POLITICAL OPPOSITION ROUNDUP: PLAYERS AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 000414

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM RS
SUBJECT: POLITICAL OPPOSITION ROUNDUP: PLAYERS AND
PROSPECTS IN 2009

REF: A. MOSCOW 388

B. MOSCOW 290

C. MOSCOW 254

D. MOSCOW 201

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Alice Wells for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Political opposition forces in Russia
continue to hold little influence and do not pose any
challenge to the ruling regime. In 2008, the number of
nationally registered political parties in Russia decreased
from 14 to 6, with only one liberal democratic party
(Yabloko) among them. The democratic opposition in general
has almost no national-level support, with only small support
in Moscow and St. Petersburg. The Communist Party (KPRF) has
positioned itself best to benefit politically from the
economic crisis, as disaffected voters turn against the
ruling United Russia party. This cable enumerates the major
registered and unregistered opposition forces in Russia, with
attention to their prospects in 2009. End Summary.

Significant Changes to the Opposition Landscape in 2008
-------------- --------------


2. (C) The year 2008 included significant changes for
opposition politics in Russia, with the number of registered
nationally parties decreasing from 14 to 6 due to their
consolidation, dissolution, and transformation. The
inconsequential Party of Peace and Unity (a shell essentially
comprised of only party head Sazhi Umalatova) merged into the
Patriots of Russia, itself a small nationalist party with
only limited regional ambitions. The Agrarian Party
dissolved itself and joined United Russia, and the Green
Party transformed itself into a movement and awaits
absorption into Just Russia. The Party of Social Justice
merged into Just Russia. Under the weight of
multi-million-dollar debts and Kremlin pressure, the Union of
Right Forces (SPS) dissolved itself and merged with the
Democratic Party and Civil Force to form the new
Kremlin-friendly Right Cause. Finally, former prime minister
Mikhail Kasyanov's Russian People's Democratic Union (RNDS)
lost its registration in December.


3. (C) Three Duma parties are opposition parties in principle
if not practice: the Communist Party (KPRF),the
ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR),
and the Kremlin-aligned Just Russia. Two other parties enjoy
official national registration, the Patriots of Russia and
Yabloko, and the new Right Cause party, which was registered
to work and compete in 73 (of 88) Russian regions on February

18.

Just Russia: Kremlin-Aligned But Picking Up Protest Votes
-------------- --------------


4. (C) The Kremlin-backed Just Russia Party, led by Sergey
Mironov, holds 38 seats in the State Duma and calls itself a
"constructive opposition" party. However, the left-leaning
Just Russia has not opposed any significant policies endorsed
by United Russia and instead has attempted to position itself
as an alternative to the Communist Party. February 16 media
reports stated that Mironov had met with Kremlin Deputy Chief
of Staff Vladislav Surkov in what may be an effort to direct
voters disatisfied with United Russia toward Just Russia
instead of letting them defect to the Communists.


5. (C) Prognosis: Just Russia operates in lockstep with
United Russia and enjoys only tepid support among voters.
However, a more visible role for the party would indicate
increasing government fear about losing votes to the
Communists. The addition of new high-profile personalities
to Just Russia's leadership or candidate lists would further
signal its ascension if United Russia's popularity ebbs amid
the economic crisis.

Communist Party: Gaining New Life Amid Economic Turmoil
-------------- --------------


6. (C) The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF),
which holds 57 seats, is the only State Duma party that
overtly criticizes the regime, although within limits and
almost never on foreign policy. KPRF has protested more
visibly as the economic crisis has broadened, including
through public speeches lambasting the regime's anti-crisis
measures and through nation-wide public rallies on January

31. Although long-time KPRF leader Gennadiy Zyuganov has
publicly railed for total nationalization of Russia's natural
resources, other party leaders have indicated to us a
preference for a more social-democratic model that appeals
beyond the traditional pensioner-and-veteran demographic into

MOSCOW 00000414 002 OF 004


younger and more entrepreneurial voters (Ref B).


7. (C) Prognosis: The worsening economy likely will benefit
the Communists in the form of larger turnout at rallies and
higher vote tallies in March regional elections, although
party leaders predict widespread electoral fraud will hide
the extent of their wins. Regardless, KPRF lacks the State
Duma votes to derail legislation and requires government
permission to rally legally. KPRF does not yet represent a
viable threat to the regime, and the Communists have focused
more on broadening their public support than on calling for
public support to unseat Medvedev and Putin. The KPRF has
failed to develop a social-democratic agenda, and its support
base is oriented in an older generation that is passing from
the scene.

LDPR: Nationalists May Benefit From Economic Crisis
-------------- --------------


8. (C) The ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of
Russia (LDPR),helmed by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, maintains 40
seats in the State Duma and has backed nearly all of United
Russia's major domestic and foreign policy initiatives.
LDPR, as another controlled opposition party, offers voice to
the country's more radical nationalist elements and attracts
youthful voters amused by Zhirinovskiy's antics, but the
party does not initiate any major legislation and clashes
with United Russia only on smaller regional issues (e.g., a
recent row in January over electoral registration in Murmansk
region).


9. (C) Prognosis: Zhirinovskiy remains one of Russia's
premier political showmen, but his public support emanates
primarily from the public perception of external threats to
Russia. For this reason, LDPR's current platform extends
little beyond diatribes against the United States, Ukraine,
and Georgia. The economic crisis, increased xenophobia, and
anti-immigrant sentiment may attract more voters to the
party, but it poses no threat to the regime.

Right Cause: Leadership Woes, Limited Kremlin Support
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Leaders of the new Kremlin-friendly Right Cause told
us that the pro-business, ostensibly liberal party was the
brainchild of President Medvedev, and that it will target
educated and entrepreneurial voters, with the goal of
garnering between 8-15 percent of the vote in October
elections. Those same leaders acknowledged, however, that
Right Cause will operate within Kremlin-defined space and
will have no formal relations with non-Duma opposition
movements. Right Cause continues to suffer from fractured
central leadership among its three co-chairs (Leonid Gozman,
journalist Georgiy Bovt, and business leader Sergey Titov),
and recent difficulties naming a head of its Moscow City
branch has exposed limits to the party's Kremlin patronage
(Ref D). Right Cause Party submitted registration paperwork
on January 21 and reportedly will receive registration on
February 18.


11. (C) Prognosis: For the regime, Right Cause's biggest
success was stamping out the remains of the erstwhile SPS
opposition party. Now, Right Cause's troubles are
widespread: it has no support outside Moscow and St.
Petersburg; its leadership is fractured and suspicious of
each other; and it is running on a pro-business platform
during an economic crisis. Although fashioned by the regime
as a right-leaning counterweight to Just Russia, Right Cause
likely will struggle to build public support among liberal
democrats who see the party as a Kremlin stooge or among
business owners who are suffering from the economic crisis.

Solidarity: Kasparov's Latest Doomed Project
--------------


12. (C) In December, the Solidarity movement held its
inaugural congress to elect its leaders, including Garry
Kasparov, Boris Nemtsov, and Vladimir Milov. Described to us
by Milov as "Other Russia without the National Bolsheviks,"
Solidarity is building its membership from disaffected former
SPS members, human rights activists, and members of various
organizations that constituted Other Russia (including
Oborona Youth Movement, Smena, and Kasparov's own United
Civil Front). Solidarity's leaders have ensured us that they
are capable of attracting thousands of protesters to events,
but in their brief existence they have mustered no more than
200 people to any single event (Ref C). Solidarity's
leadership structure includes 13 opposition leaders in its
Presidium, but Kasparov remains the movement's public face.


13. (C) Prognosis: In private meetings, Kasparov has boldly

MOSCOW 00000414 003 OF 004


but implausibly predicted that Putin will be fired within one
year and that mass public rallies will push support for
liberal democracy (and, one presumes, for Solidarity).
However, the leadership has proven unable to organize
Solidarity's platform and its priorities differ depending on
which of its 13 leaders we speak with. Without a united
voice, the movement likely will flounder into obscurity as
did the Kasparov-led Other Russia and National Assembly.
Kasparov remains a polarizing figure, whose attacks on the
GOR are only outstripped by his diatribes against fellow
oppositionists.

National Bolshevik Party (NBP): Anarchists With Useful PR
-------------- --------------


14. (C) The banned NBP, led by radical writer Eduard Limonov,
appeals almost entirely to youth eager to participate in
anarchic street protests than in political discourse. The
Natsbols' modus operandi rarely varies: it advertises its
protests beforehand to the media, and at the appointed time
youths brandishing NBP flags and bright flares erupt into
protest chants. The police carry away the protesters, while
eager journalists take photographs. Limonov himself often is
arrested, as he was on the January 31 Dissenters' Day protest
in Moscow. Other stunts have included the July 2007 takeover
of a room in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the January
2008 takeover of a United Russia office in St. Petersburg.


15. (C) Prognosis: NBP holds no political power or ambitions,
and the "bolshevik" in its name refers only to its vague
desire for anti-establishment revolution. Limonov's ability
to attract supporters willing to be clubbed and arrested
benefits the opposition little domestically, but the dramatic
news photos of police brutality that appear in Western media
bolster the NBP's credentials among Russia's liberal
democratic opposition. For this reason, no matter how widely
they disagree on policy issues, opposition leaders such as
Garry Kasparov have been reluctant to fully shed their
working relationships with Limonov.

Yabloko: Democrats on Last Legs Financially, Electorally
-------------- --------------


16. (C) The last liberal democratic party with official
registration, Yabloko has minimal visibility at the national
level and, for financial reasons, competes today only in
municipal-level elections. A 2008 leadership shakeup
replaced party co-founder Grigoriy Yavlinskiy with Sergey
Mitrokhin. The party's regional presence has dwindled
sharply, so that today, for example, its Volgograd Region
branch has only 320 members, down from several thousand five
years ago. Facing threats from the government that the party
owes up to eight million dollars in debts stemming from the
2007 and 2008 campaigns, Mitrokhin told us Yabloko has shrunk
its aspirations simply to staying solvent and keeping its
party registration.


17. (C) Prognosis: Yabloko would seem a prime target to be
dismantled, perhaps under the pretense of party debts as SPS
was in 2008. However, with its meager membership rolls and
inability to raise funds, Yabloko does not represent a threat
to the regime. In fact, the regime can use Yabloko as a
symbol that democratic opposition lives in Russia. However,
lacking money, national media coverage, or even
regional-level electoral ambitions, Yabloko likely will
continue to languish in the political wilderness.

Government Restriction of Opposition
--------------


18. (SBU) The regime greatly limits the political opposition
and continues to develop new tactics to do so.

-- Exclusion From National Media: Non-Duma parties hostile to
the GOR generally are denied access to state-owned national
broadcast media or depicted in an unflattering light, and
even Duma parties such as the Communists struggle to receive
even minimal access.

-- Subversion and Intimidation: Numerous opposition leaders
face harassment, which ranges from pranks (such as being
doused with paint or having animal feces strewn on vehicles)
to violent assaults (such as at Solidarity's January 31 flash
mob rally). Opposition groups also face difficulty reserving
space for meetings, as Solidarity did for its December Moscow
Region congress. On February 6, media reports described how
the government had used moles to infiltrate the St.
Petersburg branch of Yabloko.

-- Refusal to Allow Assemblies: Opposition groups face
enormous obstacles in attempting to receive permits to hold

MOSCOW 00000414 004 OF 004


rallies. In Moscow, the city government regularly denies
democratic opposition group applications, or offers to issue
permits for secluded locations. The January 31 Dissenters'
Day marked a departure, however, as the Communists and LDPR
both received permits, and even the anti-auto tariff TIGR
group received permission for its small rally. On February
15, the city allowed a rally in honor of a journalist and a
human rights activist who recently were assassinated in
Moscow (Ref A).

-- Onerous Party Registration Process: Parties must gather at
least 40,000 signatures in order to receive party
registration. To appear on a regional ballot, a party must
either pay a significant deposit or gather signatures from a
threshold percentage of the region's population. Regional
electoral commissions routinely find "irregularities" with
submitted signatures, which resulted in Yabloko not appearing
on any region's ballot in October 2008.

-- Party Leader Term Limits: President Medvedev proposed in
December an undefined limit on how long party leaders could
serve. Presumably aimed at the KPRF's Zyuganov and LDPR's
Zhirinovskiy, the wording of this proposal has subsequently
been refined to not affect these leaders' positions.

Comment
--------------


19. (C) The Communists and to a less degree LDPR likely will
benefit from the economic crisis as the electorate casts
protest votes against United Russia. Still, elections remain
a low priority for many Russians, with a January Levada
Center poll revealing that only 13 percent consider voting
for their officials to be very important (one percent less
than in 2004). Party consolidation has made it easier to
control political discourse by offering fewer legal options
for expressing political opposition. The ruling regime faces
no real challenge to its authority at this time. A
deteriorating economic situation may lead to some mass
rallies, but there is no political party is currently
positioned to turn such unrest into a cohesive
anti-government force.
BEYRLE