RUSSIA ON DONATIONS TO AFGHANISTAN: WE ALREADY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002764

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA ON DONATIONS TO AFGHANISTAN: WE ALREADY
GAVE

Classified By: Pol M/C Susan Elliott for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary: Embassy Moscow met with Ali Mustafabeily,
Deputy Director of the MFA's Second Asia Department, to
discuss Russia's contributions to stabilizing Afghanistan.
Mustafabeily stressed that the GOR was doing what it could
financially and reiterated Moscow's preference for commercial
transactions over donations to Afghanistan. On broad
strategy Mustafabeily contended the U.S. should publicly
strengthen Karzai so he can take ownership of the battles
against the terrorists and drug-lords. Democracy and human
rights, he said, should take a back-seat. End summary.

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The Well is Dry
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2. (C) Mustafabeily reviewed some of Russia's contributions
to Afghanistan, including the donation of two helicopters and
the planned delivery of 50 KamAZ trucks, which should occur
this week. He also referred to Moscow's support for higher
education in Afghanistan such as the USD 2 million donated to
the World Bank for reconstruction of a university in Kabul.
He claimed the GOR was at its limit for official assistance
directly to Afghanistan, but that Russian private companies
can take up the work of reconstruction. Mustafabeily stated
confidently that sufficient resources existed in Afghanistan
from the international community, World Bank, and others, to
finance projects without GOR funds.


3. (C) While leaving the door open for nominal GOR
donations to organizations such as the World Bank and some
military equipment transfers, Mustafabeily focused the
conversation on why the Afghan Army and Police should
purchase weapons from the GOR instead of expect donations.
He indicated that in 2010 the MOD might be able to complete
the donation of 50,000 AK-47s, but currently the MOD lacked
the resources to fulfill this pledge. He stated that the
security forces should instead purchase weapons from Moscow
because they have been using Russian-made arms for years and
it will take decades to transition to NATO-compatible
systems.


4. (C) Similarly, Mustafabeily reiterated the GOR's belief
that private companies should be leading the way in
Afghanistan. For example, a private Russian company has
already drafted plans for projects related to the Salang
Tunnel, which Mustafabeily noted was a key strategic route
linking Afghanistan with its northern neighbors. These plans
had been sent to Washington, he stated, and the only
roadblock was financing. The GOR, he claimed, was waiting
for a contract so the project could begin. "We have the
experience and we are ready to work," Mustafabeily exclaimed.


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Advice is Free
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5. (C) Mustafabeily turned to his own service in
Afghanistan, explaining that he had a long history of working
in the country and noting that he was in Kabul as the last
Soviet forces left Afghanistan. He claimed that the U.S. had
made many mistakes in Afghanistan, and was continuing to make
them. He commented that the operation in Afghanistan began
as a counterterrorism operation, not one against corruption
in government or support for human rights and democracy. He
argued that the U.S. should criticize and persuade Karzai in
private only, while in public they should only offer support
to strengthen his position among the Afghan people. This was
the only path to stabilizing Afghanistan.


6. (C) Noting that the Afghan Army believed the terrorist
threat and narcotics trafficking were the problems of the
international community, not theirs, Mustafabeily claimed
that Karzai and the Afghan population must be made to take
ownership of these threats so they will act more effectively.
As an action plan for Afghanistan, he suggested the U.S.
must destroy the infrastructure and financial resources of
the Taliban, including the financial support received from
Persian Gulf countries. He contended that the Taliban
leadership should be targeted, "as we did in Chechnya."
Additionally, the Afghan government should be made to assume
more responsibility and that Karzai should be the mouthpiece
for these ideas, not ISAF and not the U.S.

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Comment

MOSCOW 00002764 002 OF 002


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7. (C) These statements echo those we have heard at lower
levels within the MFA, maintaining that Moscow has no funding
for infrastructure projects in or donations to Afghanistan.
Within the GOR, the disconnect continues between high-level
pledges of support for Afghanistan and a lack of financial
resources to give meaning to these words. We had been told
previously that FM Lavrov himself was a strong proponent of
more GOR support to Afghanistan, although reluctance persists
in other ministries such as the MOD. This, coupled with the
economic downturn in Russia, could be a factor in Russia's
dearth of financial contributions to Afghanistan.


8. (C) Unlike GOR critics who simply wanted the U.S. to
fail because they are clinging to a Cold War ideology,
however, Mustafabeily claimed a personal interest in
stabilizing Afghanistan. As a native of Azerbaijan, he
recognized the danger posed by an unstable Central Asia and
the devastation this would bring to the region. His comments
also reinforce the idea that the GOR sees no link between
stabilizing Afghanistan and democracy building, support for
human rights or fighting corruption. As we encourage Russia
to become a bigger player in Afghanistan, we should consider
that Moscow does not necessarily share our thoughts about how
to achieve stability or how a future Afghanistan will look.

Beyrle