RUSSIAN XENOPHOBIA HAS ROOTS DEEPER THAN CRISIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 000361 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL RS SOCI SUBJECT: RUSSIAN XENOPHOBIA HAS ROOTS DEEPER THAN CRISIS REF: 08 MOSCOW 3688 Classified By: Minister Counselor for Political Affairs Alice Wells; re asons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary. The recent wave of high-profile xenophobic violence gripping Russia has raised concerns within Russia's migrant community, second in size only to that of the United States. While diaspora leaders lobbied to protect the interests of their citizens, labor migrants have endured increasing police scrutiny and negative public attention against the backdrop of the economic crisis. In January 2009, 32 xenophobic attacks resulted in 16 confirmed deaths (13 in Moscow alone). Many analysts and human rights defenders linked the increase in xenophobic crime to unemployment, while others ascribe it to greater enforcement of existing legislation. However, one expert pointed to Russia's historical discrimination against ethnic outsiders as the true source of xenophobic violence. Russian officials have attributed the reported increase in the number of crimes to unemployed labor migrants, and proposed tough regulations to preserve jobs for Muscovites while pushing labor migrants out of Russia, steps which resonate with nationalist groups. Both nationalist groups and the Russian Orthodox Church proposed to create civil patrols to enforce the law, inciting an outcry from human rights groups. End Summary. Ethnic Diasporas Concerned By Wave of Hate Crimes -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In separate meetings, the representatives of the Tajik, Armenian, and Azeri diasporas in Moscow reported that the increasing number of xenophobic attacks, coupled with the economic crisis, has complicated the situation for their communities. Deputy Director of the NGO Tajikistan Foundation Ghokaev Zhurayeva told us on December 12 that the economic downturn brought more intense police scrutiny (document checks of Tajik citizens on work visas) and negative public attention for the Tajik community in Russia, and she expected the situation to worsen. While applauding her own organization's efforts to provide pro bono legal advice to legal and illegal immigrants, she scolded weak efforts by the Tajikistan embassy in Moscow to help its citizens. Ghokaev added that her NGO had recently negotiated the free repatriation from Russia of any deceased Tajik's remains, an important feat considering the steep costs associated with the return of the body and the typically meager wages of family members back in Tajikistan (Note: Ghokaev reported that Tajik Air promised to pay 50 percent of all costs of repatriation, while the administration of President Rakhmonov promised to pay the other 50 percent). In 2008, 10 Tajiks died and 36 were wounded as a result of xenophobic attacks, according to the Moscow Bureau for Human Rights (MBHR). ¶3. (C) Executive Director of the All-Russian Azeri Congress and former ambassador of Azerbaijan to Russia Eldar Gulamovich Kyliyev told us on January 21 that xenophobic attacks against migrant workers had shaken the Azeri community in Russia, but most would not return to Azerbaijan. Kyliyev reported that his Congress worked actively with counterparts in the Kremlin to advocate for local Azeris, evidenced by the massive reduction in the number of deported Azeris in 2008 (approximately 500) compared to 2007 (over 5,000). He believed that the GOR understood the negative economic and social effects that any organized program to deport migrant workers would have on former Soviet republics, but complained about the nonexistent efforts of law enforcement agencies to stop xenophobic violence. ¶4. (C) The head of the Russian Union of Armenians and former Soviet ambassador to Zimbabwe Georgiy Ter-Gazaryants presented a similar view to us on December 18, noting that although the majority of Armenians in Russia worked in small manufacturing and light retail (as opposed to construction), they still suffered from the economic slowdown and feared attacks from xenophobic youth or nationalists. Even though Armenian migrants tended to be more wealthy than their Central Asian counterparts, his organization routinely fielded calls from unemployed, destitute, or stranded Armenian citizens in Russia, looking for the financial assistance unavailable to them through Embassy channels. However, he felt that few Armenians would return home because of the crisis, choosing to live in fear with the prospects of work rather than in the secure poverty of Armenia. ¶5. (SBU) The Kyrgyz Ambassador to Russia, Raimkul Attakurov, took a different tack in confronting hate crimes, meeting twice with nationalist group Slavic Union leader Dmitry Demushkin to discuss xenophobic attacks against Kyrgyz nationals. Attakurov offered to organize a round table between Slavic Union leaders and Kyrgyz migrant workers at MOSCOW 00000361 002 OF 004 the press center for Moscow daily Moskovsky Komsomolets, drawing sharp criticism from human rights NGO Memorial and SOVA Center. High-profile legal cases against extremists have continued to grab media attention in several regions over the past two years, with the most recent occurring in Altai Republic where authorities put a skinhead group called "The Wolves of Odin" on trial for ten ethnic hatred attacks and two murders since May 2007. Why Are Hate Crimes Increasing? -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The wave of violence against ethnic minorities has continued in Russia, with 32 reported xenophobic attacks resulting in 16 confirmed deaths and 23 injuries in January 2009 (13 of these deaths reported in Moscow),according to MBHR. Human Rights Watch released a report on February 10 labeling the economic crisis as an exacerbating factor in the rise in hate-motivated violence. Moscow police chief Vladimir Pronin told a news conference on January 21 that while nationalism-inspired attacks in Moscow increased 30 percent from 2007 to 2008, an unquantifiable percentage of that increase could be attributed to greater use of Russian Criminal Code Article 282 on Inciting Ethnic Hatred. MBHR Director Aleksandr Brod told us on February 9 that law enforcement officials convicted 205 people in 2008 for xenophobic crimes, a sign that authorities placed new emphasis on curbing violence against minority communities. Many other human rights activists, including Brod, have predicted an increase in xenophobic crimes in 2009 as a result of the economic crisis, with Moscow and St. Petersburg registering as the main centers of violence. ¶7. (SBU) SOVA Center Director Aleksandr Verkhovskiy told us on February 3 that no information objectively pointed to an increase in anti-immigrant crime as a result of an economic downturn. Rather, he attributed Russian xenophobic activity to Russian attitudes -- especially of young Russians -- of ethnic superiority towards "outsiders" and scant police attention to hate crimes prior to the recent surge of violence. In a January 29 interview with the United States Holocaust Museum, he said that "the majority (55 percent) of people support the idea that ethnic Russians have to have some privileges, and support the idea to limit rights for certain ethnic groups." Russia's Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev reported on December 24 that law enforcement agencies identified 53,900 teenagers as adherents to "criminal, antisocial, and extremist" groups in Russia, and openly admitted that these same agencies have opened files on 202,700 teenagers since 2005 -- a worrying trend to Nurgaliyev. ¶8. (SBU) Public opinion reports have indicated that most Russians do not consider the large number of migrant workers to be problematic. A January 30 Levada Center poll found that only 9 percent of those surveyed pointed to the influx of migrants as alarming, a one percent decrease from a similar January 2008 poll. However, only 6 percent considered the worsening of interethnic relations and the rise of nationalism in Russia to be a troublesome trend, down two percent from 2008. Verkhovskiy associated the recent negative use of the word "immigrant" in the press and on the street to public fear about the economic crisis, but did not expect the public to join nationalist groups as a result of the downturn, saying that these groups "find little support" in Russia. His own colleague, SOVA Deputy Director Galina Kozhevnikova, offered a slightly different interpretation, predicting that while nationalist groups attracted few supporters, average Russians disaffected by the crisis could pose problems for migrant workers in the street. Government: Crimes Committed by Migrants Rising -------------- -- ¶9. (SBU) Russian government officials have continued to link the percentage growth in reported crimes and the increasing number of labor migrants when discussing Russia's economic troubles. Medvedev, in a February 6 address to the Russian Interior Ministry, challenged officials to monitor spikes in post-crisis crime rates and improve their success rates in solving crimes (1.5 million out of 3.2 million reported crimes were solved in 2008),and cautioned against allowing "speculators" to complicate the situation further. He delivered these comments after a flood of government reports tied the influx of migrants to worsening crime. The Russian Interior Ministry reported on December 27 that the number of crimes committed by Tajiks from 2003 to 2007 had more than doubled, from 4,100 documented crimes in 2003 to 8,500 in 2007, while crimes against Tajiks had decreased by 10 percent (and against all migrants decreased by 4.8 percent) in 2008. First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs (MID) Police Colonel-General Mikhail Sukhodolskiy reported on December 25 MOSCOW 00000361 003 OF 004 an 8 percent increase in crimes committed by foreign workers, attributing one-half of all violent felonies to "new arrivals." In perspective, however, felonies, misdemeanors, and infractions committed by migrants in Russia accounted for only 3.1 percent of the total number of crimes in 2008, a small number considering that estimates on the number of migrants in Russia have ranged from 4 million to 13 million (2.8 percent to 9.2 percent of the population). ¶10. (SBU) Many government officials proposed to crack down on labor migrants, ostensibly to offset the negative effects of the crisis on the native population. Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov tried to pacify Muscovites, announcing on December 30 that Moscow natives would receive preferential access to city government jobs. On December 30, United Russia Duma member Andrei Isayev suggested penalties, including criminal charges, for employers who hire illegal immigrants. Experts from Moscow State University have told us on several occasions that the "migrants steal Russian jobs" argument touted by United Russia's youth group Molodaya Gvardiya holds no water, stating that Russians uniformly stigmatize the dirty and dangerous jobs employing migrants, feigning no interest in such work. Regardless, the Federal Registration Service (FRS) proposed to adjust legislation to allow legal migrants to reside in Russia for only 90 days, causing enforcement and financial problems for border guards charged with deportation at 1,000 USD per deportee, according to a Gazeta article on December 25. Communist Party Central Committee Secretary Sergey Obukhov said that the government does not have a coordinated plan for dealing with the large number of unemployed migrants in Russia, and even suggested that the FRS may have faced some legal proceedings for trying to amend the law, delaying the rollout. Nationalists, Orthodox Preparing For Worst -------------- ¶11. (SBU) While nationalist groups like the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) and the Slavic Union have toned down their rhetoric since their failed November 4 demonstrations, nationalist leaders have called for the establishment of armed civil patrols to enforce law and order on Russia's streets. DPNI leader Alexander Belov told Interfax news on January 19 that he encouraged its members to obtain government permits for carrying non-lethal weapons in order to "take precautions" as Russia faced an upsurge in crime because of the crisis. He also noted that DPNI hoped to create volunteer units in Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod to monitor criminal activity, a proposal actively rejected by Moscow police but apparently allowed in Nizhny Novgorod. Human rights defender and head of Civil Assistance Svetlana Gannushkina admonished the announcement, believing that "rocking the ethnic relations situation threatens Russia with an imminent break-up" and likening DPNI vigilante groups to "Hitler's Brownshirts." ¶12. (C) On November 19, Deputy Director for the Russian Orthodox Church's (ROC) Department of External Affairs Vsevolod Chaplin also suggested the Church's interest in the establishment of Orthodox street patrols to ensure order. Chaplin said that all religious groups should have the right to organize groups to "battle hooligans with basic means, such as rubber clubs," an idea readily supported by DPNI's Belov and Nashi's Orthodox Movement leader Boris Yakemenko, who claimed that "Orthodox know precisely what is right and what is wrong; therefore, participation in such patrols will be correct." Gannushkina offered similar skepticism to the ROC suggestion, believing that "Buddhist patrols would be a better starting point since Buddhists are more peaceful." Geraldine Fagan told us on February 12 that the sudden December 5 death of Patriarch Aleksey II, and the subsequent election and enthronement of Patriarch Kirill, forced ROC leaders to shelve temporarily plans for Orthodox patrols. Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Western and domestic media attention to the surge in xenophobic attacks, cast as a by-product of current economic tensions, fails to address the core sense of ethnic superiority over "occupiers" that many Russians feel, despite calls for tolerance from the Kremlin and the human rights community. Russia's demographic need for migrant labor creates continuous opportunities for conflict, a "perfect storm" well beyond the preventative means of simple police actions. Certainly, high-profile sentences against violent nationalist groups suggest a more serious government tack, but more likely reflects a wake-up call to law enforcement after ignoring the problem for years. How the GOR approaches nationalist groups and xenophobic violence will indicate its philosophical stance. FSB Director Aleksandr Bortnikov told participants at a National Anti-Terrorist Committee (NAC) MOSCOW 00000361 004 OF 004 meeting on December 23 that the NAC would discuss ways in 2009 to prevent extremism from growing into terrorism. BEYRLE