GOR TRANSNISTRIA NEGOTIATOR TALKS DOWN 5 PLUS 2

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000543

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS MD
SUBJECT: GOR TRANSNISTRIA NEGOTIATOR TALKS DOWN 5 PLUS 2

Classified By: Pol M/C Alice Wells for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Russian Transnistria Conflict Negotiator
Valeriy Nesterushkin told us Russia is still working on
setting a date and agenda for planned "2 plus 1" talks in
March between Moldovan President Voronin, Transnistrian
leader Smirnov, and President Medvedev, as discussed during
Foreign Minister Lavrov's February 23-24 visit. Despite
Lavrov's public support for the "5 plus 2," Nesterushkin
suggested that Russia was increasingly skeptical that the
OSCE format remained effective, but maintained the "2 plus 1"
structure was not designed to supplant it. Nesterushkin
confirmed Russia was using offers of financial aid and energy
assistance to push Smirnov to the negotiating table. He
insisted the Russian troop presence did not violate the CFE
Treaty or Istanbul Commitments, but allowed that Russia could
withdraw its troops if an international troop presence was
established. Nesterushkin saw little chance of Transnistria
reuniting with Moldova, but described the issuance of Russian
passports as a "natural" development, while asserting
Russia's right to defend its citizens abroad. Analysts see
no chance of a conflict resolution in the near term, citing
"Transnistrian obstinacy." End Summary.

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Lavrov visit
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2. (C) Russian Special Negotiator for the Transnistria
Conflict Valeriy Nesterushkin told us on March 2 that
Transnistria ranked low on Foreign Minister Lavrov's agenda
during his February 23-24 trip to Moldova. Nesterushkin
instead highlighted the signing of the Humanitarian
Cooperation Program 2009-2010, opening of the Russian Center
of Science and Culture, talks on the economic situation and
improving trade relations, and Moldova's CIS chairmanship as
key elements of Lavrov's visit. Insisting Russia was a
"well-wishing neutral" observer of the Moldova election
process, Nesterushkin stressed that the timing of Lavrov's
visit was long-planned and not meant to interfere with the
April 5 elections, as Lavrov himself had said during a
February 24 press conference. However, Nesterushkin
described Russia as a "brand name" that evoked positive
connotations in Moldova. Therefore, Voronin wanted to use
both Lavrov's visit and the planned "2 plus 1" meeting to
show voters that he was able to maintain close contact with
Moscow. In an earlier meeting, MFA 2nd CIS Director Viktor
Sorokin told us that Russia understood Voronin would remain
the power behind any future Moldovan President, and saw this
visit as a wise down payment in its bilateral relationship
with the next Chisinau administration.

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2 plus 1
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3. (C) Turning to the Transnistria problem, Nesterushkin
said Moldovan President Voronin and Transnistrian leader
Smirnov had agreed the "2 plus 1" meeting should take place
before the Moldovan elections, but Russia had yet to obtain
agreement on a date.


4. (C) Nesterushkin conceded that there was no consensus yet
on the agenda of the "2 plus 1" talks. Moldova insisted on
discussing its draft legislation package for the resolution
of the Transnistria conflict, while Smirnov demanded that the
meeting focus on the requirement that companies in
Transnistria must first register in Chisinau before being
allowed to export -- normally not an issue, Neterushkin
allowed, but an "understandable" problem for a conflict
region. While Medvedev had convinced both sides to allow
experts to discuss trade issues, the upcoming meetings could
be "much more successful" if the negotiators received
political directives that could only come out of high-level
meetings such as the "2 plus 1."


5. (C) Nesterushkin did not shed much further light on
Lavrov's February 24 comments that the conflict parties
should agree on a "state and legal model" to resolve the
conflict, while the "2 plus 1" talks should "help approve
basic principles." Nesterushkin clarified that the principle
of "equality of the negotiating parties" should not prejudice
the sides' standing in other contexts, such as final status.
Nesterushkin did not name any other principles -- we
suggested territorial integrity, for which Lavrov had
reiterated Russia's support at the press conference -- but
simply noted that the OSCE had developed principles for the
non-military resolution of regional conflicts. He confirmed
Russia's desire for a deliverable of the "2 plus 1" talks,
saying only that a signed declaration would be ideal, or if
not achievable an unsigned statement of positions, or a press

MOSCOW 00000543 002 OF 002


release, with the content depending on the as-yet-unconfirmed
agenda.


6. (C) Expounding on Lavrov's February 27 description of the
"2 plus 1" talks as "laying the groundwork" for the "5 plus
2," Nesterushkin expressed skepticism that the Transnistria
conflict "must" be resolved in the "5 plus 2" format.
Instead, he argued, one should use "whatever format produces
results." However, the "2 plus 1" talks were not meant to
supplant the "5 plus 2" format.


7. (C) In reference to his own meetings with Transnistrian
leader Smirnov and Transnistrian "Foreign Minister"
Yastrebchak last week, Nesterushkin confirmed Russia was
using Smirnov's desire for Russian financial and energy
assistance to push Transnistria into talks with Moldova.
However, he saw little chance of moving Transnistria toward
reuniting with Moldova as long as polls in Transnistria
showed popular support for independence.

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Kozak Plan/Troop presence
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8. (C) Nesterushkin defended Russia's continued support for
the 2003 Kozak Plan as the basis for a conflict resolution,
claiming it was the only plan that had enjoyed the consensus
of both conflict parties. In answer to our question, he said
the Russian troop presence in Transnistria as upheld in the
Kozak Plan could be an issue for negotiations. He conceded
that Russia could withdraw its troops once an international
troop presence was established, but voiced skepticism that it
would be possible to gain concurrence for such a proposal.
When pressed that if all mediators agreed jointly to such a
plan, the conflict parties might be persuaded come on board,
he doubted a mediator "could be agreed upon to present a
joint proposal."


9. (C) Nesterushkin repeated the Russian position that the
CFE treaty and the 1999 Istanbul Agreement on the Adaptation
of the CFE Treaty did not apply to the Russian troop presence
in Transnistria. While the troops were "ready to withdraw,"
Russia would not do so as long as the conflict continued.
Besides, Nesterushkin maintained, Transnistria considered the
Russian presence the "guarantor of stability" and would not
let the troops leave.

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Passports
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10. (C) Nesterushkin defended the issuance of Russian
passports in Transnistria -- with The Moscow Times reporting
recently that one quarter of the population in Transnistria
has a Russian passport -- as a "natural" development, which
did not cause concern in Chisinau, and pointed to the large
numbers of dual Moldova-Ukraine passport holders in
Transnistria as an example of other instances of foreign
passportization. He dismissed the notion of this being a
step toward Transnistria's inclusion into the Russian
Federation as an "artificial hypothesis," but asserted
Russia's right to defend Russian citizens abroad.

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Analysts see stalemate continuing
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11. (C) Despite Russia's efforts, analysts do not see the
Transnistria conflict being resolved anytime soon. While
Sergey Markedonov of the Institute for Political and Military
Analysis told us he did not see any side having an interest
in resolving the conflict, Artem Malgin (MGIMO)
unhesitatingly pointed to Transnistria as the reason for the
lack of progress, being "much less cooperative than Moldova."
Vitaliy Kulik of the Ukrainian Center for Studies on Civil
Society similarly suggested in a guest commentary on
www.politkom.ru that Transnistria was the main obstacle to a
resolution, contending Smirnov was holding out for the
unlikely Cyprus-style recognition by Russia alone.
BEYRLE