PRESSING RUSSIA TO ASSIST US IN AFGHANISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000985

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID MARR AF RU
SUBJECT: PRESSING RUSSIA TO ASSIST US IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. MOSCOW 746

B. MOSCOW 416

C. MOSCOW 833

D. MOSCOW 818

E. WASKIN TO YATES EMAIL 04/06/09

F. STATE 31102

G. MOSCOW 329

Classified By: DCM Eric Rubin for reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: Significant Russian assistance to stabilize
Afghanistan remains a possibility that will require continued
engagement by the U.S. Our dialogue with Russia has produced
some positive results, with the GOR allowing the transit of
non-military material to ISAF and offering to expand this to
include lethal equipment, but many of our proposed areas for
cooperation remain stalled. While expressing willingness to
donate military equipment to Afghanistan, Russia continues to
press for weapons sales. Russian interest in rebuilding
Afghan infrastructure has not moved forward quickly, and
Moscow keeps suggesting that others provide the funding.
Russia's interest in contributing to Afghanistan is partially
driven by its desire to use the issue to gauge the state of
Russia-U.S. relations. In that regard, the GOR has proposed
creating a special mechanism to sustain a bilateral dialogue
on Afghanistan. An Afghanistan sub-group within the CTWG or
the security issues framework may provide us with an
appropriate forum to press Moscow to put its money where its
mouth is, and start providing more concrete assistance to
Afghanistan. End summary.

Engaging Russia on Afghanistan
--------------


2. (C) The MFA told us that FM Lavrov came away from his
March 6 meeting with the Secretary impressed with the
Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategic Review, and that he submitted
to President Medvedev a formal proposal to expand Russian
cooperation with the U.S. and NATO (ref A). The U.S. and
Russia also held bilateral consultations on Afghanistan
February 10, and the U.S. attended the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization's (SCO) March 27 conference on Afghanistan in
Moscow, the first formal U.S. engagement with the SCO (refs B
and C). Such efforts have had positive results, with the GOR
offering to expand the NATO transit agreement to include
military and lethal equipment bound for ISAF. Moscow
considers the transit agreement a significant contribution to
Afghanistan, and has used it to argue that Russia should be
included in meetings of contributors to ISAF, which includes
non-troop contributing countries and international
organizations.


3. (C) Our efforts to date show that turning Moscow's
rhetoric into reality is difficult. Despite repeated U.S.
explanations that nearly all weapons supplied to Afghanistan
have been donated, the GOR keeps pressing for Russian weapons
purchases by the U.S. or others (refs B and D). Earlier
Russian enthusiasm to reconstruct Afghan infrastructure has
become lukewarm, and our encouragement for Russian firms to
bid on contracts to rebuild Soviet-era facilities has been
met by GOR suggestions that USAID award these contracts to
Russia as a political gesture (refs B and E). Efforts to get
Russia to be more responsive to delisting requests in the UN
1267 Committee have been met by insistence that more
information on the subjects be provided.


4. (C) When we recently delivered ref E non-paper requesting
specific contributions to Afghanistan to MFA Afghan desk
chief Vitaliy Rugalyov, he explained that Moscow views
Afghanistan through the prism of its relationship with
Washington, and sees our expanded engagement on the issue
primarily as an indicator of improved bilateral ties. We
explained to Rugalyov that while the U.S. recognizes
cooperation with Russia on Afghanistan as a significant means
to improve our relationship, the U.S. priority is stabilizing
a country to which we are about to commit over 17,000
additional troops, and our engagement with Russia on this
issue is intended to help gather additional resources to
accomplish this goal.

Cold War Thinking Blocks Russian Aid
--------------


5. (C) Rugalyov told us that a Cold War mentality existed
among influential figures in the Russian military and
security establishment that caused them to recommend against
assisting the stabilization of Afghanistan, which would be a
form of assistance to the U.S. They see Afghanistan as an
"occupied country" and an "American project." These
individuals argue that sending military or civilian

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assistance to Afghanistan will end up in U.S. hands.
Rugalyov said that he was shocked to hear how openly these
views were expressed within segments of the GOR, and believed
that some of these individuals genuinely want the U.S. to
fail in Afghanistan. Rugalyov contended that the MFA stood
in opposition to these unreformed cold warriors. FM Lavrov
is an articulate proponent of the need for Russia to assist
the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan, and Medvedev was
sympathetic to his argument. This way of thinking about
Afghanistan, and cooperation with the U.S. in general, was in
the ascendancy, especially as bilateral relations improved.
Rugalyov recommended that the best way for the U.S. to help
support Lavrov's argument, and Medvedev's inclination, for
Russia to play a role in Afghanistan is for Washington to
continue its high-level engagement with Moscow on the issue.

Russia Wants a Special Dialogue
--------------


6. (C) Rugalyov informed us that the GOR was interested in
establishing a formal mechanism for dialogue on Afghanistan
that could facilitate Russian assistance. Such a mechanism
was included in Lavrov's recent proposal to Medvedev to
expand cooperation on Afghanistan. (Note: DFM Borodavkin
expressed a similar idea to SCA DAS for Afghanistan Moon
during their February 10 meeting, ref G.) When we suggested
the NATO-Russia Council as an appropriate forum, Rugalyov
stressed that Moscow saw the U.S. as the real decision-maker
on Afghan issues and desired direct dialogue with Washington.
Moscow is looking for a "signal" that the U.S. wants, and
values, Russian cooperation on Afghanistan beyond the
consultations already held. In addition to creating a
permanent mechanism for discussion, Rugalyov suggested that
Washington make "a political decision" to award an
infrastructure rehabilitation project, even a small one, to a
Russian firm, to help overcome Russian reluctance to engage
more directly in the country.

Infrastructure Rehabilitation
--------------


7. (C) Rugalyov cast doubt upon the interest, or ability, of
Russian companies to undertake USAID-funded infrastructure
reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, citing their concern
over security and lack of understanding of the USG
contracting process. He agreed with the suggestion made by
MFA Department for International Organizations Deputy
Director Dmitri Maksimichev to USAID Moscow Director Waskin
during their March 16 meeting that the U.S. give the contract
to rehabilitate the Salang Tunnel to the Russian firm
Zarubezhtransstroi without competitive bidding because it is
best qualified to do the work as the company that built the
tunnel during the Soviet period (ref E). Rugalyov advised
that the company had all the original plans for the tunnel,
and would not make them available without getting the
contract.

Russian Development Assistance
--------------


8. (C) Rugalyov doubted that the GOR would begin a
large-scale development assistance program for Afghanistan in
the near future, and would continue to provide modest
deliveries of wheat and other in-kind assistance through the
Russian Ministry of Civil Defense and Emergency Situations.
This year, in honor of the twentieth anniversary of the
withdrawal of the last Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the
Ministry plans to ship 7,000 tons of wheat and provide
vehicles, including 50 Kamaz trucks for the central
government in Kabul and two fire-fighting vehicles to the
Balkh provincial government. In March, the Ministry sent 40
metric tons of aid, including foodstuffs, clothing and tents,
some of which was supplied by a Russian veterans'
organization. Rugalyov explained that funding for aid
deliveries came from the GOR's general fund and not
ministerial budgets. Russia is skeptical of large
development projects such as road building, which, Rugalyov
argued, are seen by Afghans as a means to assist ISAF's fight
against insurgents. The GOR prefers small projects that have
a direct impact on the lives of ordinary people, and will
provide limited funding for local health and education
programs.

Military Assistance in the form of AK-47s
--------------


9. (C) Rugalyov explained that the MFA has been pushing for
significant GOR assistance to the Afghan military, but has
been stymied by the MOD's preference for arms sales. He
shrugged off any suggestion that Russia could come through

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with the $200 million in military assistance for the Afghan
army that the MFA has been talking about since 2007. The MFA
was optimistic that Russia would provide 50,000 AK-47s
requested recently by the Afghan MOI, and recommended
providing an initial batch of weapons as a donation. The
issue currently stood with the MOD; if it blocked the AK-47s,
FM Lavrov intended to appeal the decision to Medvedev.
Rugalyov explained that the MOD was concerned that there is
no mechanism in place to ensure the proper use of the AK-47s,
fearing that some might be sold by the Afghans or fall into
the hands of extremists. We reiterated the U.S.
recommendation that all military transfers to the Afghans be
coordinated through CSTC-A, which would ensure the proper
storage and use of these weapons.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) Although Russia claims an equal seat at the table on
high-profile foreign policy issues, it has yet to pony up the
commensurate resources, reserving assistance for counties
where it perceives Russia's major interests lie, such as
post-Soviet states. Moscow also sees the assistance it has
provided to Afghanistan through the transit agreement as a
significant contribution justifying special recognition from
the U.S. Therefore, we will have to keep up the pressure to
encourage Russia to follow through on additional assistance.
We recommend establishing a bilateral working-level
Afghanistan sub-group, under the CTWG or the security issues
framework, to continue the dialogue already underway between
Moscow and Washington to push forward specific areas of
Russian military and development assistance to Afghanistan.
This should be complemented by high-level visits by Special
Representative Holbrooke and General Petraeus.
BEYRLE