social, industrial, and fiscal agenda, and the operating environment for banks in India reflect this objective. Under law, all banks operating in India are required to hold a certain proportion of their liabilities in government securities. These mandated ratios, apart from acting as a safety net for banking capital, ensure a captive market for government securities, and aid government borrowing programs. This requirement, known as the statutory liquidity ratio, or SLR, is currently set at 24 percent. The government has at times raised the SLR to ensure the government borrowing program is conducted smoothly, and has in times of crisis lowered this ratio to ensure liquidity in the system. (A one per cent increase in the SLR yields additional demand for government bonds of roughly USD 8.5 billion.) As government securities offer an attractive yield - a five-year government bond yields around 7 percent - banks often prefer the safety of these investments to more risky credit operations. For much of the last decade, banks significantly exceeded the SLR, prompting charges of "lazy banking." RBI guidelines also require that banks set aside a certain percentage of their deposits with the RBI, known as the Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR). In addition, current RBI guidelines require that Indian banks - both public and private -- allocate at least 40 percent of the bank credit to certain priority sectors, including exports, housing, and the rural and agriculture sectors. Of this 40 percent, 18 percent of credit is exclusively allocated to agriculture and 10 percent to "weaker sections" of the economy, including small and marginal farmers, landless laborers, and urban and rural microfinance. ¶9. (SBU) As with the RBI, the Union Ministry of Finance (MoF) plays an important role in guiding the banking sector. The MoF appoints the heads of the PSBs and board members, determines the amount of government equity, and guides some lending policies. A common concern is that the MoF strives to influence credit policy in general, especially lending rates. Banking sector observers presume that the Finance Ministry consistently pressures state banks to lower interest rates to encourage greater borrowing, especially for high-end consumer goods, homes, and industrial purposes, though both bank leaders and MoF officials deny this. In practice, despite clear government interest in reducing lending rates and reductions in the policy lending rates, bank lending rates have stayed in the 11-16 percent range. The Reserve Bank of India -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is the central bank of India, and is the regulator and supervisor of the financial system. Led by a Governor appointed by the Prime Minister, the RBI is responsible for formulating and implementing monetary and credit policy, overseeing foreign exchange, issuing currency, and lending to the government. The RBI has a dual mandate to promote economic development - rather than growth - and ensure price stability. In practice, therefore, the RBI privileges stability and low inflation over growth. The RBI believes that while economic growth benefits many sectors of the economy, inflation hits everyone, and the poorest the hardest. For this, the RBI has a number of "levers" at its disposal, including two policy rates - the repo rate and the reverse repo rate - at which the RBI lends or absorbs money in the system, and sends signals about inflationary or monetary policy trends. The RBI can also use the aforementioned CRR and SLR to absorb or release liquidity into the system when credit expands or contracts too quickly. In addition, the RBI can conduct foreign exchange operations to mitigate the impact of capital flows on liquidity in the banking system or the value of the rupee, both of which MUMBAI 00000373 004.2 OF 008 can affect inflationary trends, credit policy, interest rates, and market operations. In the last several years, the RBI has actively used all these tools to control, limit, or encourage various market trends, depending on the policy goal. With so many tools, however, the RBI remains in constant "policy motion," like the wizard behind the curtain, for the use of each lever provokes the need for adjustment elsewhere in the system. ¶11. (SBU) On banking, the RBI's philosophy strives for holistic growth and development. The RBI takes seriously its mandate to protect banking consumers and the safety of the banking system as a whole, and believes that India's financial system should serve the overall needs of India's economic development first. The RBI displays caution - and sometimes distrust - toward entrepreneurial banking and complicated financial products, especially those products originating from abroad, and is concerned that smart financiers will, if given the opportunity, take advantage of the system and of less financially literate investors for short-term gains. To that end, banking guidelines require the RBI's approval for all new bank branches to ensure that development needs are being met, especially the creation of larger rural banking networks, and the RBI scrutinizes the introduction of all new financial products. ¶12. (SBU) The previous RBI Governor, Y.V. Reddy (2002-2008) was noted -- and often criticized -- for his caution, conservatism, and perceived lack of transparency. Nevertheless, Reddy left a lasting legacy as a strong, and independent, central banker who presciently helped the Indian banking sector avoid much of the tumult of the global financial crisis. In 2005, Reddy, fearing a real estate asset bubble, required banks to raise their risk weight ratios for real estate loans, which curtailed some real estate lending and limited banks' exposure to a potential asset bubble. In addition, against the advice of the Finance Ministry which supported the creation of more innovative financial products, Reddy restricted the participation of banks in the derivative and asset securitization markets, arguing that the Indian financial system was not yet ready for many complicated financial products. In 2003, the RBI imposed tight restrictions on banks' ability to trade in interest derivatives which was then an exchange-traded product regulated by the capital market regulator, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). The RBI stipulated that trading in interest futures would be allowed only for hedging interest risk of their underlying government securities portfolio. He also refused to make other pro-cyclical moves, such as lowering interest rates, to forestall a borrowing boom and he placed restrictions on India's exposure to external commercial borrowings, which, while limiting short term growth, reduced Indian corporate exposure to foreign loans. Indeed, many of his most ardent critics have grudging praised him for ensuring India's relative isolation from the extremes of the financial crisis. THE RBI in Action: Management of the financial crisis -------------- ¶13. (U) The current RBI Governor, Duvvuri Subbarao, took over in September 2008, as the global financial crisis hit. The impact of the global financial crisis on India was initially disorienting, but its overall effect was ultimately much more moderate than other major economies. Through much of 2008, the RBI was concerned about rising commodity and oil costs and raised interest rates in order to stave off inflation. The Lehman collapse in September, however, caused an immediate tightening in global credit markets. Indian corporate borrowers - now unable to borrow in international markets - turned to local banks, most of whom were scaling back their lending due to concerns over the risks and viability of borrowers. This emergency borrowing - much of it for working capital - forced short-term rates to jump and squeezed out lending for many smaller companies, who were considered more risky. For some MUMBAI 00000373 005.2 OF 008 time, trade finance became difficult to secure, which coincided with a decrease in demand for India's exports. And finally, foreign portfolio investors began to pull out of India's equity markets, withdrawing USD 12.8 billion in a few months, and forcing the depreciation of the rupee to new lows. ¶14. (U) Recognizing India's vulnerability to the global credit crunch, the RBI took a number of measures to inject liquidity into the system, restore confidence in credit markets, and spur banks to lend. Over a number of weeks, the RBI significantly reduced its two policy interest rates, reduced the CRR, and lowered the SLR by one percent. These actions put together released nearly USD 50 billion in the economy. Simultaneously, the RBI sold dollars in the forex market to reduce pressure on a depreciating rupee. Due to a shortage of dollars in the forex market, RBI created a forex swap facility for banks having overseas branches. The RBI also created special facilities for mutual funds facing major redemptions, non-banking finance companies, and housing finance companies. All in all, these measures gradually restored confidence in Indian credit markets and helping India ride out the crisis, and demonstrated that the RBI had the ability to intervene quickly to protect the banking sector and credit markets. Foreign Banks -------------- ¶15. (SBU) The presence of foreign banks dates back to the pre-independence period, but foreign participation in the Indian banking system has expanded dramatically only in the last decade. From just a few foreign banks in 1999, there are currently 32 foreign banks operating in India, with over 293 branches, largely in urban areas, performing a wide range of services, from investment banking and asset management to retail and corporate banking. (Note: The RBI issues a single class of commercial banking license, so all banks, domestic or foreign, are able to offer the full scope of banking operations. End Note.) Foreign investment in a domestic private bank is capped at 74 percent of the bank's capital; no foreign institutional investor can hold more than 10 percent, and no bank can hold more than 5 percent, with voting rights capped at 10 per cent. Foreign direct investment in PSBs is subject to a statutory limit of 20 percent per bank. Some publicly traded Indian private banks, such as ICICI, HDFC Bank, Development Credit Bank and ING Vysya, are now technically majority foreign-owned. (Note: Currently, the foreign holding in ICICI Bank is 65.6 percent and in HDFC is 73.85 percent. End Note.) The prudential norms applicable to foreign banks for capital adequacy, income recognition and asset classification are, by and large, the same as for the Indian banks, and deposit insurance is provided by the Indian government to all savers. ¶16. (U) Foreign banks had a 5.9 percent share in total bank credit, while foreign banks accounted for 5.2 percent of total deposits. Foreign banks account for 7.5 percent of banking assets in India (unlike China, where foreign banks hold only about 2 percent of assets). However, foreign banks are more dominant in the off-balance sheet business - such as investment banking -- with a market share of as high as 77 percent. All private banks - both foreign and domestic -- have a combined market share in the deposits, advances and off-balance-sheet business of 23.4, 24.1 and 77 percent, respectively. Foreign banks are considerably more profitable than domestic state-owned banks as indicated by a higher return of assets. In 2008, foreign banks had a return of assets ratio of 2.57 as against 1.01 for nationalized banks and 0.86 for SBI and its associates. In line with these figures, we have been told repeatedly by American bank representatives that their operations in India are some of their most profitable globally. MUMBAI 00000373 006.2 OF 008 ¶17. (U) The RBI has the authority to review and approve the addition of any new bank branches, domestic or foreign, and foreign banks have long claimed that this policy is discriminatory and impedes India's economic development. In the WTO, India committed to permit 12 new bank branch licenses per year to foreign banks. Between 2004-2008, the RBI approved 59 new foreign bank branches. During the same period, however, the RBI approved the addition of 8525 new branches for domestic banks. However, foreign banks are exempt from some of the RBI's lending requirements. For instance, foreign banks must only allocate 32 percent of net credit to meet priority sector lending requirements, as compared to 40 percent for domestic banks, and are exempt from agriculture and "weaker section" lending mandates. In addition, foreign banks can classify export credit as priority sector lending, which is not permitted for domestic banks. Unlike their Indian competitors, there is also no regulatory compulsion for foreign banks to open branches in rural and semi-urban areas. In contrast, private banks in India must open one out of four branches in rural and semi-urban areas after their first five years of operation. The RBI's Philosophy: Liberal, Just, and Prudent -------------- --- ¶18. (SBU) Traditionally, RBI officials have argued that their policy on foreign bank branches is liberal, just, and prudent. First, liberal because the RBI has historically granted a few more branches than their WTO pledge required. Second, "just" because the RBI is motivated by principles of reciprocity, and is more inclined to approve branches for banks whose home markets are open to Indian banks. Third, prudent because as the final crisis shows, foreign banks engaged in highly risky practices that could have endangered the Indian financial system. More recently, the RBI has further justified this caution by pointing to the role of foreign banks in the global economic crisis, and the subsequent wave of government bailouts, collapses, or mergers. The RBI considers the risk appetites of many foreign banks to be unhealthy, and not in synch with the wider social mandates necessary in a developing country like India, such as rural lending and soft credit terms to avoid NPAs. (Note: So far, only one American bank - Citibank - has expressed interest in significantly expanding their branch network in India. End Note.) Reciprocity: The Key to More Branches? -------------- ¶19. (SBU) According to the RBI, it reviews the holistic strategy for bank branch openings on a yearly basis, and approves branches based on overall needs and the perceived sincerity of the bank's goals. Before the crisis changed the focus of many international banks, their leaders insisted that most foreign banks are keen to assist the RBI in its vision of financial inclusion, and offered to open rural branches, along with more lucrative urban ones. During the period when U.S. regulatory authorities were evaluating the applications of several India banks to open new branches in the U.S., the Indian government promised that further bank branches would be granted according to the principals of reciprocity. For instance, after signing the 2005 Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) with Singapore, the RBI allowed Singapore-based DBS bank to open 8 branches in India between July 2008 and June 2009. Simultaneously, Singapore's central bank allowed SBI to establish 4 branches, with more to follow. However, as U.K. government colleagues are quick to point out, the number of branches granted to English banks in India has not kept pace with Indian branches in the UK, much to their chagrin. MUMBAI 00000373 007.2 OF 008 The Indian Banking Sector of the Future: The Roadmap -------------- -------------- ¶20. (SBU) In February 2005, the RBI released its banking "Roadmap" which laid out the central bank's vision on the future development, equity structure, ownership, and governance of the banking sector. In the first phase, between 2005 and 2009, the RBI provided that foreign banks could operate in India through one of three channels: branches, wholly-owned subsidiaries, or subsidiaries with foreign investment of up to 74 percent in a private bank. During this phase, the RBI said that it would also permit individual foreign banks to take greater equity -- more than the five percent already allowed -- in "unhealthy" domestic banks, on a case by case basis. With the roadmap, the RBI expressed its intention to encourage the consolidation of the domestic banking industry - in other words, to promote the mergers of lacklustre, smaller, unhealthy private and public sector banks with bigger, healthier ones - as a precursor to gradually allowing more foreign participation in the Indian banking sector. The RBI pledged to review the implementation of these more liberal banking guidelines in 2009, and many foreign bankers expected that the RBI would implement new reforms and liberalization measures which would expand opportunities for foreign banks. ¶21. (SBU) However, in its update to the roadmap released in April 2009, the RBI decided against any additional reform measures, citing concerns over the benefits of greater participation of foreign banks in India and current global conditions, referring to the current financial crises. In the intervening five years, the RBI did not allow any foreign banks to takeover unhealthy local banks - never an appetizing offer to begin with, since foreign banks would prefer to invest in healthy banks as a matter of course - and the RBI was not able to engineer the consolidation of some of the most duplicative banks during this time period, largely due to opposition from bank employee unions, among other reasons - all problems that continue today. ¶22. (SBU) The RBI's vision of the Indian banking sector continues to be far more conservative than the Finance Ministry or Planning Commission would like. Two reports - the High Powered Expert Committee on Mumbai as an International Financial Center (2007 - known as the Mistry Report, after its Chairman, Percy Mistry) sponsored by the Finance Ministry, and the Raghuram Rajan Committee Report (2008) sponsored by the Planning Commission - both urged broader financial sector reforms, including further liberalization in the banking sector. The Mistry report, focused on an international dimension, and the Rajan report, focused on the domestic environment, both recommended inflation targeting, a floating exchange rate, the creation of liquid bond and derivative markets, and government equity divesture from inefficient PSBs, and advocated for `principles-based' regulation, rather than rules-based regulation. The Mistry Report also called for full capital account convertibility, while the Rajan Report made dozens of other small suggestions which would "tweak" markets in the right direction without shaking the system. The RBI, under Governor Reddy, largely ignored the findings of these two reports, and dismissed the idea of principles-based regulations. With Governor Subbarao, a former Finance Ministry official, at the helm, it is too soon to tell whether the RBI will take heed of the ideas in these reports. Already, interlocutors have noted that Subbarao has been considerably clearer and more transparent in his public monetary policy statements than his predecessor. MUMBAI 00000373 008.2 OF 008 Comment: Progress Will Be Slow, New Approaches Needed -------------- -------------- ¶23. (SBU) As the Indian banking system has liberalized, the competition created by the expansion of Indian private sector and foreign banks have spurred greater innovation and efficiency among the dominant public sector banks. Nevertheless, large numbers of unbanked citizens remain, with access to credit and financial products restricted to a relatively small section of India's population. The RBI has exerted prudent, but conservative, oversight over the banking sector, favoring price stability and gradualism over growth and rapid change. The RBI - and many in the Indian financial sector - believes that the central bank's caution in restricting the expansion of foreign banks, overseas borrowing, and complicated financial products was instrumental in India's avoidance of the worst excesses of the financial crisis. Moreover, the RBI believes that foreign banks, in particular, have little to offer India by way of domestic credit, financial inclusion, and rural banking, three of the central bank's biggest priorities. By allowing slow, gradual reform over the course of many years, the RBI wants to ensure that Indian banks - especially laggard state-run ones -- will be competitive with foreign banks when more access is given. In doing so, the RBI believes it can influence the practices of the Indian banks to ensure that they fulfill the country's development priorities. Therefore, USG arguments that greater financial sector liberalization will promote India's overall development goals will continue to fall on deaf ears at the RBI. Instead, moving forward, we should remain focused on the needs of the wider U.S. financial services sector - and other areas, such as infrastructure finance - where some progress can be made. We should also tie our arguments to clearly stated Government of India or RBI priorities where possibly. End Comment. FOLMSBEE