RUSSIA ON DONATIONS TO AFGHANISTAN: WE ALREADY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002764 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL AF RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA ON DONATIONS TO AFGHANISTAN: WE ALREADY GAVE Classified By: Pol M/C Susan Elliott for reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Embassy Moscow met with Ali Mustafabeily, Deputy Director of the MFA's Second Asia Department, to discuss Russia's contributions to stabilizing Afghanistan. Mustafabeily stressed that the GOR was doing what it could financially and reiterated Moscow's preference for commercial transactions over donations to Afghanistan. On broad strategy Mustafabeily contended the U.S. should publicly strengthen Karzai so he can take ownership of the battles against the terrorists and drug-lords. Democracy and human rights, he said, should take a back-seat. End summary. -------------- The Well is Dry -------------- ¶2. (C) Mustafabeily reviewed some of Russia's contributions to Afghanistan, including the donation of two helicopters and the planned delivery of 50 KamAZ trucks, which should occur this week. He also referred to Moscow's support for higher education in Afghanistan such as the USD 2 million donated to the World Bank for reconstruction of a university in Kabul. He claimed the GOR was at its limit for official assistance directly to Afghanistan, but that Russian private companies can take up the work of reconstruction. Mustafabeily stated confidently that sufficient resources existed in Afghanistan from the international community, World Bank, and others, to finance projects without GOR funds. ¶3. (C) While leaving the door open for nominal GOR donations to organizations such as the World Bank and some military equipment transfers, Mustafabeily focused the conversation on why the Afghan Army and Police should purchase weapons from the GOR instead of expect donations. He indicated that in 2010 the MOD might be able to complete the donation of 50,000 AK-47s, but currently the MOD lacked the resources to fulfill this pledge. He stated that the security forces should instead purchase weapons from Moscow because they have been using Russian-made arms for years and it will take decades to transition to NATO-compatible systems. ¶4. (C) Similarly, Mustafabeily reiterated the GOR's belief that private companies should be leading the way in Afghanistan. For example, a private Russian company has already drafted plans for projects related to the Salang Tunnel, which Mustafabeily noted was a key strategic route linking Afghanistan with its northern neighbors. These plans had been sent to Washington, he stated, and the only roadblock was financing. The GOR, he claimed, was waiting for a contract so the project could begin. "We have the experience and we are ready to work," Mustafabeily exclaimed. -------------- Advice is Free -------------- ¶5. (C) Mustafabeily turned to his own service in Afghanistan, explaining that he had a long history of working in the country and noting that he was in Kabul as the last Soviet forces left Afghanistan. He claimed that the U.S. had made many mistakes in Afghanistan, and was continuing to make them. He commented that the operation in Afghanistan began as a counterterrorism operation, not one against corruption in government or support for human rights and democracy. He argued that the U.S. should criticize and persuade Karzai in private only, while in public they should only offer support to strengthen his position among the Afghan people. This was the only path to stabilizing Afghanistan. ¶6. (C) Noting that the Afghan Army believed the terrorist threat and narcotics trafficking were the problems of the international community, not theirs, Mustafabeily claimed that Karzai and the Afghan population must be made to take ownership of these threats so they will act more effectively. As an action plan for Afghanistan, he suggested the U.S. must destroy the infrastructure and financial resources of the Taliban, including the financial support received from Persian Gulf countries. He contended that the Taliban leadership should be targeted, "as we did in Chechnya." Additionally, the Afghan government should be made to assume more responsibility and that Karzai should be the mouthpiece for these ideas, not ISAF and not the U.S. -------------- Comment MOSCOW 00002764 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶7. (C) These statements echo those we have heard at lower levels within the MFA, maintaining that Moscow has no funding for infrastructure projects in or donations to Afghanistan. Within the GOR, the disconnect continues between high-level pledges of support for Afghanistan and a lack of financial resources to give meaning to these words. We had been told previously that FM Lavrov himself was a strong proponent of more GOR support to Afghanistan, although reluctance persists in other ministries such as the MOD. This, coupled with the economic downturn in Russia, could be a factor in Russia's dearth of financial contributions to Afghanistan. ¶8. (C) Unlike GOR critics who simply wanted the U.S. to fail because they are clinging to a Cold War ideology, however, Mustafabeily claimed a personal interest in stabilizing Afghanistan. As a native of Azerbaijan, he recognized the danger posed by an unstable Central Asia and the devastation this would bring to the region. His comments also reinforce the idea that the GOR sees no link between stabilizing Afghanistan and democracy building, support for human rights or fighting corruption. As we encourage Russia to become a bigger player in Afghanistan, we should consider that Moscow does not necessarily share our thoughts about how to achieve stability or how a future Afghanistan will look. Beyrle