INFORMATION ON SECURITY DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002754 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR PM, EUR E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON SECURITY DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA REF: STATE 112900 Classified By: Political M/C Susan M. Elliott for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d). ¶1. (SBU) The USG and GOR have four existing, formal mechanisms for conducting security dialogues with the Russian Federation; all four are scheduled yearly. 1) Joint Staff Talks (JSTs): This event is hosted annually by U.S. Joint Staff J-5 or the GOR Chief of the Main OPS Directorate on a rotational basis. The agenda is dynamic, but is typically focused on international military/security issues, mil-to-mil (M2M) cooperation, and transparency as nominated by the respective sides. 2) Bilateral Defense Consultations (BDCs): Hosted by ASD/ISA and the Director of International Relations, Russian MoD on a rotational basis. Agenda is more policy and pol-mil oriented, but it is subject to items nominated by the respective sides. 3) General Officer/Flag Officer Discussions (GO/FO): Alternatively hosted by EUCOM J5 and GOR MoD equivalent; agenda is more narrowly focused on AOR issues and developing direction for construction of the bilateral workplan (WP). 4) US-GOR Colonels Working Group (CWG): Objective is to discuss and nominate events for the following year's WP. In practice, they meet more than once per year, alternating sites between Stuttgart and Moscow. ¶2. (SBU) In addition, as a result of the Presidential summit in Moscow in July, the Presidents directed their respective senior military officers to establish a military-to-military working group under the auspices of the Bilateral Presidential Commission. The primary objective of this group will be to enhance military cooperation consistent with the Presidents' broader cooperative agenda. ¶3. (SBU) In practice, CJSC and CHOD will conduct 2-3 day counterpart visits every other year, with discussion agendas and visit venues to be determined by the respective sides. Ad hoc engagements vary, based upon interests of the respective sides. In the past these have included: --STRATCOM-Strategic Rocket Forces; --U.S. Air Forces Europe-GOR Air Force; --NORTHCOM/NORAD-RF Air Force; -Incidents at sea/Main Navy Staff talks between U.S. and Russia; -GO/FO delegation exchanges between EUCOM Component Commands and elements of the Russian Armed Forces. ¶4. (SBU) We believe dialogue was first established by mutual consent in the late 1980s. The frequency of these meetings has been determined by informal understanding. ¶5. (SBU) The most recent CJCS-CHOD security dialogue meeting came when the CJCS came to Moscow July 6-9. No set schedule determines the frequency of such meetings, but the event is placed on the WP and dates are left to respective sides to negotiate. The next scheduled meetings are: --JSTs: December 14-18; --BDCs: Although featured as an event on the 2009 WP, they will probably not be executed this year due to ongoing military reforms and personnel shifts within GOR MoD; --GO/FO Consultations: TBD; --CWG: November 17-19; --INCSEA/Main Navy Staff Talks: December 10-11 in Moscow. ¶6. (SBU) The USG and GOR expect officers to meet with their rank/position equivalents. ¶7. (C/NF) While useful and meaningful exchanges do take place during the contacts discussed above, a number of challenges MOSCOW 00002754 002 OF 002 in effecting real, substantive and ongoing Military-to-Military (M2M) dialogues exist. These challenges include: 1) Lack of Russian transparency and reciprocity: The GOR MoD has not changed its modus operandi for information exchange nor routine dialoguing since the end of the Cold War. For example, Russian delegations routinely refuse to share their briefing materials with us, even when presented with formal requests for these materials. Representatives of the GOR MoD are closely monitored by their Military Intelligence (GRU) handlers, and are loathe to engage in any dialogues outside of tightly controlled statements recited from prepared texts. While U.S. hosts will often invite Russian MoD delegations to different bases for tours and exchanges, U.S. delegations are rarely afforded visits anywhere but dedicated conference facilities at MoD HQ in Moscow. Access to Russian academic institutions is particularly problematic. Visiting U.S. delegations from Senior Service Schools are afforded, at best, a one-hour visit at MoD HQ to meet with a single representative of the GOR MoD External Liaison Division. Despite deliberate U.S. transparency regarding its actions in Russia's "near abroad," the Russian MoD is loathe to provide information about its activities. A recent example occurred over the last six months: while the US provided information to Russia concerning our limited training activities with the Georgian Armed Forces, Russia provided no information regarding a series of Collective Security Treaty Organization exercises occurring in Belarus and Kazakhstan involving some 12,000 Russian troops. 2) Coordinating DoD Relations with Russia: Russia was integrated into the EUCOM AOR as a result of the publication of the 2002 Unified Command Plan (UCP). Russia, however, resents the "delegation" of its relations to a "regional command" and refuses to interract with EUCOM on a continuing, formal basis. DoD efforts to date have managed to gain some recognition by Russia of EUCOM's role in the M2M relationship. For example, Russia has not accepted initiatives to conduct a COM EUCOM-CHOD exchange. Efforts need to continue along these lines to formalize the relationship. 3) Lack of Continuity/Followup: While exchanges with the Russians have been executed according to the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Workplan (WP),they have suffered from a lack of continuity. This is often characterized by a lack of formally acknowledged minute and action items. In many ways, every meeting therefore is similar to a "restart" of a new forum, rather than a continuation of an extablished venue with review of previous business, followup actions, etc. Beyrle