Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW2737
2009-11-06 08:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:
RUSSIA-GEORGIA: FAILED BORDER CROSSING TALKS,
VZCZCXRO0867 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHMO #2737/01 3100837 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 060837Z NOV 09 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5320 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002737
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS AM
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-GEORGIA: FAILED BORDER CROSSING TALKS,
NOGAIDELI VIST, DETAINEES
Classified By: Pol M/C Susan Elliott for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002737
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS AM
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-GEORGIA: FAILED BORDER CROSSING TALKS,
NOGAIDELI VIST, DETAINEES
Classified By: Pol M/C Susan Elliott for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (C) Summary. Georgian Charge Shugarov said the
Russia-Georgia talks on opening the Qazbegi-Larsi border post
between Russia and Georgia failed because Russia insisted all
legal documents governing Georgian border traffic had to be
redone because Georgia had departed the CIS. Shugarov could
not say why the GOG denied that the October 28-29 talks
involved Russians. Russian DFM Karasin told Shugarov that
former Georgian PM Nogaideli had not come with any GOG
mandate to open new lines of communication with the GOR, but
Karasin could not convincingly explain why he agreed to meet
with Nogaideli in the first place. Karasin brushed aside
Shugarov's concerns about the recent detentions of Georgians
near South Ossetia, saying that this was what the Incident
Prevention and Response Mechanisms had been created for. End
Summary
--------------
Qazbegi-Larsi
--------------
2. (C) Georgian Charge Givi Shugarov gave us a readout on
November 5 of the October 28-29 talks held in Yerevan on
opening the Qazbegi-Larsi border post between Georgia and
Russia had unexpectedly failed. Shugarov's sources were
members of the Georgian delegation and an informal discussion
(on the margins of a reception) with DFM Grigoriy Karasin.
Karasin told Shugarov that Russia was only willing to allow
Russians and Armenians use the border crossing, but not
Georgians. He argued that Georgia's exit from the CIS had
invalidated the legal documents governing cross-border
traffic with Georgian people, cars, or trucks. Shugarov said
Karasin could not explain why Georgians holding valid Russian
visas were also excluded, although they could enter Russia by
plane or ship. Karasin assured Shugarov that Russia was
doing all it could to prepare the necessary documents to open
the border post. The border post has been closed since 2006,
and since renovated -- on the Georgian side with the help of
U.S. funding, Shugarov noted. While Russia and Georgia
agreed to meet again before year's end, no date has been set.
3. (SBU) Note: While Georgia issues visas to all Russian
applicants, Russia only issues visas to Georgians to (a)
visit close relatives, (b) conduct humanitarian work, (c)
study, or (d) participate in international events such as
symposia or sports championships. Russia currently does not
issue business or tourist visas to Georgians. End Note.
4. (C) Shugarov said that initially, Russia had asked that
the negotiations involve only Russian and Georgian
representatives. Georgia declined, noting that all official
contact between Russia and Georgia had to occur through the
Swiss. Despite the fact that this form of communication is
common practice since Georgia broke off diplomatic relations
with Russia, Moscow refused to accept the Georgian position.
As a compromise, the sides finally met in Yerevan with
Armenian participation, given Armenia's strong interest in
opening a land connection between Russia and Armenia via the
Qazbegi-Larsi checkpoint. Shugarov could not say why the GOG
denied that the talks involved Russians.
5. (C) Shugarov noted with surprise that Karasin described
the Yerevan talks to him as successful and useful, but at the
same time acknowledged that they produced no result. Karasin
also described the Georgian delegation as competent and
well-versed, but criticized them for initially speaking
English and using a Russian-language interpreter, although
all present spoke fluent Russian.
6. (C) Shugarov said that Russian Border Guard Agency
Rosgranitsa Deputy Director Maltsev headed the Russian
delegation, although MFA 4th CIS Georgia Desk Director
Pavlovskiy was the de facto leader. Georgian MFA Deputy
Director for European Affairs Kakha Chitaia headed the
Georgian delegation, with Senior Counselor Georgiy
Zakarashvili from the Georgian interest section in Moscow
supporting.
--------------
Nogaideli Visit
--------------
7. (C) Karasin told Shugarov he had agreed to talk with
former PM and Movement for a Just Georgia party leader Zurab
MOSCOW 00002737 002 OF 002
Nogaideli October 27 simply because Nogaideli had asked for
the meeting. Karasin said Nogaideli had not come with any
government mandate to open new lines of communication with
the GOR. Nogaideli told Karasin he wanted to find a way out
of the dead end of disagreement over the status of the
breakaway regions, and that Georgia should speak directly
with all involved parties, including South Ossetian and
Abkhaz "authorities." As a former PM who covered economic
issues, Nogaideli thought that economic cooperation and
transport and communications were the most promising issues
for discussion. Karasin claimed he asked Nogaideli how he
wanted to achieve all this, given he was in the opposition,
with no governmental authority. Nogaideli allegedly had no
answer.
--------------
Detainee release
--------------
8. (C) Karasin brushed off Shugarov's query about the recent
spate of detentions of Georgians by Russian FSB border guards
and South Ossetian de facto authorities, saying that "these
things happen." All he would add, according to Shugarov, was
that the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms had been
created to address this kind of occurrence.
--------------
Comment
--------------
9. (C) If Shugarov's reporting of Karasin's positive
assessment of the Qazbegi-Larsi talks is accurate, it appears
that Moscow could be playing a transparent game of claiming
it wants to facilitate cooperation with Georgia, while doing
everything possible to obstruct actual progress. Karasin's
casual approach to the rise in detentions near the South
Ossetian administrative boundary line also does not bode well.
Beyrle
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS AM
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-GEORGIA: FAILED BORDER CROSSING TALKS,
NOGAIDELI VIST, DETAINEES
Classified By: Pol M/C Susan Elliott for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (C) Summary. Georgian Charge Shugarov said the
Russia-Georgia talks on opening the Qazbegi-Larsi border post
between Russia and Georgia failed because Russia insisted all
legal documents governing Georgian border traffic had to be
redone because Georgia had departed the CIS. Shugarov could
not say why the GOG denied that the October 28-29 talks
involved Russians. Russian DFM Karasin told Shugarov that
former Georgian PM Nogaideli had not come with any GOG
mandate to open new lines of communication with the GOR, but
Karasin could not convincingly explain why he agreed to meet
with Nogaideli in the first place. Karasin brushed aside
Shugarov's concerns about the recent detentions of Georgians
near South Ossetia, saying that this was what the Incident
Prevention and Response Mechanisms had been created for. End
Summary
--------------
Qazbegi-Larsi
--------------
2. (C) Georgian Charge Givi Shugarov gave us a readout on
November 5 of the October 28-29 talks held in Yerevan on
opening the Qazbegi-Larsi border post between Georgia and
Russia had unexpectedly failed. Shugarov's sources were
members of the Georgian delegation and an informal discussion
(on the margins of a reception) with DFM Grigoriy Karasin.
Karasin told Shugarov that Russia was only willing to allow
Russians and Armenians use the border crossing, but not
Georgians. He argued that Georgia's exit from the CIS had
invalidated the legal documents governing cross-border
traffic with Georgian people, cars, or trucks. Shugarov said
Karasin could not explain why Georgians holding valid Russian
visas were also excluded, although they could enter Russia by
plane or ship. Karasin assured Shugarov that Russia was
doing all it could to prepare the necessary documents to open
the border post. The border post has been closed since 2006,
and since renovated -- on the Georgian side with the help of
U.S. funding, Shugarov noted. While Russia and Georgia
agreed to meet again before year's end, no date has been set.
3. (SBU) Note: While Georgia issues visas to all Russian
applicants, Russia only issues visas to Georgians to (a)
visit close relatives, (b) conduct humanitarian work, (c)
study, or (d) participate in international events such as
symposia or sports championships. Russia currently does not
issue business or tourist visas to Georgians. End Note.
4. (C) Shugarov said that initially, Russia had asked that
the negotiations involve only Russian and Georgian
representatives. Georgia declined, noting that all official
contact between Russia and Georgia had to occur through the
Swiss. Despite the fact that this form of communication is
common practice since Georgia broke off diplomatic relations
with Russia, Moscow refused to accept the Georgian position.
As a compromise, the sides finally met in Yerevan with
Armenian participation, given Armenia's strong interest in
opening a land connection between Russia and Armenia via the
Qazbegi-Larsi checkpoint. Shugarov could not say why the GOG
denied that the talks involved Russians.
5. (C) Shugarov noted with surprise that Karasin described
the Yerevan talks to him as successful and useful, but at the
same time acknowledged that they produced no result. Karasin
also described the Georgian delegation as competent and
well-versed, but criticized them for initially speaking
English and using a Russian-language interpreter, although
all present spoke fluent Russian.
6. (C) Shugarov said that Russian Border Guard Agency
Rosgranitsa Deputy Director Maltsev headed the Russian
delegation, although MFA 4th CIS Georgia Desk Director
Pavlovskiy was the de facto leader. Georgian MFA Deputy
Director for European Affairs Kakha Chitaia headed the
Georgian delegation, with Senior Counselor Georgiy
Zakarashvili from the Georgian interest section in Moscow
supporting.
--------------
Nogaideli Visit
--------------
7. (C) Karasin told Shugarov he had agreed to talk with
former PM and Movement for a Just Georgia party leader Zurab
MOSCOW 00002737 002 OF 002
Nogaideli October 27 simply because Nogaideli had asked for
the meeting. Karasin said Nogaideli had not come with any
government mandate to open new lines of communication with
the GOR. Nogaideli told Karasin he wanted to find a way out
of the dead end of disagreement over the status of the
breakaway regions, and that Georgia should speak directly
with all involved parties, including South Ossetian and
Abkhaz "authorities." As a former PM who covered economic
issues, Nogaideli thought that economic cooperation and
transport and communications were the most promising issues
for discussion. Karasin claimed he asked Nogaideli how he
wanted to achieve all this, given he was in the opposition,
with no governmental authority. Nogaideli allegedly had no
answer.
--------------
Detainee release
--------------
8. (C) Karasin brushed off Shugarov's query about the recent
spate of detentions of Georgians by Russian FSB border guards
and South Ossetian de facto authorities, saying that "these
things happen." All he would add, according to Shugarov, was
that the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms had been
created to address this kind of occurrence.
--------------
Comment
--------------
9. (C) If Shugarov's reporting of Karasin's positive
assessment of the Qazbegi-Larsi talks is accurate, it appears
that Moscow could be playing a transparent game of claiming
it wants to facilitate cooperation with Georgia, while doing
everything possible to obstruct actual progress. Karasin's
casual approach to the rise in detentions near the South
Ossetian administrative boundary line also does not bode well.
Beyrle