MEDVEDEV'S TEAM REMAINS SMALL, CONSIDERING RISKY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002731

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR ECON ETRD KDEM RS
SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV'S TEAM REMAINS SMALL, CONSIDERING RISKY
NEW VERTICAL OF POWER

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Susan Elliott for reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: President Medvedev's recent reorganization
of the Presidential Administration (PA) was a tiny step
toward strengthening his team, but the possible creation of a
separate, presidentially-controlled "parallel vertical of
power" risked damaging the established balance of power
between him and Prime Minister Putin. At this point,
Medvedev's team is paltry compared with Putin's, and
observers almost universally remained convinced that Putin
was the ultimate decisionmaker on most topics, including who
would become Russia's next leader. Cadre policy provided
another lens -- albeit sometimes blurry -- for examining the
Russian political elite's balance of power and intentions
toward the 2012 presidential election. End Summary.


2. (C) Eighteen months into his presidency, Medvedev's cadre
of loyal officials remains small and weak. Although many
officials have university, St. Petersburg, or government
connections to both Medvedev and Putin, experts generally
named Konstantin Chuychenko and Arkadiy Dvorkovich as the
only senior officials loyal to Medvedev. United Russia
strategist and Head of the Center for the Study of the Elite
Olga Kryshtanovskaya recently concluded that only 10 percent
of officials who report to Medvedev were actually beholden to
him. By comparison, it took then President Putin
approximately 2 years to fully form his team, but three
quarters of them remained in place.

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Surface Level PA Changes
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3. (SBU) In October, Medvedev made two cadre changes that
superficially increased his influence. On October 6,
Medvedev removed longtime speech writer Dzkakhan Pollyeva and
appointed Yeva Vasilevskaya, whom observers see as better
suited to Medvedev's style. On October 15, Medvedev
redistributed the functions of two PA departments. Medvedev
appointed Sergey Dubik, an advisor and head of the Department
for Personnel, as the new head of the Department for
Personnel and Cadre. The head of the Department for Cadre
and State Awards, Viktor Ivanov ally and KGB veteran Vladimir
Osipov, was stripped of his cadre duties and became head of
the Department for State Awards. Presidential Spokeswoman
Natalya Timakova said that the changes optimized the
structure of the PA and that cadre policy was a priority for
improving the quality of Russia's bureaucracy.


4. (C) Experts generally agree that Medvedev's October
reshuffles do little to increase his team's authority or
ability to act independently of Putin. Tatyana Stanovaya of
the Center for Political Technologies told us that Dubik's
increased authority was not significant because he remained
subordinate to PA aide for cadre decisions Oleg Markov, who
was a member of Putin's team. Although Dubik was close to
Medvedev, he also maintained an excellent relationship with
Putin, and was unlikely to actively go against the PM without
some level of certainty that Medvedev and his team de facto
led Moscow decisionmaking. Stanovaya, and her boss Aleksey
Makarkin, emphasized to us that any significant changes by
Medvedev were likely to be coordinated with Putin; otherwise
it could lead to elite infighting that would seriously
threaten the stability of the political system Putin and
those around him, including Medvedev, had created over the
last decade.

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New Parallel Vertical of Power Risky Proposition
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5. (C) A more radical potential cadre policy change surfaced
October 29 from an "independent" group of experts and Just
Russia Duma deputy Ilya Ponomaryov at the Medvedev connected
Institute for Contemporary Development. Experts discussed
their recommendations of how the President could continue his
drive to modernize Russia. The most controversial
recommendation was the creation of a "parallel vertical of
power" that would be under the President's control and work
on resolving emergency and strategic issues. One of the
authors of the report, President of the Institute for
National Strategies Mikhail Remizov, emphasized after the
conference that the government did an excellent job of
resolving problems when they surfaced, but Russia needed
structural changes so that a group under the President -- who
was responsible for preserving Russia's security and setting
her strategic course -- could work on fixing underlying
structural issues. (Note: In essence, the government under

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Putin used a whack-a-mole technique, but somebody needed to
discover how to unplug the machine so that the moles stopped
popping up. End Note). The November 2 edition of the
business weekly Profil, analyzing rumors of cadre shuffles,
noted that elites will take any cadre decision as a signal
regarding the sincerity of Medvedev's intentions as expressed
in his "Russia, Forward" article.


6. (C) Remizov confirmed to us that Medvedev had received
the institute's recommendations for a new parallel structure,
but Remizov was unsure if the President would incorporate it
into his November 12 address to parliament. Observers, such
as Gleb Pavloskiy, quickly blasted the proposal, calling it a
joke that would lead to the kind of instability Russia
experienced in the 1990s. Pavlovskiy added that this
proposed body could only function in accordance with the
budget, which Putin and United Russia controlled, and that it
was unlikely that two verticals of power would evenly share
funds.

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Cadre Rumors Focused on Naryshkin
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7. (C) Cadre reshuffling rumors have permeated Moscow
recently, including Nezavisimaya Gazeta's report that
Medvedev would soon replace the Head of the PA, Sergey
Naryshkin, with Minister of Justice Aleksandr Konovalov.
While cadre rumors surfaced daily, Deputy Director for the
Institute of Social Systems Dmitriy Badovskiy told us that
Putin, for the time being, had turned down Medvedev's request
for Konovalov. Putin and Medvedev, however, might be able to
agree upon another candidate such as First Deputy PA Head
Vladislav Surkov, who desperately wanted the job, Sergey
Sobyanin, or others. While Badovskiy put forth Surkov as a
possible compromise candidate, Lilia Shevtsova of Carnegie
told us that President Medvedev did not like Surkov, which
would make it unlikely that Surkov would get the nod as head
of the PA. Badovskiy added that Medvedev wanted to make
tactical and structural cadre changes, but understood that he
and Putin needed to preserve elite stability, which enhanced
both their chances to become president in 2012.

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2012 Election Remains Factor in Cadre Decisions
-------------- --


8. (C) Medvedev's cadre policy reflects more then short-term
factors. Kryshtanovskaya and General Director for Political
Information Aleksey Mukhin asserted that Medvedev does not
want to rock the balance-of-power boat prior to the next
presidential election in 2012, otherwise Putin would throw
him overboard. Mukhin said that at this point, the most
likely way for Medvedev to be reelected was to maintain
Putin's support. Mukhin, Stanovaya, and Makarkin said that
Medvedev had yet to make a significant decision without
Putin's consent, and that although Medvedev wanted to
strengthen his team, he could not do it at the expense of
Putin's.

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Comment
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9. (C) Medvedev's caution and evolutionary step-by-step
modus operandi suggest that cooperation with various Kremlin
factions will continue, even if the President appoints or
promotes a few senior officials who are mainly loyal to him.
A reevaluation of his intentions would be necessary, however,
if Medvedev openly confronted Putin by unilaterally removing
longtime siloviki and other officials from Putin's team with
those beholden to the President. Medvedev's poslanie and the
upcoming United Russia Congress should provide more clues as
to the direction of Russian domestic policies, who controls
those policies, and the level of cooperation between factions.

Beyrle