BOSNIA: RESPONSE TO BUTMIR PACKAGE AND LAVROV'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002728 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019 TAGS: PREL BK RS SUBJECT: BOSNIA: RESPONSE TO BUTMIR PACKAGE AND LAVROV'S TRIP REF: STATE 113011 Classified By: Political MC Susan M. Elliott for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The MFA's BiH desk officer Ivan Gorbunov told us on November 3 that Russia rejected the U.S.-EU Butmir Package and saw it as new conditionality to the Office of High Representative's (OHR's) transition and beyond the scope of international consensus. He challenged our assessment on the importance of Silajdzic's opposition and whether the Serbs and Croats could give up their entity representation. Gorbunov told us that the GOR preferred more effort be put behind meeting the "5 plus 2" conditions, a more "realistic" deliverable for the November 18 Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Steering Board meeting. With the early election season in BiH, the GOR is concerned that this would be the last opportunity for the entities to make concessions. Gorbunov stated that Russia would be willing to delay the PIC Steering Board session to allow more time for progress. He stated further that Republika Srpska PM Milorad Dodik's opposition to the Butmir Package was clear, and that while Russia would continue to press him to participate in negotiations, it would not press him to make concessions. The GOR will support a technical rollover of the EUFOR mandate. Russia continues to resent that it was not consulted before we launched the Butmir Package; however, even without its endorsement, the GOR will allow us additional time to maneuver. End Summary. "5 Plus 2" First then Amendments -------------- ¶2. (C) We delivered reftel points to Third European Directorate Counselor Ivan Nikolaevich Gorbunov, desk officer for BiH and Croatia, on November 3. Gorbunov stated frankly that the GOR rejected the U.S.-EU approach, telling us that it went beyond what had been agreed to by the PIC Steering Board, had been done without prior consultation, and that, despite U.S. and EU statements, it added new conditions to the "5 plus 2," effectively delaying transition. Gorbunov also assessed that the "Butmir Package" would continue to run afoul of both the Croats and the Serbs, neither of whom would agree to give up their unique representational bodies for constitutional reform. He also did not share our assessment that Bosniak President Haris Silajdzic's opposition did not pose a problem, pointing to how Silajdzic had undermined the April Package in 2006. ¶3. (C) Gorbunov countered that it was essential for the PIC and the entities to focus on the remaining conditions for OHR transition -- settling state property and agreement on the disposal of excess materiel. In the GOR's view, both items could be resolved before the PIC Steering Board meeting. Gorbunov offered that the GOR would be open to a delay in the November 18 PIC session, using the potential security issues from a soccer match as a ready excuse. He suggested that this would allow more time for progress on the "5 plus 2." He was especially concerned that with the early start of the election campaigns, that it would be months before the sides could be prodded forward again, and therefore, this PIC meeting was the best opportunity to reach OHR transition. ¶4. (C) While Gorbunov did not dispute the need for constitutional reform, he said the GOR disagreed with our methodology. He argued that OHR transition would aid in the process of entity integration, as the EUSR worked with the entities to make the legal and regulatory changes necessary for EU membership. While the GOR agreed that EU integration is desirable and necessary for BiH, he labeled it a "remote incentive" that was unlikely to drive the process forward at this stage. He said that from the GOR's perspective, the continued existence of OHR served to delay the reforms necessary, as the entities could leave it to OHR to resolve. Will Press Dodik to the Table but not to Concede -------------- --- ¶5. (C) Gorbunov told us that he translated for President Medvedev during his meetings in Belgrade with RS PM Dodik and confirmed that Medvedev pressed for Dodik to remain at the table. However, Gorbunov underlined to us that the GOR would not press the two entities or three constituent peoples to make concessions that could not be adopted by the BiH parliament. "What is acceptable to the locals is acceptable to us. ... We will be very cautious on constitutional amendments," he said. Gorbunov linked Dayton to assuring peace and security in BiH, and removing Dayton would put peace and security at risk. Gorbunov assessed that Dodik's MOSCOW 00002728 002 OF 002 motivations were very clear: entity voting was a key instrument of securing RS interests and Dodik would oppose any condition by the EU, "or NATO," to remove this instrument. EUFOR and European Convention on Human Rights -------------- ¶6. (C) The GOR will support a technical roll-over on EUFOR, but Gorbunov commented that the real concern was getting the EU to pay for it. He also suggested step-by-step progress on the European Convention on Human Rights was possible, but that this too would come with time and the building of trust between the entities. He again argued that this was only possible following OHR transition. Lavrov's to Sarajevo -------------- ¶7. (C) Gorbunov told us that Lavrov will travel from Cyprus to Sarajevo on the morning of November 5 and spend five to six hours on the ground. Lavrov plans to meet with Foreign Minister Sven Alkalaj, members of the Presidency (he did not specify),Chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikola Spiric, High Representative Valentin Inzko, and RS PM Dodik. Gorbunov will serve as the minister's translator and offered to share what he could when he returns. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Gorbunov's comments followed some reflection by the GOR on the U.S.-EU package, and demonstrated some wounded pride at not being consulted before we launched negotiations with the entities and constituencies. At this stage, the GOR is unwilling to support our initiative in the face of local opposition and has defaulted back to "5 plus 2" and the PIC Steering Board. While not willing to endorse or support our efforts, the GOR's willingness to carve out more time for negotiations indicates that they will allow us some room for maneuver. Beyrle