RUSSIAN MFA ON GENEVA TALKS ABOUT GEORGIA CONFLICT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000488 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG OSCE UN SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA ON GENEVA TALKS ABOUT GEORGIA CONFLICT Classified By: Pol M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: MFA CIS Fourth Department Conflicts Division Chief Aleksey Dvinyanin February 26 characterized the incident response and prevention mechanism as the first concrete result of the February 17-18 Geneva process. He expressed disappointment that the humanitarian working group did not achieve results, but stressed that Russia's priority was to create a secure process for the return of "refugees" rather than access for humanitarian aid from the south. He saw no need to advance the next meeting from June, reiterating Russia's arguments that the issues could better be handled in other fora such as the UN, and contended we should evaluate how the new incident mechanism was working first. Calling Czech warnings to Belarus about recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia "irresponsible," Dvinyanin said it had placed the entire Geneva process in jeopardy. Reaffirming Moscow's support for its proposals on OSCE and UN mandates, Dvinyanin was optimistic about the renegotiation of a UN observer mandate, but pessimistic regarding the OSCE mission. Dvinyanin accused the EU monitoring mission of failing to notice the strong Georgian military presence near South Ossetia. He confirmed that Russian embassies would be prepared to represent Abkhaz and South Ossetian interests if asked to do so, in accordance with the December inter-MFA MOUs with the breakaway regions. He assured us that the sole purpose of the upcoming border demarcation was to delineate the borders to Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Russia as they had been during the time of the Soviet Union. End Summary. -------------- Geneva Process -------------- Working Group 1: Purposeful vagueness -------------- ¶2. (C) MFA CIS Fourth Department Conflicts Division Chief Aleksey Dvinyanin saw the results of the February 17-18 Geneva talks as making some progress, characterizing the agreement on incident response and prevention as the first concrete result of the Geneva process and the first practical agreement since the August conflict. He lauded the U.S. delegation and specifically A/S Fried's role in the talks. Explaining that the agreement had been purposely left vague and "flexible" to allow the "participants in the field" to flesh out practical details such as varying the number of participant parties according to the nature of meetings (e.g., just South Ossetians and Georgians to exchange information, or Russia, the OSCE, and the EU joining the two parties in other contexts),Dvinyanin voiced hope that the mechanism "would actually be used." Working Group 2: Wrong priority -------------- ¶3. (C) Dvinyanin expressed disappointment with the lack of tangible outcomes in the second working group on refugees and IDPs. He asserted that too much time and attention had been focused on deliveries of humanitarian aid, and lack of access from the south. Russia would prefer the working group to focus on the return of IDPs and refugees, which was a more critical issue. Russia had "different priorities" because its aid already "fully sufficed" to cover the humanitarian needs in the breakaway regions. As examples, he named financial assistance and the rebuilding of villages, including those inhabited by ethnic Georgians. Russia did not mind if South Ossetia chose to ask for international assistance, but understood its sensitivities to the route by which aid might be delivered. ¶4. (C) Russia's humanitarian priority, Dvinyanin stated, was to create a secure process for the return of "refugees." Therefore, Russia supported South Ossetian special representative Chochiev's proposal that the two Geneva working groups on security and IDP return meet jointly or be merged, or that the issue be discussed in a broad session "with all participants," though he steered clear of calling it a plenary session. Dvinyanin underscored that verifying refugee status for those claiming it was also important. Stabilizing the situation on the borders and "liquidating hatred" were the most pressing requirements for progress on humanitarian issues. Next meeting -------------- ¶5. (C) Despite the need for progress on security, Dvinyanin questioned the need for a new meeting in Geneva before June. Calling the Geneva process "informal talks," he asserted that other international fora such as the UN were better equipped MOSCOW 00000488 002 OF 003 to address the issues of security and humanitarian assistance. He suggested that we should evaluate how the new incident prevention mechanism was working before scheduling another round. He intimated that holding the next Geneva meeting in June at the same time as discussions on the renewal of the UN and OSCE mandates would make sense. ¶6. (C) Describing Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg's February 23 statement that Belarus would incur difficulties in its relationship to the EU if it were to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as "irresponsible," Dvinyanin said the Russian MFA had taken note at the highest level and sent a report to Prime Minister Putin. Dvinyanin noted that Abkhazia was now threatening not to participate in another round of Geneva talks unless the Czechs apologized, and added that such types of statements could jeopardize the entire Geneva process. ¶7. (C) When asked about the possibility of working group meetings in the interim, Dvinyanin stated that it was Russia's "principled position" that there should be no separate meetings, both due to the interlinkage of the groups' issues, and due to the strain it would impose on the Abkhaz and South Ossetians to staff frequent meetings. -------------- Observer mandates -------------- ¶8. (C) While Dvinyanin was downbeat on the prospects for renegotiating an OSCE observer mandate because of South Ossetian distrust of the OSCE, he was more sanguine regarding the UN observer mission in Abkhazia, because Sukhumi wanted international monitors. OSCE -------------- ¶9. (C) Elaborating on the OSCE mission renewal, Dvinyanin noted South Ossetian disapproval of the OSCE observers' performance during the August conflict as well as now, and said that the South Ossetian views were colored by "antipathy." Russia therefore could not do much to change the South Ossetian position that there would be no OSCE observers in South Ossetia until the OSCE agreed to equal field presences in Tskhinvali and Tbilisi that were independent from one another. ¶10. (C) Despite our protests, Dvinyanin criticized the Greek OSCE efforts as too inflexible. Russia's earlier proposals for equal presences in Tbilisi and Tskhinvali for political, economic, and humanitarian support still stood, Dvinyanin maintained, as Russia did not see how to deviate from the proposal's main points. Citing the examples of OSCE missions in Chechnya and pre-independence Kosovo, he insisted that a mission in Tskhinvali equal to and independent from Tbilisi's would not constitute recognition of South Ossetian independence. UN -- ¶11. (C) Dvinyanin praised UNSCR 1866 as "useful," as its provisions "avoided" the questions of territorial integrity and status. If that approach were maintained until June, he thought it would be "simple" to draft a new mandate that focused on the non-use of force and human rights. He noted that Russia stood by its proposals containing "various new options" for a mission, despite their rejection by the U.S. in New York. No progress without recognition -------------- ¶12. (C) Noting Vice President Biden's remark in Munich about "pressing the reset button" in U.S.-Russia relations, Dvinyanin wrapped up his views on the Geneva talks by stating Georgia should not become an obstacle in the greater U.S.-Russia agenda. -------------- Border situation -------------- ¶13. (C) Dvinyanin accused the EU monitoring mission of failing to notice the strong Georgian military presence -- "including tanks and rocket launchers" -- near the administrative border to South Ossetia since it signed an MOU with the Georgian Defense Ministry on January 26. We pushed back, noting the reports of separate UNOMIG and EU no-notice inspections of the border areas during the week of February MOSCOW 00000488 003 OF 003 17, in which both missions did not detect any force levels in excess of the agreed numbers. Dvinyanin remained skeptical, but could only point out that no-notice inspections were not part of the MOU. He stated that Russia was considering joint inspections or invoking the incident response and prevention mechanism. -------------- Interest sections -------------- ¶14. (C) In response to reports about Russian plans to set up Abkhaz and South Ossetian interest sections in Russian embassies overseas, Dvinyanin explained that one of the provisions in the inter-MFA memoranda of understanding signed during the working visits of "Foreign Ministers" Shamba and Dzhioev in December allowed the Russian MFA to represent South Ossetian or Abkhaz interests abroad "if the need arose, or if requested." Given that South Ossetia and Abkhazia were "small countries" with little means and staff, Dvinyanin surmised that Russian diplomats would initially represent the two enclaves' interests, but in any case expected it would take time for the MOU to "fully come into force." -------------- Border delineation -------------- ¶15. (C) Dvinyanin told us that Alexander Golovin, special presidential envoy for the delimitation and demarcation of the state border with neighboring CIS countries, would not personally get involved with the demarcation of the "state borders" between Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which he had announced on February 17 to begin this year. Dvinyanin assured us that the sole purpose of the demarcation exercise was to delineate the borders as they had been during the time of the Soviet Union, and not shift them. BEYRLE