RUSSIA'S ECONOMY: STABILITY OR THE EYE OF THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 000859 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2019 TAGS: ECON EFIN PGOV RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S ECONOMY: STABILITY OR THE EYE OF THE STORM? REF: REF A: MOSCOW 160 REF B: MOSCOW 534 Classified By: DCM Eric Rubin, Reasons 1.4 (b/d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The Russian economy shows signs of having stabilized in recent weeks, with oil prices edging up, the ruble stable, and a rally in the Russian stock markets. Deputy Prime Minister Shuvalov bullishly proclaimed last week that the economy had reached bottom and predicted a recovery by the end of 2009. This past weekend, Deputy Central Bank Head Ulukayev said the GOR had restored macroeconomic stability and was contemplating reducing interest rates to speed recovery. Presidential Assistant Dvorkovich and Finance Minister Kudrin, however, struck a more pessimistic stance in public, noting that the downturn could last as long as two years. Kudrin in particular was bearish, noting that the Russian banking sector was facing a second wave of problems driven by the rapidly increasing number of non-performing loans (NPLs) on the banks' books. Most, though not all, of our contacts in academia and the financial sector share Kudrin's concerns, citing in addition to a second banking crisis doubts over the sustainability of the recent rise in oil prices, continuing concerns over capital outflows, and other negative indicators, such as retail sales -- which turned negative in February for the first time in years. End Summary. -------------- Signs of Stability -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Russian economy appears to have stabilized in the last month. The steady climb of oil prices since the beginning of the year has been a key driver; the per-barrel price of Russian oil (Urals blend) has climbed from $32 to almost $50. The ruble, which had lost approximately one-third of its value against a dollar-euro currency basket between November 2008 and late January (Ref A),has held steady since January without visible CBR intervention. In the last few weeks the ruble actually appreciated against the bi-currency dollar/euro basket (driven largely by dollar weakness) leading the CBR to purchase dollars to slow the ruble's appreciation. Russians' confidence in the ruble may also be returning, as evidenced by increases in ruble bank deposits this year. ¶3. (SBU) The country's main stock indices, which lost more than 70 percent of their value by the end of 2008, have also strengthened and some foreign investment has begun to return, albeit so far only small amounts. The ruble-denominated Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX) is up 35 percent year-to-date, and the dollar denominated benchmark Russian Trading System (RTS) is up about 15 percent, although they are still far below their levels of last summer, before the Georgia conflict sparked capital outflow and a stock market collapse. A $3.3 billion budget surplus through February, due to reduced expenditures (a side effect of the delay in revising the 2009 budget),and steady international reserves of $388 billion as of March 27 have also helped project an image of restored stability. -------------- Optimists versus Pessimists -------------- ¶4. (SBU) These positive indicators have led some officials and economic analysts to make hopeful pronouncements about the end of the downturn for Russia. First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov last week stated publicly that the worst was over for the Russian economy. Shuvalov went so far as to predict that by 2020 Russia would be the best place in the world to live. Deputy Chairman of the CBR Alexei Ulukayev added his voice to the chorus of optimism, also claiming that the sharpest phase of the crisis was over. Ulukayev cited in particular the return of foreign money to Russian stock markets, which he maintained would result in capital outflows in 2009 less than the $83 billion assumed in the revised federal budget. Ulukayev also said the ruble was likely to continue strengthening and could reach 32 to the dollar this year, well below the 35:1 level assumed in the revised budget. The stronger ruble would in turn allow the CBR to cut interest rates as a spur to growth; something that MOSCOW 00000859 002 OF 005 critics on the right, including Moscow Mayor Luzhkov, have been calling for. Ulukayev did acknowledge a problem with bad loans but said that as long as they do not exceed 10 percent of total loans, the banking system should be able to cope without major difficulties and without widespread bankruptcies. ¶5. (C) In stark contrast to the optimism of Shuvalov and Ulukayev, Presidential Assistant Dvorkovich and Finance Minister Kudrin sounded pessimistic notes in public, both warning that the Russian economy may have yet to hit bottom and that Russia could be facing an extended downturn that might last several years. Kudrin was particularly bearish, warning that the rally in oil prices might be temporary and that a rising tide of NPLs could lead to a &second wave8 of problems in Russia's financial sector. Kudrin has moderated his position this week, saying that growth in the fourth quarter was possible, but likely did so to paper over the public disagreement within the government. -------------- -------------- Analysts Split, but Majority Side with Pessimists -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) In support of Shuvalov, Renaissance Capital's Managing Director for Strategy Roland Nash claimed in a recent research note that prices for many of Russia's commodity exports appeared to have bottomed out. Nash expressed optimism that, because oil and industrial metals prices had not continued to fall since the beginning of the year, the economy's U-shaped recovery was imminent. Troika Dialog's respected Chief Economist, Evgeniy Gavrilenkov, has also been expressing optimism for several weeks that the stability of the ruble should prompt an import substitution effect that could lead to GDP growth of 3 percent this year as Russian industries increase production for domestic consumption and for export. ¶7. (C) Deutsche Bank's Chief Economist Yaroslav Lissovolik also told us he was an optimist, convinced that the government's anti-crisis program and import substitution brought on by the ruble devaluation would moderate the recession. Lissovolik added that as oil prices remained stable, the ruble would also remain stable. Lissovolik said he was also encouraged by the return of foreign investors to the Russian stock markets, even if they were bargain-hunting. Capital outflows appeared to have stopped and the debt situation appeared to have improved. Lissovolik acknowledged the possibility of a banking crisis, but argued that the government still had enough resources to bail out key individual banks if need be. ¶8. (C) However, most of our other regular contacts in academic and analytical circles side with Kudrin and Dvorkovich. They attributed the stability of the ruble to tight liquidity, which has exacerbated the downturn, and to government pressure on local currency traders not to speculate, nor to help anyone else speculate, against the ruble or risk their banks being cut-off from government support and suggested that these policies were not sustainable over time. In addition, these analysts focused on the possibility of a crisis in the banking sector, the uncertainty of a sustained rise in oil prices, the likelihood of continuing capital outflows, and falling retail sales as some of the reasons to believe the Russian economy has yet to hit bottom and will contract further. -------------- Banking Sector: Round Two -------------- ¶9. (C) Alfa Bank President Petr Aven underscored the depth of the problems in the financial sector in an interview with the Financial Times in which he said NPLs were likely to reach 15-20 percent and that many banks would consequently be at risk of bankruptcy. Uralsib's Chris Weafer, who worked with Aven at Alfa until 2006, told us Aven rarely gives interviews of this sort and only does so when he has something important that he wants to convey. In this case, Weafer said, Aven was signaling the need for a second round of government bailouts for the banking sector. Weafer said his own bank and Alfa, the two largest independent Russian banks, would be in trouble if NPLs reached 15 percent and would be &toast8 if they hit 20 percent. In an interview this week with the Russian press, Aven went even further, suggesting that the Russian Government should recapitalize Alfa Bank by taking a MOSCOW 00000859 003 OF 005 minority stake in the company. ¶10. (C) Aven's current employee, Alfa's Chief Economist Natalia Orlova, was one of the first analysts to draw attention to the problem of rising NPLs in a provocative note she wrote in early March (with Aven's blessing according to Weafer),in which she said NPLs, driven by the recession, would be the next big crisis to engulf the Russian economy. Expanding on her note, Orlova told us that rising NPLs were a major risk for the market because the overwhelming share of the debt Russian corporations owe is short-term. Orlova said the combination of $220 billion due in the next 12 months -- much of which is dollar-denominated -- and declining GDP would push the share of NPLs to 15 percent or more, potentially requiring an estimated $90 billion in recapitalization of the banking sector. ¶11. (C) Sergei Guriev, Rector at the New Economic School is another regular contact who believes the banking sector is in deep trouble. Guriev said the GOR had succeeded in avoiding panic and in rescuing the banking sector last fall, but at great cost, and he questioned whether the GOR had sufficient resources to recapitalize banks again. He told us that most Russian banks were already insolvent, with increasing percentages of their loans non-performing. Sberbank, where he serves as a member of the board, for instance held construction-related real estate collateral with a book value of $100 billion which, if marked to market, would be worth only 30 cents on the dollar. That said, Sberbank was at least competently run according to Guriev. German Gref was attempting to strengthen the bank's bottom-line by limiting problematic loans, despite government pressure. Guriev offered a harsher critique of VTB, the second-largest bank, calling it a "zombie bank" that was serving as the GOR's ATM with little consideration for the quality of its loans. Guriev concluded that the banking sector was highly vulnerable to shocks and that the GOR would ultimately have to decide which banks to save. ¶12. (C) Citibank Russia President Zdenek Turek also expressed concern at the state of the banking sector, telling us that despite the expenditure of more than $200 billion in international reserves to preserve confidence in the banking system, banks were nevertheless poorly equipped to support the GOR's crisis mitigation tactics. He said "the Russian Government might have won the battle but could still lose the war," and echoed Guriev,s concern that the GOR no longer appeared to have the resources needed to recapitalize the sector. -------------- Oil Price: Critical but Unreliable Factor -------------- ¶13. (C) Most of our contacts, whether optimistic or pessimistic, see the price of oil as the key variable in Russia's economy. Lissovolik, for instance, acknowledged that the Russian economy had proven far more dependent on oil than he would have said was the case a year ago. He said a sustained increase in oil prices might not lead to growth, which would require a global recovery, but it would strengthen the government's financial position by restoring revenues from oil and gas taxes -- the single largest source of government financing. It would also strengthen the ruble, which Lissovolik called a "petro-currency." ¶14. (C) However, most of our contacts, share Kudrin's view that the current rise in prices is likely temporary. Weafer provided the clearest analysis of this point-of-view, noting that there were questions on both the supply and demand side of the equation that argued for a short-term fall in oil prices, with Urals again falling toward $30 a barrel. Weafer said that OPEC had done better than usual in reducing supplies earlier this year. However, at the most recent OPEC meeting, he said, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states had refused to go along with further cuts unless other countries, including Russia, shared the pain. This was likely to result in increased stocks, he said, which would put downward pressure on prices. On the demand side, Weafer argued that the summer driving season in the U.S. would be key. If it failed to support OPEC,s demand projections, which he thought likely given the extent of the economic slowdown in the U.S., the result would be much reduced demand and still more downward pressure on prices. Weafer said prices would likely rise again later in the year, but that a summer drop would be a major blow to Russia,s economy at a time when it MOSCOW 00000859 004 OF 005 was already reeling. -------------- Negative Capital Account -------------- ¶15. (C) Yet another negative trend that most of our contacts believe is still eating away at Russia,s macroeconomic position is the likelihood of a highly negative capital account. As we have reported previously, Higher School of Economics Professor, and former CBR Deputy Chairman, Sergei Aleksashenko told us that the capital account could be as much as $200 billion in the red this year. The World Bank,s latest report on the Russian economy sees capital outflows this year of $170 billion. ¶16. (C) However, Russia's external debt situation appears to be improving as the GOR has moved decisively in the last two months to press banks and companies to restructure debts (septel). Citi's Turek said the GOR understood that it no longer had the funds to help Russian corporations manage their foreign debts and had sent a clear message not to count on GOR for help but instead to restructure. Lissovolik called restructuring one of the "themes" of the second quarter of 2009 and said that the government policy appeared to be bearing fruit. The most recent CBR data appeared to show that a large amount of external debt had been rolled over in recent weeks. ¶17. (C) However, Turek noted that if this approach proved unsuccessful, the GOR really had no plan B other than to let the ruble go. If it imposed capital controls, it would kill any prospect of the ruble emerging as a reserve currency. If it tried to borrow, it would be able to raise at most $7-10 billion internationally, which would do very little to counter capital outflows. And, if it tried to support the ruble with reserves, it risked its investment rating. Turek argued that longer-term the best approach for the government to its debt situation would be to attract new foreign capital through improved transparency and reduced corruption. -------------- Retail Sales Plunging -------------- ¶18. (C) Another key indicator that appears to herald a further contraction is retail sales, which have remained relatively strong throughout the first part of the crisis and have thereby helped to moderate the downturn. However, after surprising many analysts with positive year-on-year results in January, retail sales fell in February -- the first time since 1998 according to Weafer -- and are expected to decline further as the Russian consumer continues to cut back. Alfa's Orlova told us that while the first blow to the economy came from capital outflows, which since August have exceeded $300 billion, the second blow would come from a sharp slowdown in consumption. ¶19. (C) Lissovolik and Gavrilenkov agreed that retail sales were likely to fall in the near-term but argued that later in the year the government,s anti-crisis program would restore some of the missing demand and that by the fourth quarter, sales would be positive once more. In addition, both claimed that an import substitution effect would also help maintain consumer spending and employment. However, Orlova and the other analysts told us that the combination of a 20-30 percent reduction in private sector salaries since November 2008, 15 percent inflation, and the devaluation of the ruble would sharply contract retail sales deep into the year. This in turn would lead to a more severe downturn than the GOR was forecasting (Guriev said 10 percent) and would lead to what Weafer, Orlova, and Guriev all predicted would be a spike in unemployment by the summer, putting still more strain on the government,s dwindling resources. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶20. (C) Much as in the U.S., there is a genuine debate both within the government and in the financial community as to whether the economy has bottomed out or whether Russia is simply in the midst of a "bear market rally." In this context, GOR efforts to talk up the economy are understandable and defensible. At the same time, so is Kudrin's more cautious, conservative approach. At some point MOSCOW 00000859 005 OF 005 this winter, the GOR,s principal economic officials realized, as Weafer put it, that they are in "a marathon not a sprint" and that husbanding the government's resources, especially its remaining reserves, was essential if Russia were to manage the recession without major dislocations. It remains to be seen whether this realization came too late. If Russia is in the eye of the storm, as we suspect, then it may not have enough resources, despite its initially strong fiscal position, to ride out the storm. End Comment. BEYRLE