GOR CONCERNED AZERBAIJAN WILL RAISE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000289

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS AJ
SUBJECT: GOR CONCERNED AZERBAIJAN WILL RAISE
NAGORNO-KARABAKH IN UN

Classified By: Acting Pol M/C David Kostelancik for reasons 1.4(b) and
(d)


1. (C) Summary: Minsk Group Co-Chair Yuri Merzlyakov told us
February 6 the GOR had learned Azerbaijan was planning to
make Nagorno-Karabakh an agenda item for the March UNGA
session on protracted conflicts in the GUAM area, which ran
the risk of halting the conflict resolution process. If this
did not happen, Merzlyakov suggested inviting Armenian and
Azerbaijani Presidents Sargsian and Aliyev to meet again in
April, and possibly again at the June Economic Forum in St.
Petersburg. He underscored the importance of the Presidents'
meetings, as they were "freer" in addressing issues than
their "maximalist" Foreign Ministers. Merzlyakov proposed
making the next Co-Chair visit to the region from February 26
to March 2, as Armenia's Foreign Minister Nalbandian would be
out of the country until March 1. End Summary.

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Plans to raise Nagorno-Karabakh in the UN
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2. (C) Russian Ambassador-at-large and Minsk Group Co-Chair
Yuri Merzlyakov told us February 6 that the GOR had just
learned Azerbaijan was planning to make Nagorno-Karabakh an
agenda item for the March UNGA session on protracted
conflicts in the GUAM area. Merzlyakov feared Armenia would
retaliate by demanding the involvement of representatives of
Nagorno-Karabakh in the session, which in turn would likely
grind the conflict resolution process to a standstill.

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Next steps
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3. (C) Barring any such negative development, Merzlyakov
suggested inviting Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents
Sargsian and Aliyev to meet again in April, while there was a
possibility for another meeting of the leaders at the St
Petersburg Economic Forum in June. With a laugh, Merzlyakov
dismissed the notion that Medvedev would again invite the
leaders, as he had November 2, 2008, presumably remembering
how President Medvedev had closed the Minsk Group Co-Chairs
out of that event. On a more serious note, Merzlyakov warned
that the rumored Azerbaijani action in the UN would likely
spell the end of any meetings between the two presidents.


4. (C) Underscoring the importance of such presidential
meetings, Merzlyakov recalled that Sargsian and Aliyev's
January 28 meeting in Zurich had brought progress on the
first of the Minsk Group's goals, finding a common
understanding on the Madrid Principles. Merzlyakov lamented
the presidents moved no closer on the Minsk Group's other
goal, rapprochement over the four outstanding issues: the
Lachin corridor, referendum, future status of
Nagorno-Karabakh, and refugee return. The Minsk Group
Co-Chairs would try to raise these issues during their next
visit to the region. Merzlyakov observed that the Foreign
Ministers generally did not advance the issues, instead
preferring to stake out "maximalist" claims on territorial
integrity (Azerbaijan) or the future status of
Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenia). The Presidents were "freer" in
their approach to the issues, making their meetings so
crucial.


5. (C) Regarding plans for the next trip of Minsk Group
Co-Chairs to the region, Merzlyakov said that Armenia's
Foreign Minister Nalbandian would be out of the country until
March 1, so he intended to propose to his Co-Chair colleagues
visiting Baku February 26-27, then transit Yerevan to
Stepankert February 27-28, followed by a visit to Yerevan
March 1-2.

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CSTO, EU, Turkey
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6. (C) Merzlyakov reiterated that the Minsk Group remained
the only path for the peaceful resolution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. He rejected any thought of
linking the plans for a CSTO rapid reaction force to the
resolution of the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, and stated
that the CSTO had no bearing on the Minsk Group's standing.
With a grin, Merzlyakov suggested Azerbaijan should be happy
if CSTO partner Armenia were to give up some of its forces
for use in the rapid reaction force. Statements such as EU
Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner's offer for the EU to help
should be seen as a confirmation of EU's special envoy to the
South Caucasus Peter Semneby's involvement, as well as a
reference to the EU's Eastern Partnership plans. Turkey's

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Stability and Cooperation Platform was only meant to improve
security in the region, not supplant the Minsk Group Process,
Merzlyakov said. Turkish commitments to respecting the
territorial integrity of the conflict did not mean Turkey
would take any action if Azerbaijan's integrity was
threatened -- Merzlyakov pointed out that Turkey had never
made any mention of using force.
BEYRLE