INFORMATION REQUST IN ADVANCE OF G-20 MEETINGS

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000535 C O R R E C T E D COPY SIPDIS STATE/EEB/OMA ALEX WHITTINGTON STATE FOR EUR/RUS TREASURY/IMB BILL MURDEN, WILBUR MONROE, MARY BEASLY E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2119 TAGS: ECON EFIN RS SUBJECT: INFORMATION REQUST IN ADVANCE OF G-20 MEETINGS REF: A. A) STATE 17502 ¶B. B) 08 MOSCOW 3376 ¶C. C) 09 MOSCOW 101 ¶D. D) 09 MOSCOW 160 ¶E. E) 09 MOSCOW 334 ¶F. F) 09 MOSCOW 346 ¶G. G) 09 MOSCOW 364 ¶H. H) 09 MOSCOW 365 Classified By: Econmincouns Eric T. Schultz, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) -------------- Economic Overview -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Russia's economic downturn appears to be accelerating. Oil and gas revenues have plummeted; industrial production has fallen by 16 percent. Growth is forecast at negative 2.2 percent his year but will likely be even worse as the economy has been contracting at close to 10 percent in recent months. The government is forecasting inflation at 14 percent inflation, meaning that Russia is in "stagflation". The ruble has lost a third of its value since September 2008, and unemployment, about 8 percent, is increasing. The Finance Ministry forecasts budget revenues will drop 40 percent or more this year, leaving the country with a eight percent budget deficit - the first in nearly a decade. ¶2. (SBU) Initially, the government's crisis response was predicated on a return to growth and rising commodity prices by the year's end. However, the GOR has now finally acknowledged that the economic downturn will be long and severe and an extended budget debate has resulted, which pits advocates of deficit spending against proponents of fiscal restraint. The GOR's main objective is to prevent an increase in social tensions through spending. However, with budget revenues sure to drop by 42 percent this year, it is uncertain how Russia will continue to finance social expenditures this year or next. ¶3. (SBU) The government currently plans to increase spending by $14 billion this year. Much of the spending will go to anti-crisis commitments: more funds for banking sector capitalization, maintaining social spending (health care, pensions),and increasing unemployment benefits. In that regard, the government plans to finance the deficit from the reserve fund, accumulated during previous years of high oil prices and amounting to approximately 10 percent of GDP. However, the government is also looking for ways to reduce spending; for instance, it recently announced that it will no longer provide funds to individual firms to repay their foreign debts. The government may have to borrow externally, likely at high interest rates. ¶4. (SBU) Going into the G-20, GOR officials are keenly aware that global - particularly U.S. recovery is critical to Russia's recovery. They are tracking the U.S. debate over fiscal and monetary policy closely, and in many respects their policy approaches parallel our own. At the London Summit, the Russians will want to coordinate anti-crisis measures closely and will be looking to cooperate on reform of the international financial architecture. In that regard, the GOR focus is on reform of rating agencies, the IMF, and monitoring agencies. End Summary and introduction. ¶5. (U) The following responses are cued to questions in para 5, ref A. -------------- ¶I. Objectives for the London Summit -------------- ¶6. (SBU) GOR officials have stated they want the G-20 Summit to move beyond specifics. Beyond that, officials have not provided details in their public statements about what they expect from the summit. Russian proposals for the London Summit (as shared with the government of the G-8 countries) call for agreement on the parameters of a new global financial architecture and a follow-up conference to decide on the ground rules for a new global financial regulatory framework. ¶7. (SBU) The GOR, which has had a difficult relationship with the IMF, proposes revising the role of the Fund's mandate in light of the global crisis. This would include increasing IMF resources, developing new credit facilities to help countries particularly hard hit by the crisis, a redistribution of IMF quotas and, probably most importantly, a greater voice for emerging and developing countries (with fewer conditionalities on loans). The GOR suggests that the IMF or an ad-hoc working group of the G-20 study the possibility of expanding the list of currencies used as reserves (presumably to include the ruble) and supports the establishment of multiple, regional financial centers (presumably to include Moscow). In addition, the GOR proposes the establishment of a supra-national structure, not necessarily associated with the IMF, to function as a crisis early warning system and a global lender of last resort. The GOR is in favor increasing resources for development financing and the implementation of an energy-efficient growth concept. ¶8. (SBU) The GOR supports in principle the Declaration of the Washington Summit to refrain from any barriers to global trade and the movement of capital, though in practice it has taken a number of protectionist steps since the summit. It also proposes that measures the G-20 countries are taking to promote domestic demand are consistent with "long-term macroeconomic stability" as reflected in low-inflation, a reasonable budget deficit and public debt levels. -------------- II. Impact of the Global Financial Crisis -------------- A) Support for the Banking Sector: ¶9. (SBU) The GOR has prioritized support for the banking sector. The goal has been to supply an increase of long-term and short-term credits to the banking sector. Last fall, the GOR approved, but did not allocate all of, USD 38 billion in subordinated loans from Central Bank reserves and the National Welfare Fun principally for the benefit of the country's state-owned banks. The 2009 federal budget is expected to add another USD 13.1 billion to this amount. The additional liquidity has not, however, found its way to the real economy and has instead been used to shore up bank balance sheets, including through currency speculation (shorting the ruble). In addtion, the state Vneshekonombank (VEB) received USD 50 billion from Central Bank reserves to provide loans to Russian companies with foreign debts. Only USD 11 billion were disbursed. The repayment terms were LIBOR 100 basis points due at the end of 2009. VEB approved financing for UC Rusal (USD 4.5 billion),Alfa Group (USD 2 billion),Evraz (USD 1.8 billion),Mechel (USD 1.5 billion),Rosneft (USD 774 million),Russian Railways (USD USD 270 million),and PIK Group (USD 262 million). ¶10. (SBU) Last fall, the GOR increased the amount of retail deposits fully covered by Deposit Insurance Agency guarantees. In October 2008, the 100-percent guarantee for retail deposits increased from RUR 400,000 (USD 11,000) to RUR 700,000 (USD 20,000). The Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA) also received an additional capital infusion of USD 8 billion to prevent bankruptcies. The DIA briefly took control over VEFK Bank, Moskovskiy Capital, MZ Bank, and Bank Tarkhany. DIA also facilitated the reorganization of Rossiyskiy Capital, Russian Development Bank (not be confused with the Development Bank of Russia state corporation that forms part of VEB),Potentialbank, Gazenergobank, Nizhegorodpromstroybank, Bashinvestbank, GB Nizhniy Novgorod, Bank Severnaya Kazna, Elektronika Bank, and Bank24.ru. ¶11. (SBU) During the autumn of 2008, the Finance Ministry increased the frequency of its short-term loans of surplus budget funds, a program that ended as of December 31, 2008 with all loans repaid. The Central Bank (CBR) also moved to ease the liquidity squeeze by providing larger volumes of short-term loans and by lowering reserve requirements. Since late January 2009, however, the CBR has raised interest rates on its short-term loans as a means of defending the ruble against speculative attacks. ¶12. (SBU) The GOR has not made a formal decision concerning the treatment of bad assets, but is reportedly considering options. As for regulatory changes, Prime Minister Putin has voiced public support for a transfer of bank supervision to an agency/body separate from the Central Bank, which currently has responsibility for the function, and that might incorporate elements of the Deposit Insurance Agency. B) Foreign Exchange Reserves: ¶13. (SBU) Russia,s foreign exchange reserves have declined more than USD 200 billion dollars since early August as the result of capital flight, reflecting concerns about the aftermath of the conflict with Georgia, falling oil prices and uncertainty about the solvency of the country,s banking sector. The combination of the Georgia conflict and falling oil prices compelled the Central Bank to intervene in foreign exchange markets to prevent a steep decline in the value of the ruble. Mid-September reports of interbank loan defaults by some of the country,s larger private banks sent securities, prices sharply lower and added to the downward pressure on the ruble. By mid-November, the Central Bank moderated its defense of the ruble by announcing it would allow the ruble to gradually fall against a basket composed of 0.55 dollars and 0.45 euros in 1-percent increments. On January 22, the Central Bank announced the end of its managed CBR would refrain from intervening until/unless the ruble depreciated another 10 percent, which happened within a week of the January 22 announcement. By that time, the ruble had lost nearly a third of its value. Since that time, the government has used increased interest rates and informal administrative controls to stabilize the ruble without recourse to currency interventions. All told, Russia,s foreign exchange reserves have declined from USD 596 billion in August to USD 380 billion today, primarily as a result of the ruble defense and its gradual devaluation. -------------- III. The Broader Economic Crisis -------------- A) The Budget: ¶14. (SBU) The GOR is in the process of revising its 2009 budget, aprocess that is now two months old. In late December, Prime Minister Putin directed the Cabinet to revise the budget in light of new economic realities, namely a substantially lower prices for oil, which had previously supplied as much as 43 percent of revenues. The original budget, approved in the fall of 2008, forecast a 3-percent of GDP surplus based on an oil price assumption of USD 95 per barrel. Putin said the revised budget should be based on an assumption of USD 41 per barrel. The budget also needed to account for the USD 70 billion 'anti-crisis' stimulus Putin outlined in his United Party Congress address on November 20. ¶15. (SBU) Finance Minister Kudrin,s public statements indicate the revised 2009 federal budget will face a deficit of 8 percent of GDP, due to an expected drop in revenues of at least 40 percent (compared to the original budget) and a 5.5 increase in spending (again, relative to the original budget). Officials have offered few clues about how budget discussions are shaping up. The budget was to have been made public the first week of March but has been delayed again, until late March, reportedly over disagreements over what priorities to fund. ¶16. (SBU) Officials have offered few clues about the budget discussions. Prime Minister Putin has stated that the GOR will fund 100 percent of its social policy obligations, namely health care, pensions, and education. First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov said publicly on February 4 that spending on infrastructure projects not already underway would be cut. Press reporting has indicated that Cabinet ministers received instructions to cut their ministries, budgets by 15 percent, but Finance Minister Kudrin has said in a number of interviews that reporting on spending or the size of the deficit should be dismissed as imprecise. ¶17. (SBU) Russia,s budget code does not contain provisions for a mechanism akin to a continuing resolution. Tax revenue continues to come into the federal treasury, and salaries continue to be paid. However, in the absence of a budget, ministries must request funding for their projects and programs from the Finance Ministry and government spending has reportedly fallen dramatically as a result. B) Support to Domestic Industry: ¶18. SBU) A number of domestic industries have either received direct financial bailouts from the GOR, or have benefited from other stimulus measures. Three of Russia,s major producers of cars and trucks have already received multi-million dollar loans from the GOR to weather the crisis, while the GOR is working on a restructuring and financing plan for the fourth major car and truck manufacturer. In addition, in order to stimulate domestic demand, in February 2009, the GOR announced a $347 million state procurement of vehicles and $55.6 million in subsidized financing for consumers willing to buy domestically produced 'economy class' car models. ¶19. (SBU) The defense and aerospace industries have been given billions of dollars to stay afloat through the crisis, largely by means of the direct transfer of sums from the GOR budget to the state-owned corporation Rostekhnologii, which owns over 400 Russian companies in the defense, aerospace, titanium and automotive sectors. Many of Russia,s financially strapped airlines have been promised bailouts, and several insolvent airlines are being recapitalized and merged into a new aviation subsidiary of Rotekhnologii. All of Russia,s airlines will benefit from subsidized GOR financing for the purchase of jet fuel, while those still financially able to purchase planes from abroad will receive temporary relief from the duties charged on many types of imported leased or purchased aircraft. ¶20. (SBU) GOR bailouts have also been deployed to prop up Russia,s metals and mining companies, including a $4.5 billion GOR loan to major aluminum producer RusAl (owned by oligarch Oleg Deripaska),and a $1 billion loan for coal and steel producer Mechel from the state-owned GazPromBank. C) Trade Policy: ¶21. (SBU) In response to the global economic crisis, the GOR has increased duties on several categories of products, including automobiles and trucks; harvesters; steel pipe, tube and rebar; and dairy products. Observers view virtually all of these duty increases as protectionist measures intended to provide relief to vulnerable domestic industries that are losing market share to imports and struggling to cope with the crisis. The GOR claims that their actions are consistent with those of other countires. For instance, they note that the recent duty increases on dairy products such as butter and milk were only announced after the EU recently began offering export refunds to EU dairy producers. ¶22. (SBU) The GOR is also currently considering other potential duty increases to protect domestic producers of footwear, televisions, certain industrial equipment, and cheese. In addition to duty increases, the GOR has in the last three months reduced the export duties on certain categories of metals, including copper cathode and nickel. The reductions in export duties are meant to make domestic producers, exports more globally competitive with the prices charged by other producers. ¶23. (SBU) On February 1, the GOR also imposed a discriminatory tax on EU, Swiss and Turkmenistani trucks that use Russian roads. Russian officials argue that the measure was intended to be a reciprocal charge on countries that charge similar taxes on Russian trucks, but EU officials have countered that similar fees charged in some EU member states are applied equally to all truckers, both foreign and domestic. The measure appears to put EU trucking companies at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis other major users of the domestic road system, including Russia, Ukrainian and Turkish firms, and to collect a disproportionate amount of revenue from the EU for badly needed improvements to Russia,s transportation system -------------- --- ¶V. Political and Foreign Policy Ramifications -------------- - A) Impact on leadership: ¶24. (C) As the economic crisis deepens, differences in policy approaches among various elite groupings within the Kremlin and the White House have emerged. Opposition parties within the State Duma have also publicly begun to question the direction of GOR crisis response policy. However, none of these differences, and the yet-uncoordinated and relatively small public manifestations of discontent, currently present a challenge to the ruling party (United Russia),its leader, Prime Minister Putin, or to President Medvedev. However, as the government's reserves dwindle, and as commodity prices remain low (in comparison to even 6 months ago),it is possible resentment over government mismanagement could translate into political and social unrest. B) Possibility of Unrest: ¶25. (C) The risk of crisis-driven unrest in Russia remains low and is likely to remain so, at least through the summer. Public opinion surveys show an up-tick in dissatisfaction with the country's general direction, but with no indication that the darkening mood signals an increased tendency for protest or other signs of active discontent. Some argue with justification that society has yet to feel the full effect of the economic crisis. They predict a moment of truth next fall, when the number of unemployed (or underemployed) Russians begin to rise amid continued deprivations and expected cutbacks in government benefits and support. The greater short-term risk is that of intra-elite infighting, driven by competition over dwindling wealth and resources, particularly if the sides try to stir up public dissatisfaction as an instrument of leverage. C) Criticism of U.S.: ¶26. (C) Russians by and large have been conditioned through pronouncements since autumn 2008 from their senior leaders to blame the U.S. for having started the crisis. Since the inauguration of President Obama, Russian government criticism of the U.S. has tapered off. Some more acerbic commentators, including a few permitted to use state-run television as their platform, have spouted anti-U.S. statements, aiming them at the Bush administration, though also attacking some economic policies initiated by President Obama. Even pro-Western commentators have criticized the U.S. for continuing to monopolize world capital markets, drawing investment from China for government securities at a time when Russia and other countries need additional capital inflows. It is possible that, as the crisis deepens in Russia, criticism of the U.S. might further increase. D) Foreign Policy Implications: ¶27. (C) Some commentators have argued that the government might use a foreign crisis to divert attention from economic hardships. This might take the form of conflict with Ukraine, or again with Georgia. Others note that to do so would amount to economic suicide, costing the government huge sums while potentially resulting in cut offs from foreign credit and further flight of foreign investment from Russia. That said, at this point, it does not seem that Russia is interested as yet in scaling back its desire to play a more controlling role in the affairs of its neighbors. Despite its own economic problems, Russia has already made additional financial commitments to Kyrgyzstan and Belarus and is considering loans to Ukraine as means of enhancing its influence. This is happening even Russia faces the likelihood of renewed external borrowing in 2010, if not before, at high interest rates. ¶28. (U) Embassy contact is ECON John Stepanchuk, Stepanchukjc@state.gov. BEYRLE