OSCE FROZEN CONFLICTS ENVOY ON TALKS WITH GOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000328

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG OSCE
SUBJECT: OSCE FROZEN CONFLICTS ENVOY ON TALKS WITH GOR

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Reporting on his earlier meeting with DFM
Karasin, OSCE Special Representative Christopoulos told
Ambassador Beyrle February 10 that Russia supported the
presence of OSCE military monitors inside South Ossetia, and
was even considering adding language about such observers to
the OSCE's planned proposal for a technical roll-over of the
current monitor mission to Georgia proper. Christopoulos
welcomed the GOR's counterproposal on the new OSCE mandate,
even though Karasin's suggestions for "sequentially"
establishing missions in Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, as well as
having separate offices for each mission in the Security and
Stability Office in Vienna, were unacceptable. Christopoulos
announced that the three Geneva Process Co-Chairs had agreed
that the next session of talks should take place in two
months. Building on the OSCE's success in restoring gas
deliveries to South Ossetia, Christopoulos described current
OSCE efforts to supply Georgia with South Ossetian water,
deliver humanitarian aid, and resolve the questions of
missing persons, detainees, and the restitution of bodies.
End Summary.

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Monitors
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2. (C) Reporting on his February 9 meeting with DFM Karasin,
OSCE Special Representative for the Protracted Conflicts
Ambassador Charalambos Christopoulos (Greece),accompanied by
Greek Ambassador to Russia Michel Spinellis, told Ambassador
Beyrle February 10 that Karasin expressed Russian support for
the presence of OSCE military monitors inside South Ossetia,
and had told Christopoulos that South Ossetian views were
evolving on that issue, too.

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Technical roll-over
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3. (C) Despite that change of tune, Christopoulos
acknowledged it was nearly impossible to negotiate a new OSCE
mandate by February 18, after which the OSCE monitors still
in Georgia proper would have to withdraw. Therefore,
Christopoulos said he had prepared a proposal for a technical
roll-over of the monitors' presence in Georgia proper through
June 30, the date the OSCE mission to Georgia must close down
in the absence of a new mandate.


4. (C) Christopoulos said Karasin announced Russia would
propose adding a sentence on the presence of observers in
South Ossetia to the proposal for a technical roll-over of
the observers' mission in Georgia proper. In response to
Ambassador Beyrle's question, Christopoulos agreed it was
unclear why Russia now was so eager to promote the presence
of the observers in South Ossetia, but noted Karasin's
interest in maintaining the presence of the 20 OSCE observers
currently in Georgia proper per the August 19, 2008 OSCE
Permanent Council Decision. Christopoulos said he had warned
Karasin against proposing any language on observers that
broached the question of South Ossetia's status, reminding
Karasin of his December 2008 agreement during Christopoulos'
last visit not to suggest solutions to specific issues that
bore implications for the status of South Ossetia.

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New Mandate
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5. (C) In addition, Christopoulos welcomed Russia's
separate, detailed counterproposal for a new OSCE mandate.
Although he described elements of the Russian proposal as
"unacceptable," Christopoulos said its value lay in the fact
that it was based on the Greek proposal and was detailed
enough to allow for negotiations and re-drafting exercises.
Christopoulos said Russia would shortly circulate its
proposal in Vienna.


6. (C) Christopoulos said that Karasin suggested a
"sequential" approach for a new OSCE mission, starting with a
mission to Tbilisi, followed later by one to Tskhinvali.
Karasin insisted that the Security and Stability Office (SSO)
in Vienna consist of two independent offices, respectively in
charge of Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, and at most linked via the
Conflict Prevention Center (CPC). Christopoulos reported
that he cautioned Karasin against such an approach, as an
initial sole mission in Tbilisi would touch on the question
of the status of South Ossetia by creating the impression the
mission's area of responsibility was all of Georgia, as would
separate SSOs, even if they were linked via the CPC. Russia
would stand isolated if the OSCE opposed the GOR's proposals,

MOSCOW 00000328 002 OF 002


which was in nobody's interest.

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Geneva Process
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7. (C) Christopoulos said Karasin, having just returned from
the Russian White House, was "aggressive" in expressing
disappointment with the EU's February 5 condemnation of
Russian plans to erect military bases in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, and "hurt" about the EU's request that Russia "act
in a responsible manner" on the issue. Karasin accused the
EU of having timed the release of that statement in order to
undermine the Geneva process talks February 17-18.
Ambassador Beyrle noted Russia's ambivalence about the Geneva
Process, and suggested Russia might be looking for a way to
blame the West for torpedoing the talks.


8. (C) Agreeing on Russia's ambivalence about the Geneva
talks, Christopoulos announced that the three Co-Chairs (EU,
UN, and OSCE) had agreed that the next session of talks
should take place in two months. Christopoulos said it was
necessary to maintain the momentum on the talks rather than
agree to Karasin's December 2008 suggestion to reduce the
frequency of the talks to annual or semi-annual. He added
that the GOG agreed to review its insistence on a plenary
meeting in Geneva -- a red flag for the South Ossetians and
Abkhaz, who were excluded from such meetings. Ambassador
Beyrle encouraged these developments, stressing that the
Geneva talks were currently the only venue that brought all
parties to the table, and that the talks were growing more
civil and substantive with each iteration.

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Humanitarian aid
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9. (C) Christopoulos welcomed Ambassador Beyrle's praise for
the OSCE's resolution of the problem with gas deliveries to
South Ossetia, saying that success had garnered trust and
public praise for the OSCE even from the South Ossetian
authorities. Building on this foundation, Christopoulos said
the OSCE had now retained the same independent Austrian
expert who had already assisted on the gas problem to work on
the issue of delivering potable and irrigation water from
South Ossetia to adjacent areas in Georgia proper.
Christopoulos said water had already begun to flow into
Georgia proper, even though South Ossetia had not yet
designated its spokesperson to talk with the spokesperson
designated by the GOG in order to resolve the issue.


10. (C) Christopoulos said both sides had similarly agreed
to designate spokesmen to resolve the questions of missing
persons, detainees, and the restitution of bodies. Again,
the GOG had already designated its spokesperson, while South
Ossetia had yet to do so. Finally, Christopoulos said the
three Geneva Process Co-Chairmen hoped to overcome the
impasse on delivering humanitarian aid to South Ossetia --
Georgia blocking entry from the north, South Ossetia blocking
entry from the south -- by proposing simultaneous entry of
aid from both sides. Both conflict parties had agreed to
consider this solution, Christopoulos said.
BEYRLE