MFA SUGGESTS AFGHANISTAN AS A BACK-DOOR MEANS OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003103 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL RS AF IR SUBJECT: MFA SUGGESTS AFGHANISTAN AS A BACK-DOOR MEANS OF ENGAGING IRAN Classified By: Acting DCM Susan Elliott for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Senior Advisor to U/S Burns, Stephen Mull, met in Moscow with Zamir Kabulov, Director of the MFA's Second Asia Division, to discuss developments in Iran. Kabulov welcomed the change in American tactics to use both dialogue and pressure, but was downbeat on the prospects for success given the consensus inside Iran favoring its nuclear program and the resistance to outside pressure. Despite Tehran being a "difficult partner," Moscow sees no alternative to the current regime and fears instability could lead to a power vacuum. Kabulov suggested cooperation on Afghanistan could improve U.S.-Iran relations, but warned that the U.S. would need to pay a price for Iranian help. End Summary. -------------- A Strong Iran as a Stable Neighbor -------------- ¶2. (C) Kabulov praised U.S. efforts to establish a dialogue with Iran to dispel the "Great Satan" myth, but said the leadership and Iranian society are "consolidated" in on the nuclear issue. Similarly, the factionalized Iranian elite was divided internally but over domestic issues, not on the nuclear question. Kabulov said that additional international pressure would lead to a more strident reaction from Iran and would likely not encourage Iran to take positive steps. Indeed, placing more pressure on Tehran would likely galvanize the more radical elements within the leadership and allow them to tighten their control. Kabulov added the GOR sees no viable alternative to the current regime and if a power vacuum were created the outcome could be worse than the status quo. Therefore, the GOR was cautious toward Iran, because regime change could result in a less desirable government and regional instability that could threaten Russia. ¶3. (C) Ambassador Kabulov said Russia still views the Iranian regime as the strongest in the neighborhood. Even after the elections last summer, the Iranian leadership retains tight control over the government, society and even over the opposition. Kabulov agreed with Mull's observation that the Revolutionary Guard was amassing more power and influence with its expanding business empire, becoming involved in the telecommunications and the oil/gas industry as well as construction projects. Kabulov added the Iranian leadership was watching the Guard's activities and recognized the threat to itself if the Guard became too influential. -------------- They Listen But They Don't Hear -------------- ¶4. (C) Kabulov confided that Iran was a "difficult partner" for Russia. He complained that, although Moscow has been a steadfast partner for Tehran, "they listen, but they don't hear us." He said Russia was striving to remain cool and consistent in the face of growing anti-Russian sentiment in Iran stemming from Moscow's firm position on non-proliferation issues. He lamented that President Medvedev had sent private messages to Iran's president and supreme leader last fall and had not yet received an answer. ¶5. (C) Kabulov said Russia was unsure about Iran's true intentions for its nuclear program. On one hand, the GOI put forward strong arguments that it is peaceful in nature. On the other, he recalled that Iranians frequently complained about the fact that Pakistan was the only Islamic country "allowed" to possess nuclear capabilities and that Israel's capability is unquestioned. He explained the sometimes-conflicting statements coming from Tehran by noting that, in the Shia tradition, clergy at different levels frequently contradiction one another because information is not shared vertically throughout the hierarchy. -------------- A Door to Engagement -------------- ¶6. (C) Kabulov stressed that it was important to find different avenues of engagement with Iran, aside from the nuclear program. He stressed the importance of face-saving measures that would allow Iran to back away from its previous tough statements. He suggested that cooperation on Afghanistan could be a "door to reciprocity" for the U.S. and Iran because both had an interest in building stability there. He offered Russia's assistance in building a bridge for this relationship. MOSCOW 00003103 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) Kabulov said that, in spite of comments from U.S. military leaders, Iranians were not supporting the Taliban and had no desire to see a Taliban-led government in Afghanistan. He said Iranian leaders have a "paranoia" about U.S. forces in Afghanistan, especially on the western border with Iran. But Kabulov added that Iran believes the U.S. needs Tehran's assistance in Afghanistan more than it needs American support. As a result, Kabulov said the Iranians would expect incentives to encourage their cooperation. Kabulov offered no specific suggestions on what might bring Iran to the table, but said ideas that offer economic benefits felt by the people would probably be welcome and would preempt the possibility of criticism from the opposition. ¶8. (C) Comment: Kabulov's views are typical of Russia's Iran watchers: growing frustration with increasing Moscow-Tehran friction, yet skeptical that even unified international pressure will alter GOI behavior. ¶9. (U) This message has been cleared by Ambassador Mull. Rubin