RUSSIA-TURKEY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: NO ZERO-SUM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000834 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ENRG RS TU AJ AM SUBJECT: RUSSIA-TURKEY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: NO ZERO-SUM REF: A. MOSCOW 684 ¶B. ANKARA 456 Classified By: Pol M/C Alice Wells for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Russia has shown little concern about Turkey's recent diplomatic push in the South Caucasus, including the GOT's rapprochement with Armenia, offer to help resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and proposal for a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. Russian officials told us the GOR seeks a "strategic partnership" with Turkey, while analysts downplay feelings of competition in the region. Russia is playing each issue to its own advantage, bolstering its historic ties with Armenia while pursuing closer cooperation with Turkey's traditional ally Azerbaijan. Russia's recent efforts to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, while continuing to support the Minsk Group process, deny Turkey a principal role in the conflict resolution process. While increasing bilateral energy and other cooperation with Turkey, Russia is open to Turkey's proposed Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform and sees the Black Sea Defense Ministerial as a vehicle to reduce U.S. influence in the region. End Summary. -------------- Turkish activism in the South Caucasus -------------- ¶2. (C) Russia has shown little concern with Turkey's stepped-up activity in the South Caucasus following the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. GOT initiatives include the apparently imminent opening of the Turkish border to Armenian trade, offers to help resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and proposals for a multinational Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform and Black Sea Defense Ministerial. Turkey has also sought to exploit its position as a key energy transit country to both ensure its own supplies and garner gains from transit. -------------- Russia's Opponent or Ally? -------------- ¶3. (C) Given that the South Caucasus is solidly located within Russia's declared "area of privileged interests," the GOR is factoring Turkey into its own South Caucasus policies. The MFA's Turkey Desk told us that Russia sought a "strategic partnership" with Turkey, including "greater cooperation with Turkey" in the European-Asian region and the Black Sea. Analysts agree that Russia does not feel threatened by Turkey and is seeking to cooperate with Turkey where possible. Russia's strong engagement in the South Caucasus avoids letting Turkey seize the initiative in the region and ensures that Russian-Turkish regional cooperation happens on Russia's terms. -------------- Armenia: Turkey's newest friend -------------- ¶4. (C) In conversations with us, the MFA has welcomed the recent warming of relations between Turkey and Armenia, stating that because Armenia was a "strategic partner," Turkish-Armenian rapprochement would not reduce Russian influence in Armenia. Analysts agree Russia has no need to fear Turkey's emerging partnership with Armenia. In addition to Russia's deep historical, cultural, and religious ties with Armenia, Moscow has taken recent action to ensure Armenia stays close. Russia's military presence in Armenia, the two countries' cooperation in the CSTO alliance, and (alleged) Russian arms sales to Armenia keep Yerevan in Russia's military orbit. Russia's USD 500 million loan offer is designed to have the same effect in the economic sphere, while Armenia's dependence on remittances from Armenian guest workers in Russia will grow stronger as the financial crisis wears on. Russian support for Armenia's new communication and transport opportunities with Turkey aids Russian goals by reducing Georgia's importance to the GOAZ and ensures Armenia's allegiance. The MFA told us that the GOR stood ready to refurbish old railway lines between Turkey and Armenia, and link both countries up to Russia's electrical grid. -------------- Azerbaijan: Russia pursuing closer ties -------------- MOSCOW 00000834 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) Russia's engagement with Azerbaijan matches several objectives -- expanding Moscow's influence in the CIS, strengthening Russia's mediating position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and increasing energy security. The GOR has used frequent high-level government visits to offer the GOAZ the creation of an economic cooperation organization modeled on the Black Sea Economic Forum, cooperation on security in the region, and/or a convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Russia has also sought use of Azerbaijan's Gabala radar station past 2012, and deepened cooperation on culture and promotion of the Russian language (Ref A). Gazprom's imminent negotiations on purchasing Azeri gas at "market prices" are aimed directly at preventing additional gas from flowing west and maintaining Russian control over as much of the gas flow to Europe as possible. Despite turbulence in the relationship generated by allegations of large Russian arms sales to Yerevan, analysts expect Aliyev and Moscow to pragmatically work through differences and view warming Turkish-Armenian ties as a further spur to Baku to shore up its strategic partnership with Moscow. -------------- Nagorno-Karabakh: intractable conflict -------------- ¶6. (C) The MFA's Azerbaijan desk told us Russia welcomed Turkey's offers to help resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but suggested that Russia's support for the U.S.-Russia-France-led Minsk Group and its efforts to mediate between Azerbaijan and Armenia crowd out any actual Turkish engagement. Analysts thought Turkey's attempted involvement mattered little to Russia, given the "intractable" nature of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, the MFA told us it was concerned that, if Turkey de-links its demands that Armenia drop its 1915 genocide charges and withdraw its troops from the occupied areas of Azerbaijan, Armenia could harden its position on Nagorno-Karabakh. -------------- - Multilateral initiatives: Russia will consider -------------- - ¶7. (C) While details on Turkey's Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform remain sparse, the MFA has expressed doubts about the wisdom of attempting to unite antagonists such as Georgia and Russia or Armenia and Azerbaijan in one group. Nevertheless, Russia has been open to discussions on the initiative, most recently during the February 12-15 visit of Turkish President Gul to Moscow. Analysts told us Turkey's intentions for a Black Sea Defense Ministerial (Ref B) open only to littoral states would find favorable consideration from Russia as a vehicle to reduce U.S. influence in the region. -------------- Russia-Turkey: No zero-sum -------------- ¶8. (C) Thanks to the 15 million-strong Turkic population in Russia, along with Russia's need to factor Turkey into its hydrocarbon transport plans, and Turkish dependency on Russia for trade and energy, Moscow has abandoned its traditional zero-sum mentality regarding influence in the region. Russian assistance in constructing a civil nuclear energy plant in Turkey and the revived "Blue Stream" gas pipeline project under the Black Sea are examples of Russian attempts to expand cooperation with Turkey while pursuing Russia's own energy objectives in the region. With the MFA defining Turkey-Russia relations to us as "moving toward strategic partnership," we expect to see more Russian engagement with Turkey that will serve Russia's interests in the South Caucasus while allowing Turkey to flex its muscle in the region. BEYRLE