GOR WALKS A FINE LINE ON POSSIBLE DPRK MISSILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000659 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019 TAGS: PREL RS KS KN SUBJECT: GOR WALKS A FINE LINE ON POSSIBLE DPRK MISSILE LAUNCH REF: A. USUN 197 ¶B. MOSCOW 291 Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor David Kostelancik fo r reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. The possible test firing of a North Korean long range missile has put the GOR in a delicate position. On the one hand, Moscow appears to be providing North Korea breathing room by urging all parties to exercise restraint and to provide Pyongyang the benefit of the doubt. It has also indicated that it would ask for a thorough technical analysis in the event of a DPRK launch before agreeing to any Security Council action. On the other hand, MFA officials acknowledge concern over the North Korean course of action and tell us that the GOR has repeatedly urged the DPRK to reconsider. In pursuing these two seemingly contradictory approaches, the GOR may be balancing its interest in Northeast Asian peace and security with the need to be seen as a DPRK "champion" so that it could remain relevant on Korean Peninsula issues. End Summary. Seeking Breathing Room for DPRK -------------- ¶2. (C) The GOR has been walking a fine line since North Korea announced its intention to launch a "space satellite," which some in the Russian press are predicting will occur between April 4 and April 8. On the one hand, MFA public reaction has been muted in general and appears to seek breathing room for the DPRK regime. Foreign Minister Lavrov on March 3 told journalists that the GOR was following the situation and hoped all parties would "demonstrate restraint and adherence to the relevant resolution of the UN Security Council." Asserting the GOR position that UNSC Resolution 1718 did not ban satellite launches, he stated that it would be important to understand first what kind of rocket would carry the satellite into space. A subsequent MFA statement following a March 10 telephone conversation between Lavrov and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, during which North Korea was one of the issues discussed, repeated the same message, that Russia urged "relevant states to exercise restraint and composure and refrain from any steps that could undermine security and stability in (the) region." At a more working level, Director of the First Asia Department Konstantin Vnukov has made it clear that the GOR will reserve judgment until the DPRK carries through with the rocket launch and does not consider it appropriate to make public statements that imply a prejudging of the outcome. ¶3. (C) In the UN context, Russia will likely seek to protect North Korea from strong and swift UNSC action in the event of a missile launch. The MFA has pledged in general terms a willingness to work together in the Security Council should the U.S., Japan, and South Korea seek UN involvement. However, consistent with the position voiced by Russian Deputy Permanent Representative Dolgov in New York (Ref A), Vnukov has indicated that the GOR will likely ask that a thorough technical analysis of the launch be conducted first before the Security Council makes any judgments or takes action. But Privately Dismayed at DPRK Action -------------- ¶4. (C) On the other hand, MFA officials privately concede that DPRK's stated intentions are likely a front for the test firing of a long-range Taepodong-2 missile, and appear to be working behind the scenes to discourage North Korea from carrying out the launch. Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Borodavkin indicated in meetings with us that the GOR realized the true nature of North Korean plans and was following with concern reports of the launch preparations, as the last DPRK missile test had missed Russia's economic zone by a mere ten kilometers (Ref B). He relayed that during his last trip to Pyongyang, he asked the North Koreans to refrain from such provocative action. The South Korean Embassy also reports that Borodavkin met with the North Korean ambassador on February 27, during which Borodavkin reportedly warned that a DPRK rocket launch at this time, regardless whether it's for peaceful space exploration, would lead to negative consequences in the Korean Peninsula, as well as a worsening of the security situation in Northeast Asia. He reportedly again asked North Korea to reconsider. MOSCOW 00000659 002 OF 002 Why the Two Positions? -------------- ¶5. (C) The GOR's public attempts to provide breathing space for the North Korean regime and its private efforts to dissuade Pyongyang from carrying out the missile test are not necessarily contradictory. Due to its geographical proximity, Russia has obvious interests in a non-nuclear North Korea that will not have intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities. Also important to Russia is the maintenance of peace and security in Northeast Asia. Moscow neither wishes a North Korean missile test that would provoke sharp reactions from the U.S., Japan, and South Korea and further cement the U.S. alliances in the region, nor an even more belligerent North Korea as a result of international reactions, especially at a delicate time when the health of Kim Jong-Il and his possible successor are still open questions. In fact, the only Russian statements so far that came close to resembling strong words came from MFA Spokesman Andrey Nesterenko, when referring to reports that "some countries" were considering shooting down the rocket immediately after its launch and North Korean statements that it would exact revenge for such a step. In his words, "such explosive escalation would have calamitous consequences." The MFA therefore publicly calls for restraint from all sides while working in private to discourage a DPRK missile test. ¶6. (C) Also important in the GOR calculus is the need to maintain good relations with an easily offendable Pyongyang, so that it could remain relevant in Northeast Asian security issues. As some Russian analysts have pointed out, Russia's role in North Korea has been vague, with little real leverage over the regime. "We can sell or not sell anti-missile systems to Iran, and thus apply pressure. We're not selling anything to North Korea; there is virtually no influence," stated Alexander Khramchikhin, the head of the analytical department at the Institute for Political and Military Analysis. In this context, the GOR, already cognizant of its declining influence and its relatively weak claim to relevance vis-a-vis the other Six Party partners, needs to be seen as continuing to have close relations with Pyongyang. Acting as a champion of sorts for North Korea in the UN Security Council and providing the regime with some breathing space in the face of almost certain international condemnation may be one way for Moscow to ensure that it will not be cut out from discussions on North Korean issues. BEYRLE