RUSSIA ON MILITARY EQUIPMENT DONATIONS TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003055

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS AF
SUBJECT: RUSSIA ON MILITARY EQUIPMENT DONATIONS TO
AFGHANISTAN AND COUNTERNARCOTICS COOPERATION

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Susan Elliott for reason 1.
4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In parallel with SRAP Holbrooke's visit to
Moscow, a U.S.-Russia interagency working group composed of
counternarcotics and military experts met to discuss
potential areas of cooperation and assistance to Afghanistan.
Although the GOR counternarcotics programs for Afghan police
forces are sparsely attended, the Russians remain ready to
continue the training. Regarding military equipment
donations, the MFA stated that the GOR would consider such
requests, provided they come from the Afghan government. End
Summary.

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COUNTER-NARCOTICS TRAINING
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2. (C) The Russian Delegation was led by Zamir Kabulov,
head of the MFA's Second Asia Department and former Russian
Ambassador to Afghanistan. Kabulov began the session with an
overview of Russia's programs to train Afghan
counternarcotics police officers. He mentioned that the
Ministry of Interior (MOI) decided last year to accept up to
225 Afghan counternarcotics police at its training
facilities, but that the program was suspended after the
Afghan side failed to provide a list of prospective trainees.
He added that the MOI was nevertheless ready and willing to
continue cooperation in this area. Kabulov said that the MOI
also experienced problems with a second program, set up under
OSCE auspices at the Domodedovo International Training
Center, when Afghan counternarcotics police failed to arrive
for their designated courses "in a timely fashion." He noted
that FM Lavrov might raise the issue with President Karzai
when they meet at the inauguration. Kabulov mentioned a
third program carried out through the NATO-Russia Council
that he described as achieving "modest" results.


3. (C) MOI official Larissa Kochetova next outlined training
activities conducted at the Domodedovo Center since the
establishment of the program in 2006. She said the Center
had emphasized practical counternarcotics training for Afghan
and Central Asian law enforcement officials with a focus on
international cooperation, drug routes, and investigative
work. While she reiterated the Center's willingness to
expand its efforts to train Afghan police, Kochetova
described logistical problems that hinder Afghan
participation. She mentioned several instances in which
either the Center did not receive lists of Afghan trainees
"in a timely manner" or the participants failed to appear on
their appointed arrival day. Kochetova said that the
Center's system of "training the trainers" enabled returning
participants to share their knowledge with a wider group in
Afghanistan. She explained that many of the training
instructors at Domodedovo are from other countries, such as
Italy, Finland, Bulgaria, and (beginning next year) Germany.
Kochetova also noted that the Center's physical facilities,
such as the mock drug lab, were important for enhancing the
practical knowledge of participants. She closed by saying
the Center would be grateful for any assistance in helping
Afghan groups to arrive on time.

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MILITARY ASSISTANCE: GOA MUST ASK
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4. (C) Turning to military assistance for Afghanistan,
Kabulov stated that the GOR wanted to create strong Afghan
army and police forces that could bring security and
stability to the country. He noted that bilateral
cooperation between Russia and Afghanistan began in 2003 with
the signing of protocols and that from 2004 to 2006 Russia
had provided USD 200 million in military hardware donations
including trucks, communication equipment, artillery, rifles,
jeeps, and spare parts. Kabulov said the GOR was now
reluctant to cooperate with the Afghan MOD, and said Afghan
MinDef Wardak had dropped hints that the U.S. had told the
Afghan MOD to refuse donations that were not compliant with
NATO standards.


5. (C) Kabulov remarked that the GOR did not want to impose
assistance on Afghanistan, and that the Afghan government,
therefore, should make specific requests for weapons. He
said that the Afghan MOD had expressed a desire for Russian
weapons because they were familiar to Afghan forces and
superior to similar weapons made in other countries but that

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the GOR was troubled by unlicensed and inferior copies of
Russian weapons. The GOR, according to Kabulov, was ready to
start military equipment cooperation with Afghanistan, but
the modalities needed to be worked out.


6. (C) When told that Combined Security Transition
Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) provided a list of needed
equipment to the GOR, Kabulov said Moscow would like to work
with Afghanistan bilaterally, and encouraged Afghan MinDef
Wardak to come to Russia for discussions. He said the GOR
Ministry of Finance should determine how much aid Russia
could provide to Afghanistan, but insisted the GOR would like
to sell weapons to Afghanistan in addition to donating them.
He also acknowledged that Mi-17 helicopters would be useful
for the Afghans, especially if used for counternarcotics
operations.


7. (C) Closing the discussion, Kabulov stressed that the
Afghan forces themselves must be involved in future
discussions about requirements and donations and that they
themselves must believe that they are fighting for their own
interests. He noted that morale could not be imported.
Kabulov also stated that the MFA was ready to discuss further
donations and cooperation in this area and that they would
pass this information to the MOD.


8. (C) Comment: The MOD was not represented at this MFA-led
meeting. MFA officials have previously stated that the MOD
would make decisions regarding donations of military
equipment to Afghanistan. In a parallel conversation with
SRAP Holbrooke, MOD officials said decisions on military
assistance are made by the Russian president and MOD stood
ready to implement any decisions made. MOD officials
declined requests for working-level meetings. Additionally,
Russia's counternarcotics agency, the FSKN, was also not
invited by the MFA to participate. Therefore, the
counternarcotics dialogue focused on Russia's training
programs at the Domodedovo Center and did not include
discussion on policy issues.
Beyrle