RUSSIAN ANALYSTS DISCUSS POSSIBILITIES FOR

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000533

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL RS AF
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN ANALYSTS DISCUSS POSSIBILITIES FOR
AFGHANISTAN COOPERATION

1. (SBU) Summary. In a February 11 roundtable with
visiting SCA DAS Patrick Moon, Russian experts on Afghanistan
and Central Asia observed that Russia needed the U.S. to
succeed in Afghanistan as it lacked the psychological

capacity and the financial and military resources to get
directly involved in the country again. They argued
cooperation on Afghanistan should serve the strategic goal of
improving U.S.-Russian relations; conversely resolving some
of the more prickly issues such as missile defense and NATO
enlargement could help improve Russian willingness to
cooperate on Afghanistan. The analysts worried that some
degree of competition and zero-sum game between the U.S. and
Russia was inevitable given the energy, resource, and
strategic implications of the South and Central Asian region,
and discussed GOR claims that there was no link between
Russian assistance and Kyrgyzstan's decision to close Manas
air base. Nevertheless, they believed that Russia had
genuine concerns about the worsening situation in Afghanistan
and shared mutual interests with the U.S. in countering the
Taliban and ensuring stability. End Summary.


2. (SBU) During his February 9-11 visit to Moscow for
Afghanistan consultations with the GOR (septel),Deputy
Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs
Patrick Moon held a roundtable discussion with Russian
experts. The attendees included Yevgeniy Volk of the
Heritage Foundation, Aleksandr Lukin of the Center for East
Asian and Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies at the
Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO),
Gennadiy Chufrin of the Institute of World Economy and
International Relations (IMEMO),Aleksandr Golts of the
online publication The Daily Journal, and Sergey Kortunov of
the World Politics Department of the Higher School of
Economics.

Mutual Interests in Afghanistan
--------------


3. (SBU) The experts unanimously agreed that the U.S. and
Russia shared mutual interests in Afghanistan and that
cooperation was essential. Russia needed the U.S. to succeed
in Afghanistan, as the GOR lacked the financial and military
resources to play a leading role in countering the myriad of
challenges that could have destabilizing effects on the
region. Sergey Kortunov was particularly blunt in stating
that as Russia was psychologically incapable of getting
militarily involved in Afghanistan again, U.S. troops were
doing the job for Russia. The experts welcomed the recent
positive statements by the U.S. and the GOR on the need to
cooperate on Afghanistan and saw the February 10-11
consultations, the first face-to-face formal dialogue between
our two governments since President Obama's inauguration, as
a positive step in "resetting" the bilateral relationship.

Cooperation Should Serve the Great Bilateral Relationship
-------------- --------------


4. (SBU) The analysts stated that cooperation on
Afghanistan should serve the larger strategic goal of a
better U.S.-Russian relationship, one characterized by
respect and mutual cooperation. They all dismissed GOR
claims that there was no link between Russian assistance to
Kyrgyzstan and Bakiyev's decision to close Manas air base.
Respect and the wish to be taken seriously as the country
with a historical dominance and special interests in Central
Asia were behind these machinations, they contended. They
suggested that Russia believed it had not been treated as an
equal by the U.S., and NOW that Russia had recovered from its
weakened state of the 1990s, the GOR was sending reminders
that Moscow was at the center when it came to security issues
in the region. Thus, while the GOR seemed to be giving mixed
signals, offering transit rights to the U.S. and NATO on the
one hand but allegedly engineering behind-the-scenes the
closure of Manas on the other, in reality, it had a clear
strategy to induce the U.S. away from individual Central
Asian governments toward dealing with Russia. They argued
that Manas was a minor and transitory issue that could be
resolved relatively quickly through negotiations with Moscow.
The way it was resolved, however, should contribute to the
overall understanding between Washington and Moscow on the
direction of the bilateral relationship.

And Vice Versa
--------------


5. (SBU) At the same time, the overall direction of the
bilateral relationship and the resolution of important
strategic issues could help determine the degree to which the
U.S. and Russia cooperated on Afghanistan. Aleksandr Golts
observed that Moscow took a global view of its relations with

the U.S. and had often been frustrated by Washington's
cherry-picking approach, seeking cooperation on some issues,
disagreeing on a few issues of importance to Russia, and
simply ignoring Russian views on others. Noting that the GOR
tended not to compartmentalize in such a manner, the experts
suggested that Moscow, in its wish to emphasize that
cooperation was a two-way street, wanted the U.S. to
compromise on issues such as missile defense and NATO
enlargement in exchange for meaningful collaboration on
Afghanistan. IMEMO's Gennadiy Chufrin observed that how the
U.S. set the tone for the bilateral relationship, whether one
of cooperation or competition, could determine the range of
possible joint activities between our two countries and the
degree to which Russia would be willing to be helpful on
Afghanistan. If the U.S. chose cooperation--with the implied
compromises on the more strategic issues of NATO, missile
defense, and START--the transit of military equipment through
Russia was a possibility in addition to the current agreement
on the transit of non-lethal supplies to ISAF. What both
governments must avoid, Chufrin stressed, was the temptation
to start a modern version of the Great Game, which was not in
the real interests of either country.

Is Zero-Sum Unavoidable?
--------------


6. (SBU) Yet parts of the Russian government may indeed
have the Great Game or a zero-sum game in mind, some of the
experts suggested. According to Sergey Kortunov, if the GOR
was behind the Kyrgyz announcement on Manas, it meant that
there were influential voices in the Russian security forces
who held zero-sum views and that they had succeeded in
pushing a bad policy onto the Russian decision-makers.
Others agreed that the GOR might be more interested in using
Afghanistan as a card in a bigger global game, even though
Russia had genuine concerns about the potential spill-over
effects of instability in Afghanistan. Yevgeniy Volk argued
that Washington should be realistic about the scope of
U.S.-Russian cooperation on Afghanistan, as a certain degree
of competition was inevitable because of the enormous energy,
natural resources, and strategic implications of the South
and Central Asian region. In some cases, competition might
overshadow the inclination to cooperate.


7. (SBU) In response to DAS Moon's question on whether
competition or zero-sum was truly inevitable, Golts answered
that as long as mutual deterrence remained the foundation of
our bilateral relationship, the two countries would
inevitably turn to competition whenever problems arose, no
matter how much talk of cooperation existed. In this regard,
the U.S. should remedy the Bush Administration's mistake of
steadily ignoring disarmament, and resolve the outstanding
START issue as soon as possible. Otherwise, the basic
foundation of the relationship would always be fundamentally
zero-sum.

Genuine Concerns about Afghanistan
--------------


8. (SBU) Despite their views on Russia's inclination to
view Afghanistan through the prism of strategic interests
vis-a-vis the U.S., the experts were unequivocal that Russia,
as well as the Central Asian countries, had genuine concerns
about the situation in Afghanistan. According to them, the
pervasive view in Russia and Central Asia was that the
security situation was worsening and drug trafficking in the
region was increasing. For countries such as Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in particular, the narcotics
problem was growing, fueled by both internal factors as well
as the supply from Afghanistan. Lukin argued that
Kyrgyzstan's decision to close Manas was not just about money
and pressure from Moscow; it also reflected Bishkek's
dissatisfaction with a perceived U.S. inability to stabilize
Afghanistan and ensure security in Central Asia. The Central
Asian countries were questioning whether the U.S. could
guarantee their security as well as Russia could. The Manas
announcement was thus Bishkek's way of signaling that it was
seeking alternative security guarantees from the region,
including Russia, the SCO, and the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO).


9. (SBU) The experts were skeptical of recent poll results
from groups such as the Asia Foundation that suggested only
15 percent of the Afghan population supported the Taliban,
noting that they had seen other data indicating that the
Taliban's support base was growing, possibly as high as 30
percent. Even assuming the 15 percent figure to be accurate,
this still indicated an enormous capacity for sustained
guerrilla warfare, they noted. Golts warned the U.S. not to
repeat the Soviet mistake of putting undue focus on civil

reconstruction projects as a way to demonstrate an improved
situation in the country, as they came at the expense of
addressing the more urgent security challenges. Lukin agreed
that getting control of the security situation was the top
priority, and in this connection questioned the wisdom of
focusing too much attention on the democratization process
and the voter registration efforts for the upcoming
presidential elections. In his view, introducing too much
democracy at this stage was dangerous, as Afghanistan needed
first and foremost a leader who could have effective control
of the country, rather than a leader who could get the most
votes.
BEYRLE