RUSSIA WILL SUPPORT OIC ON "DEFAMATION OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002708 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (DUAL PARA 4, CORRECTED TO PARA 5) SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA WILL SUPPORT OIC ON "DEFAMATION OF RELIGIONS" REF: A) STATE 108921 B) MOSCOW 2338 MOSCOW 00002708 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Pol Min Counselor Susan Elliott for reason 1.4 (b) ¶1. (C) Summary: In response to our demarche per reftel A, MFA representative Natalia Zolotova told us that Russia planned to support the "defamation of religions" resolution sponsored by the Organization of the Islamic Conference in the UN General Assembly. Zolotova said that absolute free speech can be dangerous, and that it should be limited. Zolotova also fleshed out the MFA's sharp response to the International Religious Freedom Report, and alluded to Russia's attempts to defend "traditional values" in the UN's Human Rights Council. Expressing her support for continued dialogue on the subject, Zolotova claimed not to be advocating "cultural relativism" even while she underlined the role of culture in Russia's attitude toward human rights. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On October 30, Post delivered reftel A demarche to Natalia Zolotova, First Secretary in the MFA's Department of Human Rights and Humanitarian Cooperation. Zolotova told us that, despite U.S. objections, Russia plans to support the "defamation of religions" resolution sponsored by the Organization of the Islamic Conference in the UN General Assembly's Third Committee. Zolotova said that Russia traditionally supports such resolutions, and added that in her opinion the resolution would not encroach upon free speech. She noted that Articles 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights acknowledge that free speech has limits. In Zolotova's opinion, absolute free speech can be dangerous. For example, she said, "hate speech causes violence and social unrest." ¶3. (C) Asked how the resolution would define either "defamation" or "religion," Zolotova said that defamation meant "an insult to people's faith," but otherwise declined to give a clear answer. She also claimed that the resolution "has a legal basis," because it is linked to individual countries' laws. She acknowledged that tying the resolution to different countries' laws would allow widespread leeway for interpretation. Perhaps aware that she was painting herself into a rhetorical corner -- especially in light of the "defamations" of non-traditional religions that have recently occurred within Russia -- Zolotova intimated that Muslim leaders were considerably more focused on the "defamation of religion" than the Russians were, despite their nominal support. She said that "we have to look at the reality, after 9/11," that Muslims have suffered discrimination and are particularly sensitive on this issue. She alluded to the controversy that arose in 2006 over a Danish newspaper's depiction of the Prophet Mohammad as an example of the dangers of free speech that members of a religion may find insulting to their beliefs. ¶4. (C) Zolotova also discussed some recent interactions between the GOR and the USG in the human rights sphere, including our September demarche on "traditional values" (ref B) and this week's release of the International Religious Freedom Report (IRF). Discussing the MFA's sharp reaction to the IRF, Zolotova said, "we had expected that, in the context of a 'reset' in our relations, there might be a different tone struck in this report." However, she said that in general the GOR deals "calmly" with the State Department's annual reports. Noting that human rights is a relatively new concept in Russia, "unlike in the U.S., where it is a key part of your history," Zolotova managed to say in the same breath that Russia's culture meant a different approach to human rights, and at the same time that Russia was not advocating "cultural relativism." Despite this contradiction, Zolotova assured us that the GOR agreed that certain rights were universal and unalienable, but that having a different culture meant it would follow a different path to get there, and at a different pace. ¶4. (C) The discussion of the interface between culture and human rights continued the conversation that we had with the MFA's Andrey Lanchikov when delivering the "traditional values" demarche (ref B). Scolding the U.S. for its lack of support for the "traditional values" resolution, Zolotova said that in her opinion, the most important thing was to have as much dialogue as possible, and that by opposing the resolution, the U.S. was cutting off that dialogue. We explained that the U.S. opposed the resolution because of concerns that it would provide rights violators with a rhetorical carte blanche; furthermore, simply by participating in the UN's Human Rights Council, the U.S. is indeed keeping this vital dialogue going. We conveyed to Zolotova that we were aware of the cultural issues complicating the promotion of human rights, but that this awareness coexisted alongside our very clear position MOSCOW 00002708 002.2 OF 002 supporting fundamental freedoms. We also conveyed our desire to continue the conversation, and, however gradually, to increase the level of mutual understanding on the subject. Beyrle