Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW890
2009-04-07 14:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIAN APPROACH ON NORTH KOREA MISSILE LAUNCH

Tags:  PREL PARM KNNP KN RS 
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VZCZCXRO1673
PP RUEHDBU RUEHTRO
DE RUEHMO #0890 0971420
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071420Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2777
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4476
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 2779
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4235
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0474
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000890 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP KN RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN APPROACH ON NORTH KOREA MISSILE LAUNCH
UNCHANGED

REF: STATE 33031

Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Margaret Hawthorne f
or reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000890

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP KN RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN APPROACH ON NORTH KOREA MISSILE LAUNCH
UNCHANGED

REF: STATE 33031

Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Margaret Hawthorne f
or reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Poloff met with MFA First Asia Department Senior
Counselor Igor Sagitov and North Americas Department
Counselor Aleksandr Shilin on April 7 to deliver the reftel
points on the need for a strong, unified UN Security Council
response to the April 5 DPRK launch of the Taepo-Dong 2
long-range missile. The Russian diplomats indicated that the
GOR approach had not changed since the April 6 phone call
between the Secretary and FM Lavrov, and that new
instructions to its UN mission were unlikely.


2. (C) Sagitov stressed, however, that while the U.S. and
Russia differed in approach, we shared the same goal of
preventing nuclear and missile technology proliferation. To
that end, he stated, the GOR believed the best way to address
North Korean non-proliferation and denuclearization issues
was through the Six-Party Talks. He appealed to the U.S. not
to jeopardize the Six-Party process--"North Korea is waiting
for a Security Council resolution as an excuse to derail
Six-Party"--and to focus bilateral cooperation efforts on
ways to move it forward.


3. (C) In Sagitov's view, the North Korea missile issue has
three aspects. With regard to the technical aspect, Russian
experts have not collected enough data to make a definitive
judgment, despite the Russian General Staff's public
announcement that no satellite was detected to have entered
orbit from the launch. The GOR would therefore welcome any
information that the U.S. could share. With regard to the
legal aspect, Sagitov said we were working closely together
in New York but were unlikely to resolve the differences in
our interpretations of UNSCR 1718 in the next few days. He
therefore urged more focus on the political aspect, keeping
the channel of communication open between Washington and
Moscow.


4. (C) Judging from readouts from our British and Japanese
colleagues, the MFA is maintaining a consistent "wait and
see" approach. In his April 5 phone conversation with the
Japanese Foreign Minister, Lavrov reportedly stated that
while Russia shared Japan's concern regarding the DPRK
missile launch's impact on peace and security in the region,
the international community's response should be based on
objective parameters after a thorough checking of the facts.
We understand Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Grushko told
the British Embassy the same thing today, adding that further
sanctions would not be effective and that a strong UNSC
response would jeopardize the Six-Party Talks.
BEYRLE