RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE ON AFGHANISTAN: LETHAL TRANSIT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000457 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KG RS SUBJECT: RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE ON AFGHANISTAN: LETHAL TRANSIT, MANAS REF: A. MOSCOW 270 ¶B. MOSCOW 220 ¶C. MOSCOW 357 ¶D. 08 MOSCOW 3655 ¶E. BISHKEK 131 ¶F. STATE 14097 Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Russia has repeatedly signaled its openness to considering additional transit agreements to Afghanistan, with the implication these could include lethal equipment. As we begin shipments of non-lethal supplies through the Northern Dimension Network (NDN),and with the future of U.S. presence at the Manas air base still unclear, such an agreement could significantly reinforce our supply routes, potentially leverage Moscow's influence with Central Asian nations, and enhance U.S.-Russian cooperation in an area of vital national security interest to both countries. German and French air transit of lethal equipment, pursuant to their bilateral agreements, has been going smoothly for years, according to their Embassy officials. However, Russia is not a substitute for Manas, Russia may try to attach one or several price tags to such cooperation: suspension of missile defense deployment, slowdown in NATO enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia, use of Russian airlift and/or payment of air navigation fees. While Russian motivations may include demonstrating that "all roads to Central Asia lead through Moscow," Russia's desire to be a co-equal player with the U.S. on a matter of global importance and to be considered as essential to our success in Afghanistan may produce more constructive cooperation. Opening a dialogue on lethal transit will enable us to gauge the willingness of Moscow to cooperate as well as the costs. At the same time, if we want to try to keep Manas, we can test Moscow's claim that the base is a U.S.-Kyrgyz issue that Russia has not tried to influence. End summary. Russia Wants to Help - Sort of -------------- ¶2. (C) As we have noted (ref A),while Russia has emphasized its interest in cooperating more closely on Afghanistan and stressed the threat to Russia of instability there, Moscow places a strategic priority on consolidating its influence over Central Asia (ref B). Thus, while Russian officials have told us they recognize the importance of the Manas Air Base to Washington's efforts in Afghanistan, it is widely believed that Moscow (despite GOR denials) linked its aid package to Kyrgyzstan to eviction of the U.S. from Manas. Russia wants to be seen as the dominant player in the region, but this does not mean that we cannot seek to enlist more cooperation on Afghanistan, and potentially on Manas. GOR Open to Considering Lethal Transit Agreement -------------- --- ¶3. (C) Citing Medvedev in the February 12 meeting with U/S Burns, NSC Senior Director for Russia McFaul, and Amb. Beyrle, FM Lavrov said that Russia was "ready to consider virtually all options on transit" (ref C). DFM Borodavkin urged that Russian overtures on Afghanistan not be allowed to lapse, and hinted that we should not delay. On February 11 (almost immediately following the U.S.-Russian consultations on Afghanistan February 10-11 and reports that transit across Russia of U.S. non-lethal supplies for ISAF would begin soon),FM Lavrov responded to a press question whether Russia would allow transit of weapons by saying "additional steps are also possible." He added that Russia and NATO had discussed in March and April 2008 the possibility of using Russian military transport for ISAF's needs. "There could be other agreements too," Lavrov said. MFA Deputy Director for NATO Gorlach also indicated that Moscow would be open to considering an agreement on transit of lethal supplies, similar to what the French and Germans had, but cautioned that such an agreement would require Duma approval. While Russian overtures have been framed in a bilateral context, a lethal transit agreement could also be explored or expanded in a NATO-Russia Council context. MOSCOW 00000457 002 OF 003 German, French Lethal Transit Going Smoothly -------------- ¶4. (C) In his meeting with Burns and McFaul, Lavrov noted the ease of the German and French transit arrangements for lethal equipment and personnel. German and French colleagues confirmed to us that their bilateral arrangements for such transit have been going smoothly for years. (The German shipment for dangerous goods was halted this week because of new demands by Uzbekistan for 30-day advance notification). The Germans have one-two flights a week that carry personnel and overfly Russia, without landing. They also have one-two flights per week that carry lethal goods (e.g. ammunition) which land in Krasnodar, are inspected, refuel, fly out to Uzbekistan and then return through Russia to Germany. The French also fly into Krasnodar, and then on to Kyrgyzstan. In order to avoid problems, the Germans station a military officer in Krasnodar, and invite all the relevant officials to their Embassy for a meeting once a year. Our German colleague confirmed that the GoG paid overflight and navigation fees, in addition to landing and fuel taxes. She added that Germany also has an agreement to ship lethal equipment by ground but has never used it. They planned to start earlier this year (ref D),to ship airplane fuel, but were told by the MFA to use the NATO commercial arrangement instead, as it would be "easier." We understand that the French and German bilateral agreements required Duma approval. President Medvedev is set to sign a similar agreement with the Spanish during his upcoming visit to Madrid. Working with Russia on Manas? -------------- ¶5. (C) A dialogue on transit for lethal goods could also allow us to test Moscow's willingness to work with us on Manas, as suggested by Embassy Bishkek (ref E). Despite what appears a clear effort by Russia to get the U.S. out of Central Asia, when pressed on the importance of Manas, GOR officials claim that Russia wants "to consult on the need for U.S. presence in Central Asia," implying that Russia may not be completely opposed to such a presence, but wants to have a voice in the decision. Caveats -------------- ¶6. (C) We are not suggesting that transit across Russia is a substitute for Manas. Geography, political and financial considerations preclude a neat substitution. The state flights issue alone, in which Moscow is demanding the U.S. pay air navigation fees for all USG flights, including military, could impose a prohibitive cost on operations, unless resolved. ¶7. (C) Additionally, in his press comments, FM Lavrov said that an agreement on lethal transit might be possible "if the broader relationship between Moscow and the West improves." Some interpret this as meaning "if the U.S. suspends its missile defense plans and efforts to enlarge NATO to Georgia and Ukraine." We will not know what the trade-off will be until and unless we engage. ¶8. (C) There are also officials and commentators who see the U.S. and Russia as engaged in a zero-sum game in Central Asia, and who will therefore see such a deal as the U.S. conceding Russia's influence over the region and acknowledging that "all roads to Central Asia lead through Moscow." But, Moscow clearly has - and will use - weapons at its disposal (e.g. financial) to sway Central Asian nations towards its orbit and away from the U.S. Given palpable Russian interest in building up strategic cooperation on Afghanistan as a new leg to U.S.-Russian relations, we should explore whether we can leverage Moscow's influence with these countries to obtain what we want. Uzbekistan, for instance, has told us it would not agree to transit of lethal goods. But Russia and the U.S. working together to seek Uzbekistan's cooperation will be a much more powerful case than if we are on opposite sides. MOSCOW 00000457 003 OF 003 Comment: No Harm in Talking -------------- ¶9. (C) The GOR has publicly played up its cooperation in allowing transit of non-lethal supplies across Russia to ISAF, and indicated its willingness to consider transit of lethal equipment. Cooperation on such a public, high-profile issue plays into Russia's desire to be taken seriously as a major power and to be seen as an "equal" with the U.S. At the same time, a dialogue on lethal transit could allow us to more fully explain U.S. military intentions in Central Asia and gauge Moscow's willingness to change course on Manas. While ultimately the price Russia may exact for such a deal may be too high, we lose nothing by exploring the possibility. BEYRLE