AFGHANS WANT MORE THAN EMPTY PROMISES FROM MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003008

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL RS AF
SUBJECT: AFGHANS WANT MORE THAN EMPTY PROMISES FROM MOSCOW

REF: MOSCOW 02497

Classified By: Acting Political M/C David Kostelancik for reasons 1.4 (
b) and (d).


1. (C) Embassy Moscow DAO representatives and POLOFF met with
General-Lieutenant Mohammad Sharif Akram, Military and Air
Attache, and Colonel Abdullah Andar, Deputy Military and Air
Attache, of the Embassy of Afghanistan to the Russian
Federation to discuss the GOR's support for stabilizing
Afghanistan. Noting that GOR officials at all levels, both
in Russia and abroad, had often talked about assisting
Afghanistan, he remarked that he had seen little fulfillment
of their promises. Akram remarked that he had been in Moscow
for three years and had not seen any evidence that the GOR
was living up to its offers of assistance. He recalled that
former Russian Ambassador Zamir Kabulov, who departed Kabul
in October, had also delivered empty words and
misrepresentations. (Note: Kabulov remains an important
figure in the GOR's Afghanistan policy as the current head of
the MFA's Second Asia division.)


2. (C) Akram began by noting the linkage of stability in
Afghanistan to stability in Russia. He claimed that unrest
in Afghanistan could easily spread through Central Asia and
cause problems in Russia that the GOR would have difficulty
resolving. Akram said that, while it was unlikely Moscow
would reach the level of support provided by Washington, he
expected their support to be similar to the assistance
provided by European nations.


3. (C) Akram recognized that the GOR had donated to the ANSF
in the past and had funded training programs at military
academies. He reported that the GOR had sponsored 14 Afghan
Army cadets at military academies in Russia in fields such as
engineering, medicine and finance. Unfortunately, when 10
additional students applied, the GOA was asked to pay for the
cadets' courses. When asked about the suggested list of
equipment donations (reftel) drafted by CSTC-A and delivered
to the GOR in October, Akram said he believed the Russians
could easily provide anything on the list. He did not
comment on the appropriateness of the list or if any of the
items were needed by the ANSF. Akram emphasized that the GOA
was seeking donations from Moscow and was not looking to buy
weapons, spare parts or other items.


4. (C) Offering praise and hope for the new U.S. strategy in
Afghanistan, Akram commented that it was important to engage
Pakistan and stop the funding and support for extremist
elements based there. He lamented that the Pakistani
government (like the GOR) often said one thing but did
another, especially in the struggle against al Qaeda. The
situation in Pakistan was a "dangerous game" because of
Pakistan's nuclear weapons. He predicted that Afghanistan
could be quickly stabilized once the support system for
extremists in Pakistan was destroyed.
Beyrle