OSCE FROZEN CONFLICTS ENVOY ON TALKS WITH GOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000328 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG OSCE SUBJECT: OSCE FROZEN CONFLICTS ENVOY ON TALKS WITH GOR Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Reporting on his earlier meeting with DFM Karasin, OSCE Special Representative Christopoulos told Ambassador Beyrle February 10 that Russia supported the presence of OSCE military monitors inside South Ossetia, and was even considering adding language about such observers to the OSCE's planned proposal for a technical roll-over of the current monitor mission to Georgia proper. Christopoulos welcomed the GOR's counterproposal on the new OSCE mandate, even though Karasin's suggestions for "sequentially" establishing missions in Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, as well as having separate offices for each mission in the Security and Stability Office in Vienna, were unacceptable. Christopoulos announced that the three Geneva Process Co-Chairs had agreed that the next session of talks should take place in two months. Building on the OSCE's success in restoring gas deliveries to South Ossetia, Christopoulos described current OSCE efforts to supply Georgia with South Ossetian water, deliver humanitarian aid, and resolve the questions of missing persons, detainees, and the restitution of bodies. End Summary. -------------- Monitors -------------- ¶2. (C) Reporting on his February 9 meeting with DFM Karasin, OSCE Special Representative for the Protracted Conflicts Ambassador Charalambos Christopoulos (Greece),accompanied by Greek Ambassador to Russia Michel Spinellis, told Ambassador Beyrle February 10 that Karasin expressed Russian support for the presence of OSCE military monitors inside South Ossetia, and had told Christopoulos that South Ossetian views were evolving on that issue, too. -------------- Technical roll-over -------------- ¶3. (C) Despite that change of tune, Christopoulos acknowledged it was nearly impossible to negotiate a new OSCE mandate by February 18, after which the OSCE monitors still in Georgia proper would have to withdraw. Therefore, Christopoulos said he had prepared a proposal for a technical roll-over of the monitors' presence in Georgia proper through June 30, the date the OSCE mission to Georgia must close down in the absence of a new mandate. ¶4. (C) Christopoulos said Karasin announced Russia would propose adding a sentence on the presence of observers in South Ossetia to the proposal for a technical roll-over of the observers' mission in Georgia proper. In response to Ambassador Beyrle's question, Christopoulos agreed it was unclear why Russia now was so eager to promote the presence of the observers in South Ossetia, but noted Karasin's interest in maintaining the presence of the 20 OSCE observers currently in Georgia proper per the August 19, 2008 OSCE Permanent Council Decision. Christopoulos said he had warned Karasin against proposing any language on observers that broached the question of South Ossetia's status, reminding Karasin of his December 2008 agreement during Christopoulos' last visit not to suggest solutions to specific issues that bore implications for the status of South Ossetia. -------------- New Mandate -------------- ¶5. (C) In addition, Christopoulos welcomed Russia's separate, detailed counterproposal for a new OSCE mandate. Although he described elements of the Russian proposal as "unacceptable," Christopoulos said its value lay in the fact that it was based on the Greek proposal and was detailed enough to allow for negotiations and re-drafting exercises. Christopoulos said Russia would shortly circulate its proposal in Vienna. ¶6. (C) Christopoulos said that Karasin suggested a "sequential" approach for a new OSCE mission, starting with a mission to Tbilisi, followed later by one to Tskhinvali. Karasin insisted that the Security and Stability Office (SSO) in Vienna consist of two independent offices, respectively in charge of Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, and at most linked via the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC). Christopoulos reported that he cautioned Karasin against such an approach, as an initial sole mission in Tbilisi would touch on the question of the status of South Ossetia by creating the impression the mission's area of responsibility was all of Georgia, as would separate SSOs, even if they were linked via the CPC. Russia would stand isolated if the OSCE opposed the GOR's proposals, MOSCOW 00000328 002 OF 002 which was in nobody's interest. -------------- Geneva Process -------------- ¶7. (C) Christopoulos said Karasin, having just returned from the Russian White House, was "aggressive" in expressing disappointment with the EU's February 5 condemnation of Russian plans to erect military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and "hurt" about the EU's request that Russia "act in a responsible manner" on the issue. Karasin accused the EU of having timed the release of that statement in order to undermine the Geneva process talks February 17-18. Ambassador Beyrle noted Russia's ambivalence about the Geneva Process, and suggested Russia might be looking for a way to blame the West for torpedoing the talks. ¶8. (C) Agreeing on Russia's ambivalence about the Geneva talks, Christopoulos announced that the three Co-Chairs (EU, UN, and OSCE) had agreed that the next session of talks should take place in two months. Christopoulos said it was necessary to maintain the momentum on the talks rather than agree to Karasin's December 2008 suggestion to reduce the frequency of the talks to annual or semi-annual. He added that the GOG agreed to review its insistence on a plenary meeting in Geneva -- a red flag for the South Ossetians and Abkhaz, who were excluded from such meetings. Ambassador Beyrle encouraged these developments, stressing that the Geneva talks were currently the only venue that brought all parties to the table, and that the talks were growing more civil and substantive with each iteration. -------------- Humanitarian aid -------------- ¶9. (C) Christopoulos welcomed Ambassador Beyrle's praise for the OSCE's resolution of the problem with gas deliveries to South Ossetia, saying that success had garnered trust and public praise for the OSCE even from the South Ossetian authorities. Building on this foundation, Christopoulos said the OSCE had now retained the same independent Austrian expert who had already assisted on the gas problem to work on the issue of delivering potable and irrigation water from South Ossetia to adjacent areas in Georgia proper. Christopoulos said water had already begun to flow into Georgia proper, even though South Ossetia had not yet designated its spokesperson to talk with the spokesperson designated by the GOG in order to resolve the issue. ¶10. (C) Christopoulos said both sides had similarly agreed to designate spokesmen to resolve the questions of missing persons, detainees, and the restitution of bodies. Again, the GOG had already designated its spokesperson, while South Ossetia had yet to do so. Finally, Christopoulos said the three Geneva Process Co-Chairmen hoped to overcome the impasse on delivering humanitarian aid to South Ossetia -- Georgia blocking entry from the north, South Ossetia blocking entry from the south -- by proposing simultaneous entry of aid from both sides. Both conflict parties had agreed to consider this solution, Christopoulos said. BEYRLE