INDEPENDENT UNIONS FACE PRESSURE AND VIOLENCE FROM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000925 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/RUS, DRL NSC FOR ELLISON DOL FOR BRUMFIELD E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2019 TAGS: ELAB ECON EIND PHUM PGOV SOCI RS SUBJECT: INDEPENDENT UNIONS FACE PRESSURE AND VIOLENCE FROM GOR AND EMPLOYERS Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Two of Russia's major, independent labor confederations will merge this summer to strengthen their position in terms of resources and membership. Independent labor unions face aggressive opposition from local authorities and employers in attempting to protect workers' rights. Independent union representatives have suffered six attacks, including two attempted murders, since last fall. The GOR is trying to weaken these unions by setting up and funding alternative organizations. Furthermore, independent unions lack access to management level discussions on companies, strategies to deal with the crisis. Meanwhile, the major labor umbrella organization is hesitant to seek reform owing to its close affiliation with the GOR. Experts predict an increase in the number of strikes in 2009 compared to 2008. However, Russian workers' preference for resolving disputes directly with employers or through the courts, as opposed to striking or protesting, indicates widespread unrest is unlikely absent a significant deterioration in their living situation. End summary. -------------- INDEPENDENT UNION CONFEDERATIONS TO MERGE -------------- ¶2. (C) Russia's two major independent labor organizations, the Confederation of Labor of Russia (KTR) and the All-Russia Confederation of Labor (VKT) plan to merge by July 2009, according to KTR President Alexander Shepel. VKT consists of four nationwide and three interregional unions with approximately 1.2 million members. KTR has four nationwide and five interregional unions as well as four territorial organizations, totaling around 900,000 members. The primary objective of the merger is the consolidation of resources and networks so as to counter what the VKT and KTR leadership perceive as a growing tendency by the GOR, local administrations, and the management of some major corporations to suppress independent union activity during the economic crisis. -------------- AUTHORITIES PRESSURE, DIVIDE UNIONS... -------------- ¶3. (C) President of the All-Russia Confederation of Labor Boris Kravchenko and other independent labor experts reported that local authorities were using violent methods to silence labor union activists. Kravchenko told us on March 5 that six attacks on union representatives, including two attempted murders, had taken place in the previous three months. Unidentified assailants beat up Evgeniy Ivanov, leader of the General Motors (GM) St. Petersburg chapter of the Interregional Trade Union of Auto Industry Workers (MPRA),as he was leaving his apartment on February 8. Ivanov sustained a skull injury and a concussion along with numerous bruises. Prior to the incident, Ivanov received several phone calls threatening his family should he fail to cease his union activities. Kravchenko claimed that the assault was organized by the St. Petersburg "Office for Combating Extremism," a shadowy organization he believed was linked to the Internal Forces (MVD). Similar incidents took place in Togliatti and Taganrog. ¶4. (C) Kravchenko alleged that the GOR was attempting to divide and weaken the independent labor movement by setting up alternative, competing "yellow8 unions. He contended that the GOR assisted these groups with funds allocated for civil society development and concluded "political agreements" with them. In October 2008, one of Russia's umbrella labor organizations, the All-Russia Union of Labor Unions (Sotsprof)- with close ties to the GOR - concluded a political protocol with the United Russia Party and also received a 1.8 million ruble civil society support grant. Kravchenko said Sotsprof has set up its own auto-manufacturing unions at Ford and GM plants in Vsevolozhsk and Saint Petersburg to compete with existing chapters of the MPRA. He added that the GOR was trying to establish a similar "yellow union8 at the Hyundai plant in St. Petersburg. MOSCOW 00000925 002 OF 003 -------------- ..AND SOME EMPLOYERS TURN ON THE HEAT -------------- ¶5. (C) Kravchenko claimed that employers (often with the backing of local governments) put indirect pressure on union members and labor activists. For example, he said employers tended to put union members' names at the top of lists of employees slated to be laid off, and made particular reference to the GM and GM-AvtoVaz plants in St. Petersburg and Togliatti. MPRA's Evgeniy Ivanov claimed in a recent internet interview that GM had intentionally closed two production facilities where union activity was perceived to be the strongest, transferring some of the employees and putting them on part-time work schedules. (Note: In a conversation with us, a local GM executive vehemently denied that their company engaged in anti-union pressure tactics, and contended that GM was fully cooperating with labor unions. Likewise, a Ford Motor Company Russia official told us Ford did not condone violence or discrimination against its employees and maintained an open relationship with the unions in accordance with the company's worldwide policy. Other labor experts confirmed to us that Ford's relations with the MPRA were exemplary, noting they were an exception to the norm in Russia. End Note.) ¶6. (C) Independent labor unions in Russia are unable to influence corporate decisions regarding anti-crisis measures. KTR's President Alexander Shepel said his unions have been shut out of discussions with management on addressing the current economic crisis. In a March 16 meeting with us, Elena Gerasimova and Eduard Vokhmin of the Center for Social and Labor Rights (CSLR) claimed enterprises often implemented lay-offs without discussing with unions the economic or managerial rationale for their decisions, let alone offering alternatives. They also emphasized unions' lack of access to information on companies' financial standing (i.e. revenues, sales, management bonuses, etc.) in both the public and private sectors. -------------- THE FECKLESS FNPR -------------- ¶7. (C) The Federation of Independent Unions of Russia (FNPR), heir to the Soviet-era All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and Russia's largest labor organization, is limited in its ability to press for reform owing to its close connections with the government and the major employers, according to many of our labor contacts. (Note: The FNPR is the labor arm of the Tripartite Commission with the GOR and the Union of Industrialists set up to conduct collective bargaining on wages, etc. End Note.) CSLR's Gerasimova and Vokhmin criticized the FNPR for collaborating with the GOR and its reluctance to address the economic crisis proactively. They compared the situation today to the 1990s, when the FNPR and other unions focused on survival instead of advancing strong labor programs. -------------- LIMITED WORKER SUPPORT FOR STRIKES -------------- ¶8. (C) CSLR monitoring of protest activity revealed an increase in the number of strikes in 2008, and Gerasimova and Vokhmin expected an additional increase in 2009. KTR's Shepel concurred. However, Gerasimova and Vokhmin noted workers generally resorted to striking only in desperate situations (i.e. not receiving a paycheck for six months). Only four percent of Russians agreed with defending labor rights through strikes and protests, according to a "Tsirkon8 research group survey in December 2008. Thirty-five percent preferred to solve problems in consultation with management, while thirty-three percent considered appeals to the courts more effective. Also, workers' fear of losing their jobs - especially during the slowdown - was a disincentive to strike, further eroding labor unions' bargaining position with management. ¶9. (C) In addition to limited support from workers, administrative barriers impede civic action to defend workers' rights. Kravchenko contended legal strikes, although theoretically possible under the labor code, were practically impossible to carry out owing to innumerable bureaucratic obstacles. Local authorities were able to find MOSCOW 00000925 003 OF 003 an administrative reason to deny a request for a demonstration whenever it suited them, he maintained. Kravchenko cited the GOR's successful deterrence of a strike against AvtoVaz last summer, in which the regional governor intervened to prevent the action. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) In the current economic and political environment, labor unions are unlikely to facilitate significant improvements in workers' rights or living conditions. FNPR, which remains the main representative of labor to the GOR, is supportive of the GOR's anti-crisis measures and advocates resolving labor and wage disputes through a dialogue with management rather than strike activity. The smaller, independent unions are clearly unable to exert significant influence on management decisions, and are often perceived as a political threat by the authorities. Government motivated threats and assaults against their activists further inhibit independent unions. Continued economic decline in terms of rising unemployment and falling incomes could change workers' views on the appropriateness of strikes and protests. However, even the severe decline in workers' living conditions in the 1990s, during which time FNPR, VKT, and KTR were all active, failed to compel workers to press for the reforms that might have improved their situation today. End Comment. BEYRLE