RUSSIA SET ON A MOSCOW MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000496 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL LE IR IS SY RS XF SUBJECT: RUSSIA SET ON A MOSCOW MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE, DESPITE LIMITED INFLUENCE IN THE REGION REF: USUN 159 Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Lavrov's February 15-19 visit to the Middle East reinforced Russia's intention to convene a Moscow Middle East conference (and ward off Sarkozy's entry into the race for MEPP summitry). The GOR now aims to hold an April or May meeting that Russian officials argue will restart the Israel-Palestine track after its violent disruption in Gaza, while also advancing the Syrian and Lebanese tracks. Lavrov is likely to urge Quartet partners to agree to a date at the March 2 meeting in Sharm al-Sheikh. Despite some minor successes in the region, Russian claims to have a real impact in the Middle East have been diminished by an inability or unwillingness to convince its friends in Damascus and Tehran to rein in Hizbollah and Hamas. Russian Middle East diplomacy remains geared toward enhancing Moscow's profile on the international stage and potential economic benefits resulting from closer engagement with regional governments. Ironically, the one Middle Eastern country with whom traditionally Arab-friendly Russia presently enjoys a genuinely warm relationship is Israel, although this has not prevented Moscow from pushing Tel Aviv to agree to its conference at the same time the GOR denies Israeli calls for Russia to take a harder line on the threats presented by Syria and Iran. End summary. Gaza Crisis Offers Russia Hope -------------- ¶2. (C) FM Lavrov toured Middle Eastern capitals February 15-19 to take the pulse of the region following the Gaza crisis and rally support for a Moscow Middle East conference that the GOR is now considering for late April or May. Despite Israel's military incursion into Gaza, combined with failed Palestinian reconciliation and political uncertainty in Israel, the GOR contends that Gaza has given the Moscow conference a new lease on life. MFA officials have been telling us since January that the GOR felt strongly that a Moscow conference could revive the peace process once the dust settled in Gaza. While Lavrov had previously scheduled bilaterals with the Egyptians, he used the temporary cease-fire to embark on a broader trip intended to catch Arab and Israeli leaders while the region remained in a state of flux and the post-Gaza positions of regional capitals had yet to harden. Unfortunately for Lavrov, he reached Tel Aviv before it was clear which party leader would form the next government, and came away with mixed signals on the level of Israeli support for a Moscow conference. Livni maintained a more open attitude toward the conference than Netanyahu, according to the GOR, although neither indicated whether or not Israel would attend under a government they headed. When we quizzed the MFA about the utility of holding a Middle East conference in the current environment, officials were quick to point out that UNSCR 1860 commits the Quartet to "consider" a Moscow meeting in 2009, and Lavrov will raise the issue at the Quartet meeting in Sharm al-Sheikh. Inspires a Broader Agenda -------------- ¶3. (C) The GOR is determined to pursue an ambitious agenda for its Middle East conference. Whereas in January, when fighting continued in Gaza, the MFA said the meeting would focus on restarting the Israel-Palestine track after its violent interruption, Russian officials now say that the conference will include the Lebanon and Syria tracks. DFM Saltanov recently underscored that the Moscow conference should be an opportunity to "resume work on all the tracks" of the peace process, while Perm Rep Churkin told the UNSC that the GOR would not limit potential topics for discussion (reftel). How Moscow will square this with Tel Aviv's reluctance to allow Russia such comprehensive involvement in its negotiations with Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon remains to be seen. Moscow Has Been Waiting a Long Time -------------- ¶4. (C) The GOR began seriously pursuing the idea of a Moscow Middle East conference in 2007, although the concept had been kicking around since then-President Putin first proposed a Moscow meeting on the Middle East in 2005. Moscow claimed that its relations with Damascus and Hamas meant that Russia was uniquely qualified to play this role in the peace process, although it understood that the Israel-Palestine track was the key to settling the other issues and would remain the focus of the meeting. Following FM Lavrov's 2008 trip to the region, the GOR claimed that Russia had support from the Arab states and Israel to hold a conference that MOSCOW 00000496 002 OF 003 would continue the momentum begun at Annapolis. Moscow's rationale for hosting a conference took a hit when the Turkish-mediated discussions between Israel and Syria became public and Egypt's work toward Palestinian reconciliation appeared to bear fruit. Although the GOR praised these efforts, it was clear that Russian officials saw their chance to play a leading role in the peace process slipping away, particularly after Tel Aviv made it clear to Moscow that it did not want outside intervention in ongoing bilateral negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. The Gaza crisis gave Russia a pretext to argue that a Moscow conference would restart the peace process, but also presented the threat of Sarkozy's proposed ME conference, which would have stolen Moscow's thunder and made Lavrov's recent regional trip a priority. The Limits of Russian Diplomacy in the Middle East -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Russian diplomatic efforts in the region are a mixed bag - the GOR maintains close relations with Syria and has a line of communication open with Hamas, but has shown limited success in influencing their behavior. Although Russia did not play a role in the diplomatic efforts resulting in the Israel-Hamas cease-fire, DFM Saltanov may have had some impact when he personally urged Hamas leader Mesha'al to be more flexible and understand that it was necessary to provide Israel with the prospect halting Hamas rocket fire and smuggling weapons into Gaza. More typically, however, regular regional trips by Lavrov, Saltanov, and other Russian officials demonstrate the limited nature of Russian influence in the region. This was especially the case during the 2008 political crisis in Lebanon, when the U.S. and others looked to Russia to call upon Damascus and Tehran to allow a settlement in Beirut. While Moscow may have sent a stern message to both capitals, the MFA admitted that there were limits to Russian influence on Syria and Iran, both of which valued Hizbollah for its ability to confront Israel. In the case of Syria, the GOR has been unwilling to threaten a cutoff of military sales to increase its leverage over its primary Arab ally in the region. Russian observers argue that so long as Russia is unwilling to spend such political capital, or spend financially by providing aid to the region, it will remain on the sidelines as the U.S. continues to dominate Middle Eastern diplomacy. Parochial Interests Behind Russian Efforts -------------- ¶6. (C) Russia's diplomatic efforts in the Middle East are driven by the dual goals of enhancing Russia's international stature and advancing its economic interests. Putin's "historic" trips to the region as President marked the opening of a diplomatic offensive that saw Moscow reinvigorate ties to the region that had atrophied under the "weak Russia" of the 1990s. The return of Russia as a player in the region was intended to raise Moscow's international profile and help fulfill its self-appointed role of serving as a "bridge" between the West and the Muslim world. ¶7. (C) Greater access to Middle Eastern markets has also been a goal of Russian diplomacy, and Putin was accompanied to the region by Russian business leaders looking for energy, transportation, and arms deals. Success for Moscow has, however, been more elusive than it first appeared: a much touted contract to build a new Saudi railway was canceled in 2008, the same year that Algeria returned what it claimed were poor quality MIGs. Russian analysts argue that many of the contracts Russian firms "won" were actually given by Arab governments that want to appear to balance relations with the U.S. in an attempt to appeal to the anti-American sentiments of their populace. Defense analysts dismiss Russian claims to have increased military sales to the region, with Syria remaining the only significant market for Russian arms. The bright spot remains the energy sector, where Russian cooperation with the Gulf States can benefit both sides, and Israel may become a major consumer of Russian gas. Strong Ties to Israel... -------------- ¶8. (C) The close ties Russia developed with Israel under Putin play an increasingly important part in Russian activity in the Middle East, and has transformed Russia from its traditional pro-Arab stance of the Soviet era. The GOR maintained an evenhanded approach to the recent crisis in Gaza by calling upon both sides to refrain from harming civilians, while the Russian public's sympathy for Israel was interpreted as an echo of Russia's own experience fighting Islamic extremists in the Caucasus. Israeli politicians and diplomats are a regular presence in Moscow and Sochi, where MOSCOW 00000496 003 OF 003 they meet Medvedev, Putin, and Lavrov, typically to stress Israeli concern over Iran and Syria as well as to discuss bilateral matters. Trade has increased significantly, from $700 million in 2003 to around $2.5 billion today. Israel's large Russian-speaking population and regular travel by Russians and Israelis have made the relationship one of personal contacts as much as official channels. The return to Russia in 2008 of historic property in Jerusalem originally acquired during the Czarist era will allow the establishment of a new Russian cultural center and consulate, expanding Moscow's physical presence at a time when recently inaugurated visa free travel will increase Russian travel to Israel, and vice versa. ...Only Go So Far -------------- ¶9. (C) Close ties to Israel have not prevented Moscow from maintaining its pragmatic approach to Syria and Iran, both of which remain potential customers for Russian anti-aircraft systems despite Moscow's assurances to Washington and Tel Aviv that it will not sell weapons that would destabilize the region. The GOR recently offered to donate 10 MIG-29s to the Lebanese military, arguing it was a positive move in support of Beirut, despite Israeli opposition. Russia's ability to balance a warm relationship with Israel with pragmatic relations with Arab states and Iran demonstrates an ability to compartmentalize in the interests of maintaining the few diplomatic tools that allows Russia to remain engaged in the region. BEYRLE