RUSSIAN MFA ON TRANSNISTRIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002714

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS MD
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA ON TRANSNISTRIA

Classified By: Pol M/C Susan Elliott for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary. Transnistria Conflict Negotiator
Nesterushkin told us that the November 6 talks on
Transnistria would be an important first contact between the
conflict parties, but expressed concerns about the October 6
"3 plus 2" meeting in Vienna. He said U.S. suggestions at
that meeting to eliminate the term "special status" for
Transnistria changed agreed language that has been used since

1993. While positive about new Moldovan DPM Osipov,
Nesterushkin noted that Osipov's affiliation with the ruling
coalition's smallest party meant his views on Transnistria
might not prevail in the GOM. Nesterushkin echoed FM
Lavrov's comment that the GOM's call to remove Russian
peacekeepers from Transnistria "showed insufficient
understanding of the situation." End Summary

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Upcoming "5 plus 2" talks
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2. (C) Russian Transnistria Conflict Negotiator Valeriy
Nesterushkin told poloff October 23 that Transnistria's
agreement to attend the planned November 6 "5 plus 2"
meetings without referencing them as such was simply a game
of words. The important point was that all sides had agreed
to this first contact between Transnistrian authorities and
the new Moldovan government. Nesterushkin shared a letter
from Transnistrian "Foreign Minister" Yastrebchak from the
same day, confirming participation in the planned meetings,
but asking to postpone a Law Enforcement Seminar planned for
November 8-9, due to a local holiday.

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Special status
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3. (C) Nesterushkin expressed concern over suggestions made
by the U.S. representative at the October 6 "3 plus 2"
meeting in Vienna to eliminate the call for a "special
status" for Transnistria from upcoming statements on the
conflict region. He argued that the term had been included
in the original OSCE report number 13 from 1993, and repeated
in statements ever since. Removing the term could jeopardize
agreement on Moldova's territorial integrity, while other
formulations such as "autonomy" or "republic" to describe
Transnistria's future status were too specific, as was the
use of "status" alone.

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Kozak Plan
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4. (C) Acknowledging both Moldovan and Transnistrian
opposition to the 2003 Kozak Plan sponsored by Russia,
Nesterushkin no longer pushed for it to be the basis for a
future agreement. Given that it captured the "maximum degree
of closeness" both sides had agreed to, he echoed FM Lavrov's
October 9 statement that the Kozak Plan was based on valid
principles that would likely crop up in any settlement
agreement.

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Osipov
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5. (C) Nesterushkin said his October 12 meeting with newly
appointed Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration
Victor Osipov was useful in getting both sides acquainted.
He described Osipov as self-confident, pragmatic, and
constructive, and agreed with OSCE Ambassador Philip Remler's
assessment of Osipov as flexible on settlement issues.


6. (C) Noting Osipov's affiliation with the smallest
coalition party (Nasha Moldova),Nesterushkin cautioned that
it remained to be seen if Osipov's views would be translated
into GOM policy on Transnistria. Neither the candidate for
President, the Prime Minister, nor the speaker of parliament
were from Nasha Moldova. Also, Nesterushkin hesitated to
assume that Osipov would retain the reintegration ministry's
previous staff, which might have signaled continuity in the
new government's Transnistria policy.

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Russian troops
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MOSCOW 00002714 002 OF 002




7. (C) Commenting on Moldovan and Transnistrian calls to
respectively remove or increase the Russian troop presence in
Transnistria, Nesterushkin said it was up to the conflict
parties to decide what to do with the Russian troops. He
claimed that the troop presence was stabilizing, and that
withdrawing them would create a military void in the
ceasefire zone, Nesterushkin called Moldovan talk of removing
the troops "stupid adventurism." He did not address Moldovan
PM Filat's proposal to replace the Russian presence by
international peacekeepers.


8. (SBU) Nesterushkin's views reflected FM Lavrov's comment
October 9 that changing the peacekeeping format before
agreeing on a conflict settlement "turned everything upside
down," and "showed insufficient understanding of the
situation." MFA spokesman Andrei Nesterenko similarly stated
October 13 that any change in the Russian peacekeeping
contingent, as well as the resumption of ammunition removal
from the Russian depot in Colbasna, depended on "specific
steps" to settle the Transnistria conflict. It was up to
Chisinau and Tiraspol to select such steps.


9. (C) The October 21 joint Moldova-Transnistria-Russia
troop exercises, "sabotaged by Moldova" since 2003, were a
good thing, Nesterushkin explained. The artificial freeze
hampered normal troop readiness levels and kept the joint
peacekeeping force from fulfilling its mandate.

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Comment
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10. (C) In light of the changes in administration in the
U.S. and Moldova, Nesterushkin is looking to preserve
previously agreed positions into resumed settlement talks --
language on a "special status" for Transnistria and an
ongoing presence of Russian troops in Transnistria. He
continues to shy away from acknowledging a role for Russia in
influencing Tiraspol, instead emphasizing the need for both
conflict parties to find agreement on settlement issues.
Beyrle