DEMARCHE DELIVERED: NPT BACKGROUND INFO AND RUSSIAN POC

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000423 DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/MNSA GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION UNVIE FOR IAEA USUN FOR POL USNATO FOR POL USEU FOR POL SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PGOV PREL UNGA IAEA NPT SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: NPT BACKGROUND INFO AND RUSSIAN POC REF: A. STATE 6970 ¶B. 08 MOSCOW 1169 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: On February 18 we delivered ref A demarche to MFA DVBR Division Head and NPT point of contact Aleksey Karpov, who said the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was a major priority for the GOR and Russia wanted to see it strengthened. For the current review cycle, he said Russia would focus on multilateral cooperation and peaceful uses for nuclear power, and urged the U.S. not to make Iran a major focus of the upcoming third PrepCom, or the 2010 Review Conference. He suggested we not seek to get a Joint Statement from the PrepCom, but rely on the Statement from the second PrepCom. While reiterating that states have the right to enrich and reprocess uranium, he noted Russia's desire to strengthen participation in the Angarsk Center and international nuclear fuel bank to help prevent proliferation of nuclear materials. Russia saw P-5 consultations as the most effective way of setting NPT priorities, and urged a P-5 meeting prior to the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) meeting March 13-14 in Annecy, France (near Geneva). It would be a positive impetus going into the Review Conference if the U.S. signed on to the CTBT, and if the U.S. and Russia were able to reach agreement on a post-START Treaty. Karpov suggested that the U.S. and Russia jointly issue the U.S.-drafted paper on "Expanding International Civil Nuclear Cooperation," but noted the GOR had never received a response to its edits to the document. End summary. -------------- GOR Goals for the NPT -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On February 18 MFA DVBR Division Head and NPT point of contact Aleksey Karpov told us the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was a major priority for the GOR. Russia, he said, wanted very much to reach an agreement on how to strengthen the treaty. ¶3. (SBU) Karpov said that for this current review process, Russia would focus on peaceful uses for nuclear power and multilateral cooperation. Arguing that there was great interest among many countries to develop nuclear power, Karpov mentioned the international uranium enrichment center (IUEC) in Angarsk, which was currently looking to expand uranium enrichment capabilities to 
include customers outside of Russia, and the international nuclear fuel bank as evidence of Russia's willingness to cooperate with other countries as they safely take advantage of nuclear power. He pointed out that Kazakhstan had signed up to the IUEC, and that Ukraine and Armenia may soon join as well. The international nuclear fuel bank, he said, could be located in Russia, but would be managed by the IAEA. -------------- Dealing with Iran, North Korea, India, and Pakistan -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) While acknowledging concern about non-NPT members, Karpov urged that Iran not be the main focus of the current review process. He argued that many states have different approaches to Iran, and disagreement on this one issue would prevent the parties from reaching agreement on a myriad of other issues. IAEA inspections, he argued were the best way to insure Iranian enrichment programs were peaceful in nature. North Korea was being handled in the Six-Party talks, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group was an effective forum for handling issues concerning India and Pakistan. -------------- The Prospect of Parties Violating the Treaty -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Karpov told us the prospect of countries violating and then withdrawing from the NPT was not an issue the GOR was focused on. He said that, during the 2005 session, the GOR circulated a paper, but never received a response. He said that the GOR still considered this paper a topic for discussion. The GOR's positions laid out in the paper have not changed, he said. He said the GOR otherwise had no comment on prospect of countries violating and then withdrawing from the NPT. -------------- -------------- Pursuing Negotiations Relating To Nuclear Disarmament -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Karpov said that the GOR urges countries to sign on to the NPT in its bilateral relations with countries. He reiterated Russia's position that sovereign countries have the right to enrich and reprocess uranium. Russia, he said, can offer alternatives, such as use of the Angarsk Center or the international nuclear fuel bank. ¶7. (SBU) Karpov argued for continued P-5 consultations, and suggested a meeting could be held prior to the March 13-14 CNS Annecy Workshop. The possibility of the U.S. signing on to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),as well as if the U.S. and Russia could agree on a post-START Treaty, would be an important impetus for the Review Conference. -------------- Lack of Safeguards' Universality -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Karpov said the GOR would like to see NPT safeguards agreements become universal, and agreed it should be discussed soon. -------------- What the GOR Wants from the U.S. -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Karpov said the GOR would like a response to its proposed amendments to the U.S. paper "Expanding International Civil Nuclear Cooperation" and suggested we consider releasing this paper as a joint U.S.-Russia document during the PrepCom (ref B). He said the GOR had no objection if other countries wished to sign on to the document as well. ¶10. (SBU) Karpov said the U.S. and Russia could cooperate in many areas to promote nonproliferation. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terror, he said, was a success, with 75 countries now signed on. He also suggested the CTBT and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty as other areas where the U.S. and Russia could eventually cooperate. BEYRLE