Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW890
2009-04-07 14:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIAN APPROACH ON NORTH KOREA MISSILE LAUNCH

Tags:  PREL PARM KNNP KN RS 
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VZCZCXRO1673
PP RUEHDBU RUEHTRO
DE RUEHMO #0890 0971420
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071420Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2777
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4476
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 2779
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4235
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0474
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000890 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP KN RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN APPROACH ON NORTH KOREA MISSILE LAUNCH
UNCHANGED

REF: STATE 33031

Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Margaret Hawthorne f
or reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000890 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019 TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP KN RS SUBJECT: RUSSIAN APPROACH ON NORTH KOREA MISSILE LAUNCH UNCHANGED REF: STATE 33031 Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Margaret Hawthorne f or reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Poloff met with MFA First Asia Department Senior Counselor Igor Sagitov and North Americas Department Counselor Aleksandr Shilin on April 7 to deliver the reftel points on the need for a strong, unified UN Security Council response to the April 5 DPRK launch of the Taepo-Dong 2 long-range missile. The Russian diplomats indicated that the GOR approach had not changed since the April 6 phone call between the Secretary and FM Lavrov, and that new instructions to its UN mission were unlikely. ¶2. (C) Sagitov stressed, however, that while the U.S. and Russia differed in approach, we shared the same goal of preventing nuclear and missile technology proliferation. To that end, he stated, the GOR believed the best way to address North Korean non-proliferation and denuclearization issues was through the Six-Party Talks. He appealed to the U.S. not to jeopardize the Six-Party process--"North Korea is waiting for a Security Council resolution as an excuse to derail Six-Party"--and to focus bilateral cooperation efforts on ways to move it forward. ¶3. (C) In Sagitov's view, the North Korea missile issue has three aspects. With regard to the technical aspect, Russian experts have not collected enough data to make a definitive judgment, despite the Russian General Staff's public announcement that no satellite was detected to have entered orbit from the launch. The GOR would therefore welcome any information that the U.S. could share. With regard to the legal aspect, Sagitov said we were working closely together in New York but were unlikely to resolve the differences in our interpretations of UNSCR 1718 in the next few days. He therefore urged more focus on the political aspect, keeping the channel of communication open between Washington and Moscow. ¶4. (C) Judging from readouts from our British and Japanese colleagues, the MFA is maintaining a consistent "wait and see" approach. In his April 5 phone conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Lavrov reportedly stated that while Russia shared Japan's concern regarding the DPRK missile launch's impact on peace and security in the region, the international community's response should be based on objective parameters after a thorough checking of the facts. We understand Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Grushko told the British Embassy the same thing today, adding that further sanctions would not be effective and that a strong UNSC response would jeopardize the Six-Party Talks. BEYRLE

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