FINANCIAL CRISIS SLOWING MILITARY REFORM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000652 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MCAP MNUC ECON RS SUBJECT: FINANCIAL CRISIS SLOWING MILITARY REFORM REF: A. 08 MOSCOW 3092 ¶B. MOSCOW 281 Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d),and (h). ¶1. (C) Summary: The current global financial crisis has forced a postponement of Russia's plans for military reform. With financial realities finally forcing the GOR to prioritize Defense Minister Serdyukov's proposed reforms, it is becoming clear that Russia's already-atrophied conventional forces will not have the resources it needs to turn itself into an effective, 21st century fighting force. The purchase of new conventional weapons systems most likely will be postponed, and training for personnel will be cut. This includes the postponement of long-term training for Russia's sergeant corps, the very personnel who were supposed to form the backbone of Russia's streamlined, professional army. Plans to reduce the number of men and women in uniform will most likely prove too costly, as Russian law dictates that adequate housing must be found for retired servicemen and women. As a result, Russia will continue to rely on nuclear weapons to serve as the cornerstone of its security. Further reform will be dictated largely by Russia's military doctrine, which is currently being drafted in Russia's National Security Council by a committee headed by former CHOD Yuriy Baluyevskiy, a vocal critic of Serdyukov's reforms. End Summary. -------------- Financial Crisis Postponed Reforms -------------- ¶2. (C) On January 22, Medvedev signed a presidential order that military reforms should be finalized by January 1, 2016, rather than 2012, as originally planned. The delay came after repeated public commitments to implement the reforms by President Medvedev and PM Putin, who underscored in a December 4, 2008 interview, that defense reforms "bolster the state's defense capacity." Experts agree that the global financial crisis drove the delay, with declining revenues and a widening budget deficit forcing the GOR to make decisions on military reforms that it has thus far seemed reluctant to make. While some media had attributed the delay to the opposition voiced by the general staff and retired military officers, most experts argue that the GOR has not prioritized its military reforms, and so too many projects were originally proposed without enough funding for all of them. Already for 2009 it is projected that the GOR will spend only 200 billion rubles (about USD 5.7 billion),or about 8 percent less on defense than was originally budgeted. -------------- Conventional Rearmament Not Likely -------------- ¶3. (C) Russia's plans include replacing all of its military equipment by 2020, and the GOR has budgeted almost 5 trillion rubles (about USD 154 billion) to purchase new weapons up to ¶2015. This includes money for new tanks, fifth generation fighter aircraft, UAVs, ICBMs, and other modern equipment. Spending reductions in the military budget, however, will cut disproportionately into the purchase of new weapons systems, since the military has no plans to reduce salaries or housing for personnel. While many of Russia's weapons systems are in a state of disrepair, absent an upturn in the Russian economy many acquisitions, especially of conventional arms, will be deferred. Already there is discussion of postponing purchases of new tanks and armored personnel carriers. Instead of rearming the military, Russia will concentrate on producing weapons for its lucrative export market, which is likely to get a boost this year from the devaluation of the ruble. -------------- Cutbacks In Training -------------- ¶4. (U) Much needed military training has been delayed or scaled back. Press reports indicate that the Vystrel courses and facilities, which for the past 80 years have trained high-ranking military officers, UN peacekeepers, military journalists, chem-bio troops, and others, may be sold. Vystrel is located on some prime real estate next to a lake near Moscow, and selling it off could raise some much-needed MOSCOW 00000652 002 OF 003 money for the MOD. The facilities, however, would be difficult to replace and training and readiness of the Russian military would likely suffer. In addition, the number of military academies will be reduced from 65 to 10 (although this figure was later changed to 16, and then 18). Closing and consolidating such facilities would be expensive and could take as long as 10 years to accomplish, so it remains to be seen if the GOR will move ahead with such plans. ¶5. (U) As part of its plans to build up a highly-trained, professional sergeant corps, the GOR had planned to offer a three-year training course for sergeants beginning February 1 (sergeants currently get five months of training). This has been postponed until September 1, and there is no guarantee that it will take place at all. A professional sergeant corps was to form the backbone of Russia's reformed army. -------------- No Money For Troop Reductions -------------- ¶6. (U) The toughest reform to tackle will be reducing the size of the military, including reducing the officer corps by 200,000 (ref A). Publicly, Putin has said that no mass retirements will take place; instead, only "officers whose maximum period in service has ended will be dismissed in 2009;" officers taken on two-year contracts from the military departments of universities will not have their contracts renewed; and the GOR will reduce the number of warrant officers by not training them. ¶7. (U) Reducing the military's ranks will be expensive, however, and the GOR may not be able to afford it in the midst of the recession. Under Russian law, those who serve at least 10 years in the military are entitled to free housing upon being discharged. About 122,400 retired and former servicemen and women are currently waiting for an apartment. Even if MOD plans to purchase 60,000 apartments in 2009 (up from 22,200 purchased in 2008 to the tune of 23.2 billion rubles (USD 773 million)) come to fruition, many former military personnel currently on the waiting list will be left without housing. Further reducing the military, including cutting the officer corps from 355,000 to 155,000, would only exacerbate this problem. ¶8. (C) GOR officials nevertheless insist that cutting the size of the armed forces will occur. In a January 22 meeting with Medvedev, Serdyukov downplayed difficulties in reducing the size of the Russian military. Serdyukov said that servicemen and women who are about to retire will be given training "in various specializations that may be used in civilian employment." Along these lines, Serdyukov announced the Ministry of Defense had concluded agreements with regional governments and the Health and Social Development Ministry "regarding professions in demand" by certain employers, and that retiring soldiers will have the opportunity to receive training in these fields. Serdyukov added that the MOD had already budgeted money for this program in 2009, and indeed press reports indicate the Pacific Fleet will soon cut 5,000 personnel. Experts, however, argue that 5,000 personnel is an insignificant number, and doubt that larger cuts could be undertaken. Whether the GOR would go forward with reductions in the Russian Far East, already a focal point for anti-government protest, also seems doubtful. -------------- Continued Reliance On Nuclear Weapons -------------- ¶9. (C) As Russia's conventional forces have atrophied, the GOR has grown increasingly dependent upon its nuclear weapons to serve as a strategic deterrent. This has largely been a cost-cutting measure, as not enough resources have been available to maintain a strong conventional force. Given the prestige factor that being a nuclear power brings to Russia, this is one area where the Russian military is determined to maintain its strength. In an interview with Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Commander of Strategic Missile Forces Colonel-General Nikolay Solovtsov quoted the general staff and Serdyukov as saying current military reforms could take place only under the "protective umbrella" of Russia's strategic forces. He added that proposed military reforms do not call for reducing the ranks of the strategic missile forces. MOSCOW 00000652 003 OF 003 ¶10. (C) Solovtsov also announced that Topol-M missiles would enter duty on schedule, despite the financial crisis, and indeed a fresh battalion was recently deployed with the 54th Missile Division near the town of Teikovo, about 150 miles northeast of Moscow. Additionally, Deputy Defense Minister General Vladimir Popovkin announced on March 5 that the sea-based Bulava ICBM will be put into service aboard the Yuriy Dolgorukiy submarine in 2009 (despite the numerous problems the Bulava has faced). The GOR plans to purchase approximately 15 strategic missiles per year, including Topol-M and Bulava systems; a signal that Russia will continue to rely on its nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future. -------------- GOR Still Crafting Military Doctrine -------------- ¶11. (U) In December 2008, the Russian leadership announced the Security Council would be in charge of drafting a new military doctrine to give direction to the reforms (although plans for a new military doctrine were first announced in March 2007). While details are lacking, statements by GOR officials seem to indicate the military plans to move away from mass conscription toward an all-volunteer force of permanent combat readiness units. CHOD Makarov has stated that the Russian army will be further reduced to a peacetime level of 1 million servicemen and women, with an additional 700,000 reservists. Serdyukov told Medvedev on January 22 that 25 million rubles (about USD 833,000) has been allocated to pay 30,000 officers bonuses for serving in permanent readiness units in 2009. ¶12. (C) Leading experts such as Deputy Editor-In-Chief of the Weekly Journal Aleksandr Golts and Moscow Heritage Foundation Head Yevgeniy Volk argue that such troop reductions, combined with the purchase of modern high-tech conventional arms, point to a shift in strategic thinking among the Russian military. If enacted, Russia would have an army better designed and equipped to face 21st century threats such as terrorism, rather than a cumbersome mass mobilization army to fight NATO forces. This, however, could prove politically difficult, given the GOR rhetorical focus on the threat NATO supposedly poses to Russia; the creation of a rapid-reaction force under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, however, shows the GOR recognizes that streamlined, mobile units are needed (ref B). -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Absent an economic recovery in the near future, it seems unlikely that many of the GOR's military reforms will be completed, and Russia's straitened economic circumstances also call into question more grandiose plans for Russian force projection abroad (e.g. bases in Latin America). It is worth noting that a new commission in the Security Council chaired by retired General Yuriy Baluyevskiy (former CHOD and an outspoken critic of many of Serdyukov's reforms) is currently drafting Russia's new military doctrine. This new doctrine, which is expected to be made public this summer, will almost certainly designate the threats facing Russia (be it NATO, China, terrorism, separatism, instability in the former Soviet Union, or some combination thereof),and in the process determine the future direction of the Russian military. If the new doctrine endorses retention of a mass mobilization army, then Serdyukov's proposed reforms may confront further bureaucratic, as well as financial, hurdles. BEYRLE