Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW683
2009-03-20 09:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:
RUSSIA: CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT
how-toVZCZCXRO5255 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHMO #0683 0790943 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 200943Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2457 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000683
SIPDIS
S/CT SHARRI CLARK AND GAIL ROBERTSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC ENRG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT
REF: STATE 15113
Classified By: Acting POL MC David Kostelancik for reasons 1.4 (e),(f)
, and (g).
(C) Russia possesses limited critical infrastructure and key
resources that if destroyed, disrupted, or exploited would
likely have an immediate or deleterious effect on the U.S.
Based on that assessment, Post recommends the removal of the
Nadym Gas Pipeline Junction, which was included in the 2008
listing. While Russia remains an important supplier of
hydrocarbons, both oil and gas, to the global market, damage
to Russia's energy infrastructure would produce only
secondary impacts on the U.S., by virtue of the corresponding
disruptions that would occur on the world oil and gas
markets. Although the U.S. does purchase a significant
amount of oil from Russia, we rely on a diversity of
suppliers and supply routes, so that no individual Russian
facility is essential to U.S. economic well-being.
BEYRLE
SIPDIS
S/CT SHARRI CLARK AND GAIL ROBERTSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC ENRG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT
REF: STATE 15113
Classified By: Acting POL MC David Kostelancik for reasons 1.4 (e),(f)
, and (g).
(C) Russia possesses limited critical infrastructure and key
resources that if destroyed, disrupted, or exploited would
likely have an immediate or deleterious effect on the U.S.
Based on that assessment, Post recommends the removal of the
Nadym Gas Pipeline Junction, which was included in the 2008
listing. While Russia remains an important supplier of
hydrocarbons, both oil and gas, to the global market, damage
to Russia's energy infrastructure would produce only
secondary impacts on the U.S., by virtue of the corresponding
disruptions that would occur on the world oil and gas
markets. Although the U.S. does purchase a significant
amount of oil from Russia, we rely on a diversity of
suppliers and supply routes, so that no individual Russian
facility is essential to U.S. economic well-being.
BEYRLE