ATTACK ON YAMADAYEV DERAILS LIFTING OF GOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000824 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PHUM PINR RS SUBJECT: ATTACK ON YAMADAYEV DERAILS LIFTING OF GOR COUNTERTERRORISM REGIME IN CHECHNYA REF: 08 MOSCOW 2951 MOSCOW 00000824 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells; reason 1.4 (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: While contradictory stories continue to swirl in the Moscow-based media as to whether or not Chechen warlord and Kadyrov opponent Sulim Yamadayev died as a result of a March 28 attack in Dubai, Russia's National Anti-terrorism Committee (NAC) decided on March 31 not to lift the counterterrorism regime that has existed in Chechnya since September 1999. This decision is a slap in the face for Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov, who first raised it on March 20 in a meeting with Russian Prime Minister Putin. It also runs counter to the expressed wishes of President Medvedev, who used a March 27 meeting with Federal Security Bureau (FSB) head Alexander Bortnikov to instruct the NAC to consider lifting the regime given that that situation in Chechnya had become more "normal." End Summary. Questions Remain Over Yamadayev's Fate -------------- ¶2. (C) Most Moscow-based media has reported that Sulim Yamadayev, an opponent of Chechnya's Moscow-backed President Ramzan Kadyrov, died as a result of gunshot wounds suffered on March 28 in Dubai, where Yamadayev had lived since December 2008. Only the daily Kommersant has continued to report claims by younger brother Issa Yamadayev that Sulim is still alive in a Dubai hospital. Its North Caucasus correspondent Musa Muradov, an ethnic Chechen, told us that the younger Yamadayev has denied claims in the Russian and Dubai press that he has been given Sulim's body for burial under strict Muslim traditions. Muradov noted that, according to his sources in Chechnya, if Yamadayev had died as a result of the attack, preparations would have been made at the family's compound in Gudermes as was done in September 2008 when the oldest brother and former State Duma Deputy Ruslan Yamadayev was shot at point-blank range while sitting in his car on a busy Moscow street (reftel). Moscow Helsinki Group North Caucasus expert Aslambek Apayev told us April 1 that he had spoken with Yamadayev's father and sister on March 31 in Gudermes and they also said Sulim was still alive. Apayev also said that no preparations had been made nor services held at the family mosque there. When asked about Yamadayev's death, the Russian MFA noted only that it was following the investigation of the "tragic incident" closely, which contacts here told us fell short of confirmation of his death. Lifting of Counterterrorism Regime in Chechnya Delayed -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Regardless of whether or not Yamadayev died as a result of the March 28 attack, it has derailed Kadyrov's hopes that Russia would lift its nine-year counterterrorism regime in Chechnya. In accordance with this regime, since 1999 Moscow has kept at least 20,000 soldiers in Chechnya even after the cessation of major hostilities in 2004. According to Muradov, Kadyrov wanted to convince Moscow that in exchange for pulling out the federal troops from Chechnya and letting local law enforcement continue efforts to control the simmering violence there, the GOR could transfer to the republic's coffers some of the money saved from not garrisoning these troops and providing for their sustenance and danger pay. Muradov added that Kadyrov first raised this in a contentious meeting with Prime Minister Putin on March 20, and stated publicly on March 25 that the counterterrorism campaign would be lifted "by the end of March." A Kremlin source quickly distanced the GOR from Kadyrov's statement. ¶4. (C) In what appeared to be a carefully choreographed set-piece, on March 27 Russian president Medvedev instructed FSB chief Bortnikov, as head of the NAC, to consider lifting the counterterrorism regime in Chechnya. In his discussion with Bortnikov, Medvedev cited improved conditions in Chechnya as the reason for the change. German Embassy colleagues told us that their contacts had suggested that since Medvedev's recently announced plans to reform the Russian armed forces are contingent on moving the estimated 20,000 troops in Chechnya out of the republic to perform other tasks, the MOD has slowed the process by putting obstacles in the way of the withdrawal. The attack on Yamadayev on March 28 effectively killed any chance for a positive decision. On March 31, the NAC decided that at this time it was not possible to lift the regime, but held out hope that this could happen at a later date. MOSCOW 00000824 002.2 OF 002 ¶5. (C) According Gadzhi Makhachev, a former State Duma member and Dagestan's representative to the central government in Moscow, there is no longer any reason for federal troops to be stationed in Chechnya, and the NAC's decision could cause tension between Kadyrov and his mentor Putin. Makhachev, a personal friend of Kadyrov's (a picture of the two men adorns his Moscow office),told us he believed that security and law enforcement services pressured the NAC to decline to lift the counterterrorism regime at this time. Muradov also believed that either the FSB or the Russian military were behind the decision, although he took his analysis one step further and stated that either of them could also have been behind the attack on Yamadayev in Dubai. Muradov added that Yamadayev no longer posed a political threat to Kadyrov, so Kadyrov had "nothing to gain, but everything to lose" (such as suspicion of involvement) from Yamadayev's death. Muradov crassly said both the FSB and the Russian military benefit from the per diem and danger pay servicemen earn while serving in Chechnya. Caucasus expert Sergey Markedonov also suggested that security services could have been responsible for the attack on Yamadayev because "he know too much" about them and their activities in Chechnya. ¶6. (C) Muradov suggested a way for Moscow to save face with Groznyy by allowing Chechnya to operate its own customs service and opening up the airport in Groznyy to international flights. He said that more than the presence of federal troops, these elements of the current counterterrorism regime imposed by Moscow have hurt Chechen businessmen (by forcing them to pay bribes to customs official in neighboring republics) and inconvenienced ordinary citizens. Muradov maintained on March 31 that the decision of the NAC left open this possibility. On April 1 local media picked up on this idea, with Kommersant and Muradov leading the charge. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) None of our interlocutors would venture to speculate on why the NAC would contradict a direct suggestion from Medvedev on lifting the counterterrorism regime, preferring to place the blame on Russian special services for influencing the decision directly or through the attack in Dubai that caused renewed unease over the situation in Chechnya. Dubai police have reportedly arrested several men, all ethnic Russian, in connection with the attack. The ease with which a Hero of Russia and a decorated combatant in Russia's five-day war with Georgia in August 2008 was cast away cannot give much succor to those currently doing Moscow's bidding. BEYRLE