RUSSIA AND NATO AFTER GEORGIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000511 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2019 TAGS: PREL NATO MARR RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA AND NATO AFTER GEORGIA REF: MOSCOW 355 Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: As the Alliance debates the nature and future of the NATO-Russia relationship, and with the more positive approach by the U.S. and Russia, we have an opportunity now to set NATO-Russia relations on a new path that acknowledges our common commitment to strengthening transatlantic security, rebuilding confidence, and breaking down the barriers between us. To do this, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) will need to be less a "tool to manage Russia," and more a means of developing common approaches to joint challenges, addressing Moscow's security concerns and seeking to manage crises before they escalate. As we consider the proposal for a joint review of NRC structure and priorities, we should look at reorienting the NRC to elicit a more constructive pattern of engagement with Russia, including addressing not just "fair weather" issues, but also matters such as missile defense, arms control/non-proliferation (including CFE),and Medvedev's European Security Treaty proposal. Without accepting Russian assertions of "privileged spheres of influence" in the post-Soviet space, the NRC could also test Russia's willingness to strengthen cooperation on Afghanistan by seeking to leverage Moscow's claims of influence to encourage greater engagement by Central Asian states. We should revive robust mil-mil cooperation, including in such areas as counter-piracy and counterterrorism. Deflecting efforts to move the NRC into unhelpful channels, we should still consider using the NRC as a crisis-management forum to help identify and defuse future tensions. Although this may cause concern in Tbilisi and Kiev, we can balance it through continued support for Georgian and Ukrainian security and aspirations to eventual NATO membership. Moscow will not be an easy partner, but we should seize this opportunity to set a new path with Russia, aimed initially at securing more constructive engagement from Moscow, and eventually at establishing a more positive and cooperative relationship. End Summary. -------------- A Genuine Partnership -------------- ¶2. (C) The NATO-Russia discussion at the March 4-5 Ministerial gives the Alliance the opportunity to assess whether and how to restructure or reorient the NRC in the post-Georgia conflict environment. Before the Georgia conflict, both Alliance members and Russia often lamented that there were few ideas for practical joint cooperation, apart from Afghanistan and some military exercises, and that NATO-Russia meetings often lacked real substance. We should encourage Russia to make good on its arguments that the NRC is neither a "gift to Russia," nor a "tool to manage Russia," but a means of establishing a "genuine partnership" focused on issues of concern to all participants. Building confidence in the NATO-Russian partnership will require working towards the goal of NRC meetings being "at 27," not "26-plus-1," with members willing to discuss not just the issues NATO is concerned about, but also Russia's security concerns, such as Georgia, missile defense, and NATO enlargement. While Russia will often be a difficult partner and seek to set the agenda it wants, willingness to consult on issues of concern to Moscow can enable us to make the NRC a forum for more substantive cooperation. ¶3. (C) GOR officials acknowledge that the recent NRC informal sessions are "steps in the right direction." Speaking publicly in Moscow February 26, Russian Ambassador Rogozin said that both sides were "satisfied with the pace of re-establishing the work of the NRC." In remarks to the Spanish press March 1, President Medvedev lauded cooperation on Afghanistan and called for increased efforts. The MFA agrees that NATO and Russia should not wait until the next crisis to step up cooperation. In addition to Afghanistan, they envision the NRC serving as a forum to cooperate on missile defense, the Cooperative Threat Initiative, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, piracy, and migration. However, they stress that Russia is not NATO's "lap dog," to answer only when the Alliance dictates when dialogue with the GOR should take place. -------------- NRC as a Crisis Management Tool -------------- MOSCOW 00000511 002 OF 003 ¶4. (C) Moscow argues that the August war in Georgia revealed a major defect in NATO's relationship with Russia. By siding with Georgia and subsequently suspending NATO-Russia Council meetings for five months, the argument goes, NATO demonstrated that there was not a "true partnership" with Russia. MFA officials contend that the Georgia crisis might have been prevented if NATO had allowed Russia to discuss its concerns about Georgia in the NRC prior to the August conflict. They argue that if NATO had known about Georgia's plan to attack South Ossetia, it should have notified the GOR; if NATO did not know of Saakashvili's plans, then the Georgian president interpreted the Intensified Dialogue as carte blanche to launch his attack. They complain that during the conflict, it was not clear what NATO's role was. ¶5. (C) Rather than rehashing this fruitless debate, we need to refocus Moscow on future crisis management. The NRC could serve as a forum for doing so, while recognizing it is not a substitute for the UN Security Council. Such efforts would be complicated by Russia's desire to revisit the events of August, in order to present Moscow's side of the issue, which it believes was suppressed. However, Russian concern that the current situation in the South Caucasus not lead to a repeat of last summer's military escalation is a hook for reorienting our conversation, and can reinforce OSCE, EU and UN dialogues. -------------- Managing Contentious Issues -------------- ¶6. (C) Even given the more positive rhetoric of late, Russia remains resolutely opposed to Georgian, and particularly Ukrainian, membership in NATO. GOR officials have welcomed statements by the Secretary that the two countries are not ready for NATO membership (even though former Secretary Rice also said the same),and interpret this as a willingness by the new Administration to go slower in pressing for a NATO Membership Action Plan for the two. DFM Grushko told the Ambassador that Georgia and Ukraine's NATO aspirations were not about their right to choose their own alliances, but about Russia's "sphere of security" and military-industrial interests (reftel). While not conceding Russia's "sphere" of interests, and continuing support for the two countries through continued political and security support under the Charters and engagement in the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Councils, we should also seek to lower the rhetoric, stressing the importance of restoring stability in the region. We have consistently been the force for new ideas and initiatives in the NRC. Strengthening our partnership and adding content to NATO-Russia military and counterterrorism operations will reduce suspicions over the NATO-Georgia and NATO-Ukraine Councils. -------------- The European Security Treaty -------------- ¶7. (C) Many have questioned whether Medvedev's proposed European Security Treaty (EST) is intended to replace or weaken NATO, despite GOR disclaimers it is not. Russia insists that the world does not need the "NATO of yesterday," which, officials argue, represents a division of Europe and cannot serve as a sufficient guarantor of peace, but wants the Alliance to become more open and inclusive. Medvedev's proposal, they contend, is intended to address the gaps and failures in European security, which NATO, the OSCE, EU, CSTO, and individual nations cannot satisfactorily guarantee. While there are many unanswered questions as to the impact such a treaty would have on NATO and the other existing structures, efforts to establish a more effective partnership in the NRC and enhancements in the OSCE's hard security role could help us steer the EST proposal in a more positive direction. -------------- Adding Content to the Relationship -------------- ¶8. (C) We have an opportunity to reorient the NRC to make Russia a more constructive contributor. We have already made progress on cooperation on Afghanistan, and the NRC would be a good forum for testing Russia's stated willingness to do more, including using its influence to encourage greater engagement by Central Asian nations (this would not be conceding Russia's ability to dominate the region, but MOSCOW 00000511 003 OF 003 leveraging Moscow's influence to obtain a mutually-desired outcome). As the U.S. continues its review of missile defense, and arms control and non-proliferation goals, we could consider reviving the former discussions, and adding the latter, including CFE, in NRC discussions. In addition to the OSCE, the NRC could also be a forum for addressing the EST proposal, enabling us to identify ways to include some of the EST ideas in the two institutions, thereby eliminating some of Moscow's arguments in favor of an entirely new treaty. The Alliance is already looking to restart mil-mil cooperation, and we should look for new areas for practical endeavors, such as counter-piracy and counterterrorism. ¶9. (C) We should also consider using the NRC more effectively as a crisis management tool. Although there are differences of opinion over whether the NRC would have been an appropriate forum for discussing the growing tensions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia prior to the Georgia conflict, using the NRC as such a forum in the future may help identify and defuse such tensions more quickly. ¶10. (C) Moscow values the NRC as giving Russia a voice in the most powerful military alliance in the world, even if it does not have the veto it would prefer. Russia will not be an easy partner, and will often complicate our efforts by pressing for unacceptable agenda items, avoiding those it would prefer not to address, or using anti-NATO rhetoric to maintain support domestically for a strong military in difficult economic times. But, with the positive focus now between the U.S. and Russia, we should take advantage of the proposal to conduct a joint review of the structure and priorities of the NRC, seizing the opportunity to set NATO-Russian relations on a new path, one that acknowledges our common commitment to strengthening transatlantic security, rebuilding confidence, and breaking down the barriers between us. BEYRLE