U.S.-RUSSIA ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002696

SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR JCIC
DEPT FOR T, ISN, VCI, EUR/PRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019
TAGS: KCFE KNNP KTIA PARM PREL START RS US
SUBJECT: U.S.-RUSSIA ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY WORKING GROUP MEETING, MOSCOW, OCTOBER 12

Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: At the inaugural meeting of the U.S.-Russia
Binational Commission's Arms Control and International
Security Working Group, held October 12 in Moscow,
U/S Tauscher and Russian D/FM Ryabkov reviewed Missile
Defense, nonproliferation issues, CFE, and START. Lt
General O'Reilly of the Missile Defense Agency provided a
detailed presentation on the latest U.S. planning on
Missile Defense in Europe, and U/S Tauscher pressed for
Russian movement on establishment of a Joint Data Exchange
Center (JDEC),participation in the Joint Threat
Assessment (JTA),and related issues. The Russians agreed
in principle to a next JTA meeting in the October-November
2009 time frame but deferred movement on further
cooperation until their experts had examined the details
of General O'Reilly's presentation. U/S Tauscher
invited Russian missile defense experts to come to
Colorado Springs to visit the facility and discuss missile
defense cooperation.


2. (C) On nonproliferation issues, the Russians:
emphasized the need for P5 coordination on NPT RevCon
issues but acknowledged there may be areas where P5 or
bilateral agreement will not be possible; probed for
details of U.S. planning for CTBT ratification; asked
about U.S. strategy for moving forward with Pakistan to
break the deadlock on FMCT at the CD; pressed for U.S.
support on Russian positions on specific UN First
Committee draft resolutions; and detailed Russian concerns
relating to the Global Summit on Nuclear Security and
issues discussed at the Sherpa meeting in Vienna. They
also expressed concerns about lack of U.S. interest in
bilateral cooperation on UNSCR 1540 implementation and
difficulties with implementation of the 123 agreement.


3. (C) On CFE, both sides identified problematic areas
but affirmed their continued desire to look for areas of
common ground and reiterated their openness to bilateral
as well as multilateral discussions. On START, both D/FM
Ryabkov and Russian Ambassador Antonov expressed their
intention to work hard with the U.S. side to meet the
December 5, 2009 deadline; U/S Tauscher and VCI Assistant
Secretary Gottemoeller echoed this view and expressed
appreciation for the seriousness with which Russia was
engaging in the START talks. End Summary.

MISSILE DEFENSE
--------------


4. (SBU) After introductory remarks, MDA Director, LTG
O'Reilly provided a briefing on the Administration's new
Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense (MD). His
briefing covered: the emerging missile threats that the
new approach is designed to meet and the time frames for
the four phases for dealing with these threats; the lack
of capability against Russian ICBMs; and potential
U.S.-Russia MD cooperation. Possible cooperative areas
include: sharing MD sensor data, cooperative development
of optics and laser technologies, and collaborative flight
testing.


5. (C) DFM Ryabkov said that Russia would need to review
and analyze the issues raised in LTG O'Reilly's
presentation. Ryabkov then turned to Amb. Antonov to
provide some reactions. Antonov questioned the assumption
that Iran is a threat to southern Europe. He said that
the U.S. was confusing capabilities with intentions and
that the July 6, 2009 Moscow Summit Joint Statement on
Missile Defense Issues referenced missile challenges not
missile threats. U/S Tauscher responded that the U.S.
threat perception is based on Iran's belligerence,
non-compliance with UNSC resolutions, and the threatening
rhetoric of Iran's President.


6. (C) U/S Tauscher noted that the U.S. is offering a wide
range of cooperation. She said that the U.S. would like
to: have a Russian delegation come to the U.S. to discuss
with State ISN Acting Assisting Secretary Van Diepen a
Joint Threat Assessment; extend the JDEC and PLNS
agreements which are both due to expire in 2010; work to
get the JDEC up and running; and agree on a format for
notification of Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) launches

over the Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link.
She provided drafts of agreements to extend the JDEC and
PLNS agreements, and a non-paper on notifications.


7. (C) DFM Ryabkov replied that there is no doubt that
Russia views the President's September 17 decision as a
step in the right direction and one which partially takes
into account Russia's views of U.S. MD policy in Europe.
He added that the possibility of dialogue has been
extended and improved. He noted that the U.S. approach
places a great emphasis on technology and that there are
issues raised by the future strategic capabilities of the
Phased Adaptive Approach's latter phases. Ryabkov added
that we must move toward a common understanding of what is
being developed as an alternative to the Bush
Administration's program. He asked for more detail on
what the U.S. was now planning to deploy in terms of
ground-based systems in Europe - including in Poland. He
also raised the question about the system's potential
growth in the future.


8. (C) DFM Ryabkov said that Russia was also interested in
U.S.-Japan MD cooperation, commenting that it raised
concern that the Missile Technology control Regime (MTCR)
should be abided by. Col. Il'in of the Russian MoD said
that the U.S. had provided clear numbers on interceptors
to be deployed in Europe during the Bush Administration.
He asked whether the U.S. could say how many, and what
types of, interceptors would be deployed during each phase
of the Phased Adaptive Approach. LTG O'Reilly responded
that the SM-3 interceptors were in canisters that would be
easy to count but that the absolute number of interceptors
would be based on military commanders' assessments of the
threat. He added that the Joint Threat Assessment could
assist us in understanding the numbers of interceptors
that would be needed.


9. (C) With respect to missile threats, Ryabkov said that
Russia has its own view of "real" Iranian achievements
vs. "hypotheses." He added that there are many other
missile threats to be considered apart from Iran. He
noted, however, that there is now a better basis to move
forward on a Joint Threat Assessment than in July.
Highlighting the importance of a mutually agreed
foundation, he also stressed the importance of work in the
NATO-Russia Council, specifically the good work that has
already been done on theater missile defense (TMD).


10. (C) U/S Tauscher proposed that there be a second Joint
Threat Assessment meeting in October or November in
Washington. She also again raised the need to move on the
JDEC and PLNS agreements and cited reference in the July 6
Moscow
Summit's Joint Statement on Missile Defense Issues to the
fact
that our two countries are intensifying their dialogue on
JDEC.
Ryabkov responded that Russia could agree to a Joint Threat
Assessment
meeting in Washington in October but that prior experience
does not indicate that our estimates will reach the same
view. U/S Tauscher accepted this offer to send a threat
assessment team to Washington and again emphasized the
need to move forward on resolving JDEC issues and the
Direct Communications Link format for GBI launches.
Ryabkov responded that on JDEC we had gone through
different stages but that Russia perceived a more
deep-rooted problem than resolving specific unresolved
JDEC issues. He added that resolving the problems of
assessing missile threats would allow us to move forward
with JDEC.

NONPROLIFERATION
--------------


11. (C) NPT RevCon: Turning to nonproliferation issues,
Ryabkov emphasized that a successful Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon) in
May 2010 would be one of the major challenges ahead. The
September 24, 2009 U.S.-chaired UN Security Council Summit
and its unanimous adoption of UNSC Resolution 1887 had
been a complex undertaking that exceeded expectations and
opened the way for progress on a balanced approach on all

three "pillars" of the NPT: nonproliferation, disarmament
and peaceful uses. Also, the events at the UN and
the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington were
generating great expectations for U.S.-Russia bilateral
cooperation on nonproliferation and disarmament issues.
Ryabkov stressed the importance of working with a number
of countries, and not just in the NAM, to highlight U.S.
and Russia progress on disarmament issues. Recalling the
London P5 meeting on September 4, 2009, and the bilateral
meeting on its margins, Ryabkov noted the importance of
transparency in nuclear policy and that it was desirable
for the P5 to develop a unified position to this effect.
The question now was how to move other P5 participants to
concrete action in this area. Ambassador Antonov suggested
that the U.S. and Russia chair a joint briefing on nuclear
disarmament at the RevCon. He noted good experiences with
such briefings in past RevCons, including in 2000.


12. (SBU) U/S Tauscher concurred in Ryabkov's
assessments of the recent P5 consultations in London and
events at the UN, which should provide a strong foundation
on which to build. She advocated a robust P5 statement on
the RevCon covering all three "pillars," noting that the
U.S. and Russia did not receive enough credit for their
work on disarmament as well as on nonproliferation and
peaceful uses. Tauscher encouraged Russian participation
in the scheduled October 14 P5 lunch hosted by U.S.
Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation
Ambassador Burk in New York to discuss some of these NPT
RevCon issues in more depth (Note: Russian
representatives did participate. End note.) and supported
holding another P5 meeting to assess milestones completed
and future work in advance of the RevCon.


13. (SBU) CTBT: Ryabkov noted the importance Russia and
others attached to the Secretary's participation in the
CTBT Article XIV Conference on September 24, after a
ten-year absence. He sought details of U.S. ratification
planning, asking whether CTBT ratification before the NPT
RevCon was still an option, or would it be postponed until
later?


14. (C) U/S Tauscher reiterated the President's
commitment to seek ratification and emphasized that timing
would depend in large part on the START ratification
process. The Senate schedule was often unpredictable, but
the Administration would need to have a very significant
conversation with Senate members before proceeding on
CTBT. Tauscher said she had discussed with CTBT
colleagues on the margins of the Article XIV conference
how to encourage others among the nine outstanding Annex 2
countries to ratify. She noted Indonesia's positive
statement of intention to ratify when the U.S. ratifies
and said China seemed serious about CTBT ratification at
the London meeting. She welcomed Russia's thoughts on
how to encourage countries with more complicated
ratification scenarios such as Egypt, Pakistan, and India
to move forward in this area. She also encouraged Russian
statements promoting ratification of CTBT and noted the
important role for scientists on both the U.S. and Russian
sides in this discussion.


15. (C) Ryabkov opined that ratification by one or two of
the outstanding Annex 2 countries could result in a
"wave" of ratifiers among the outstanding nine
countries. He noted that in the Asia/Pacific region,
Russia did not see the possibility of some (presumably
DPRK) acceding to CTBT, but that the P5 could discuss this
in more detail.


16. (C) FMCT: Ryabkov also sought details of U.S. steps
being taken with Pakistan to resolve Islamabad's
opposition to starting substantive negotiations on a
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. Ryabakov noted Russia was
working with Pakistan in both Geneva and Moscow; he had
met several times with Pakistan's ambassador in Moscow.
U/S Tauscher confirmed that FMCT was a priority for the
U.S., which was committed to making sure the CD's Program
of Work, which includes FMCT negotiations, can go
forward. She had met several times with the Pakistani
ambassador in Washington but was not sure their discussion
had moved the issue very far. She recalled that at the

September 4 London P5 meeting, participants had agreed to
make separate demarches to Pakistan and had also discussed
a joint demarche, agreeing to revisit the issue in
mid-October. Tauscher said the P5 needed to work further
on this, although China had seemed unsure. She thought a
P5 joint statement could move things forward and put the
five on record. Even if China demurred, a joint demarche
or statement among the four would be useful.


17. (C) Ryabkov said that with regard to a P5 demarche,
China was on the fence. He warned that if not resolved,
the issue would become "very topical" in the context of
the NPT and events planned for 2010. He underlined the
need to get rid of this obstacle and reiterated the
importance of U.S. pressure.


18. (C) Regarding the IAEA, Ryabkov thought very good
groundwork already had been laid but that UNSCR 1887 had
shown the need for more intensive bilateral and P5
discussion on issues such as universalization of the
Additional Protocol (AP). There was also the question of
how to tackle Negative Security Assurances (NSA),where
Russia supported creation of an international convention,
which was, however, not acceptable to all. The P5 needed
to be prepared on issues such as these before the NPT Rev
Con, although full agreement might not be achievable.
Nevertheless, the P5 should try to find some common
ground. U/S Tauscher noted the ongoing work of the
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),which would affect the U.S.
position on NSA.


19. (C) Middle East Resolution: On the NPT RevCon
Resolution on the Middle East, Ryabkov said it would be
destructive to the Treaty regime if there was no
resolution of this issue and suggested holding another P5
discussion on this if needed. All states in the region
should be in compliance with the NPT, all states should
accede to the NPT, and all nuclear facilities should be
under safeguards. He conceded that finding common ground
in this area might not be possible. U/S Tauscher said the
U.S. was working closely with Egypt to find a way
forward. The U.S. would support approaches in the RevCon
that were consultative, positive, and which did not cause
participants to take sides.


20. (SBU) UN General Assembly First Committee (UNFC):
Ryabkov highlighted the importance of close bilateral
cooperation in the UNGA First Committee (UNFC). In
particular, he asked for U.S. support for Russian
opposition to a Kazakhstan draft resolution proposing
establishment of a UN International Day for a World Free
of Nuclear Weapons; and U.S. support for a Russian draft
resolution on "Bilateral Strategic Nuclear Arms
Reductions and the New Strategic Framework." On the
first issue, Ryabkov claimed the Kazakhstan initiative
would become entangled in some of the work of the NPT
RevCon and pit Nuclear Weapons States against Non-Nuclear
Weapons States; he sought U.S. support in opposing
discussions or
a vote on such a resolution although he indicated Russia
might be prepared to agree to a resolution with a different
name and identifying a date other than August 29, offering
several alternative dates. (Note: August 29, 1949 is
the date of the first Soviet atomic bomb test. End
note.)


21. (SBU) Ambassador Antonov noted that the U.S. had
reservations about the Russian draft resolution on START
since the Treaty was not yet completed, but Antonov
underlined that such a resolution would be helpful to the
RevCon. He noted Russian readiness to engage in
discussing a compromise text, which could be adjusted in
December once the Treaty was agreed. He claimed NAM as
well as European support for such a resolution and asked
for Washington to review the issue. U/S Tauscher
emphasized the overall importance of building consensus in
the UN First Committee, and that the Russian proposal
would seem not to meet the end dates of the UNFC. She
noted generally that any resolution should be timed to
support START completion by December 5 and also to build
greater support within the P5 and among other NPT members
for a strong and productive RevCon. She noted that Russia
and the U.S. shared the same overall goals and agreed to

work with Russia to look for possible areas of commonality
with regard to these issues.


22. (SBU) On the Nuclear Security Summit, Ryabkov
described the Vienna meeting of sherpas, which had
addressed issues including: a brief joint communique; a
plan of action to annex to the communique; and preliminary
Russian comments conveyed in Vienna. Ryabkov emphasized
also the need to address now the question of participants;
e.g., why had Georgia, which has no nuclear reactors, been
invited while Armenia, which does, was not? U/S Tauscher
noted support for a joint communique and plan of action,
and said Georgia had successfully interdicted a nuclear
smuggling operation on its territory. Ryabkov countered
by asserting the Russian understanding that the Summit
would not address contraband/smuggling issues. U/S
Tauscher undertook to communicate these Russian concerns
to White House planners and get back to Ryabkov.


23. (SBU) UNSCR 1540: Ryabkov recalled that in March
2009 FM Lavrov had proposed to the Secretary to have
greater bilateral cooperation on 1540, including through a
Clinton-Lavrov joint statement and a dedicated UNSC
meeting. The U.S. response had seemed to reject this
proposal, focusing instead on a more practical approach
involving meeting with various organizations to discuss
issues such as establishment of a 1540 trust fund and
other topics. Russia understood this might not have been
a fully coordinated U.S. position, however, and wished to
reiterate that it remained prepared to act on its proposal
and engage foreign ministers. Russia was concerned about
a decrease in interest in 1540; during the recently
completed Comprehensive Review, only three capitals
(Vienna, Tokyo, and Moscow) had sent experts, and there
were no representatives from international agencies.
Ministerial involvement seemed required to increase
attention, such as had been done in the OSCE and G8. U/S
Tauscher agreed on the general importance of engaging
senior levels and publics on these important
nonproliferation issues, which, although very technical,
nevertheless require strong political will and support.
Antonov also noted differences in focus, with the U.S.
preferring lower level engagement through working groups
to discuss nonproliferation problems such as working with
industry to establish and enforce export controls. In
this context he also opined that the U.S. view of
"strategic goods" did not necessarily conform to
others' views; for example, Russia saw the term as
encompassing items such as grain, petroleum, wood, and
gas, which should also be dealt with effectively through
implementation of 1540.


24. (SBU) Civil Nuclear Cooperation: Ryabkov sought to
confirm U.S. interest in bringing into force the bilateral
treaty on civil nuclear cooperation ("123 agreement") as
soon as possible. Recalling the recent visit of ROSATOM
Director Kiriyenko and his meeting with Deputy Secretary
of Energy Poneman, Ryabkov expressed surprise that there
were difficulties relating to the 123 agreement, in
developing the Action Plan that outlines specific projects
that meet the presidential understandings of April and
July 2009. Ryabkov asked the U.S. to put additional
effort into bringing into force this important element of
the bilateral relationship. U/S Tauscher noted she had
accompanied Director Kiriyenko to Oak Ridge and was
scheduled to meet with ROSATOM Deputy Director Spasskiy
the following day. She cited many political issues
relating to U.S. 123 agreements generally, not just with
Russia. She promised to consult with Deputy Secretary
Poneman in Washington and relay further information to
Deputy ROSATOM Director Spasskiy. Tauscher also expressed
U.S. support for the Russian proposal for a fuel reserve
at Angarsk and hoped that Russia would make the final
details available soon to enable us to help build support
for approval at the IAEA's November Board of Governors
meeting. She also shared the draft of a joint op-ed piece
as discussed in London to express U.S.-Russia mutual
support for fuel assurances and the Angarsk proposal, and
welcomed Russian suggestions and edits.


25. (C) U/S Tauscher also noted that FBI Director Moeller
would be bringing a sample of the smuggled HEU that was
seized in Georgia in 2006 during his visit in

mid-November. (Note: The material has remained in U.S.
custody because we conducted the forensic analysis at the
request of the Georgian Government. The Russians had
requested a sample for analysis, but would not come to the
U.S. to retrieve it. End note.) The fact that Director
Moeller is bringing the sample to the Russians
demonstrates U.S. commitment to working collaboratively
with the Russians to investigate nuclear smuggling
events. Ryabkov noted the logistical problems of the
transportation of such items, but these were close to
being decided. (Note: The transfer has been attempted
and canceled twice before due to scheduling conflicts.
End note.) Russia would be ready to discuss this with
Moeller when he arrived. Ryabkov noted this was a
difficult issue for Russia since there was no Russian
translation for the term, "nuclear forensics." This was
also an area that required further work with the IAEA to
resolve its role and function in such cases.

CFE
--------------


26. (C) Recalling bilateral meetings on May 5 among many
CFE participants and the June 10 Berlin Conference,
Ryabkov noted that on many issues there had been no
rapprochement; instead there was a fixation on what was
not agreed. The Russian Federation was pushing for a
package solution. Noting that the flank limits posed a
major problem for the Russian side, he raised the
possibility that Russia could move off the moratorium on
implementation of the Treaty if some new agreements were
achieved. He mentioned agreement on a definition for
substantial combat forces and, linked with it, lower quota
numbers for countries around the periphery of the CFE
zone of implementation as being one way to proceed. He
reiterated that the flank issue is major for Russia, but
Russia does not want to find a solution at the expense of
the NATO Allies. He said it was important to develop
agreements which avoided delays and ambiguous
interpretation. In Ryabkov's view, there should be lower
levels of arms for NATO countries, which had received a
"bonus" through enlargement. There should be an
understanding of what was allowable in stationing forces.
The flank restrictions were a problem. The unanticipated
participation of new NATO members such as the Baltics and
others was making the situation very difficult. The entry
into force of the Adapted Treaty was a temporary solution
or basis for further discussion, not a final resolution of
the issue.


27. (C) State VCI Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller said
the sides had had many creative discussions and had found
some common ground. It was notable that the parallel
actions package remained the agreed basis for discussions
between Russia and NATO, but serious problems remained:
1) continuing Russian failure to implement the CFE Treaty,
which causes both political and legal difficulties for
NATO countries, and 2) Russian insistence on changing the
Adapted Treaty before it is ratified (i.e., discarding the
so-called flank regime). Gottemoeller commented that in
recent bilateral discussions Russia and the United States
had described some ideas that had common conceptual
elements to them, such as trial implementation and
provisional application. Therefore, she judged that there
was some basis to develop common ground between the two
sides, as long as Russia was not insisting on conditions
that the NATO Allies cannot agree to. Ryabkov said Russia
did not start out against the Treaty, but CFE was becoming
increasingly unmanageable, especially because of NATO
enlargement. Russia's proposed moratorium was a way not
to torpedo CFE but a mechanism to resolve this in a
mutually acceptable way. Russia wanted continued
bilateral dialogue on this, as well as with other NATO
Allies.


28. (C) Ryabkov emphasized that Russia supported a
solution to the CFE impasse based on parallel actions, but
that Russia would no longer accept delays in ratification
or double interpretations of commitments. He outlined
Russia's five areas of greatest concern that needed to be
addressed in order to lift Russia's suspension and resume
implementation:

-- A lower level of armament limits for NATO countries to
compensate for NATO enlargement.
-- Stationing of troops in foreign countries.
-- Abolition of the Flank restrictions.
-- Participation of new NATO countries including the
Baltic states.
-- Entry into force of ACFE.


29. (C) Ryabkov stressed that Russia would not consider
individual elements of the treaty separately, or consider
a trial entry into force of ACFE on this basis. The
solution was in parallel actions and Russia wanted an
agreement with the United States on this, as well as with
other NATO Allies.


30. (C) A/S Gottemoeller confirmed U.S. willingness to
continue bilateral dialogue and also to discuss CFE in a
small group format when appropriate, to address both
timing and substance. She emphasized there was no attempt
to limit discussions to bilateral format.

START
--------------


31. (C) Ryabkov said Russia was satisfied with the
progress and dynamics of the negotiating process and noted
work was progressing from discussion of the outlines of
the follow-on Treaty to actual drafting. Russia would try
to have a fully formulated document by December 5. The
main provisions had been agreed but some difficulties on
principles prevented resolution. Ryabkov urged that at
this point the parties should not simply take the easiest
route and also should not try to put aside the most difficult
issues until the final stages. Time was short, and the
future Treaty would require provisions on the
interrelationship between strategic offensive and
strategic defensive arms. This was currently in the
preamble but should be addressed in the body of the
Treaty. Second, there was a U.S. effort to exclude
conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs from the limitations
of the Treaty, which, he claimed contravened the July 6
Joint Understanding signed by Presidents Obama and
Medvedev. In addition, Ryabkov noted attempts to limit or
place
restrictions on mobile ICBMs produced in Russia; and
imposition of a very rigid START-like monitoring system
for Russian production facilities for new types of
missiles. Ryabkov argued that the sides could not delay
resolution of these issues. The delegations should
discuss these issues in detail and resolve them.
Ambassador Antonov concurred, noting the delegations were
well-qualified to engage in such discussions and under
clear presidential orders to try to conclude a Treaty by
December 5. Antonov pledged that his team would do all it
could to work productively with the American side.


32. (C) U/S Tauscher underlined the impressive
qualifications of the team members on both sides. A/S
Gottemoeller cited good working group dynamics among the
negotiators but noted the need to accelerate the pace of
work to reach agreement by December 5. The U.S. has
agreed to accept Russia's more streamlined approach for a
treaty with three tiers (the main treaty, protocol, and a
detailed annex with procedures for inspectors or
"inspection manual"). The Russian side has agreed to
additional measures on verification and elimination
measures proposed by the U.S.


33. (C) A/S Gottemoeller then noted that there were
important areas that remained problematic. At the end of
the last Geneva round both sides developed an agreed list
of the ten outstanding priority issues for resolution.
These included agreement on counting rules and on
verification, where Russia proposed significantly lowering
the number of inspections. Another fundamental issue was
exclusion of several important prohibitions, including the
ban on telemetry encryption - first agreed in the SALT II
Treaty in the late 1970s - an important part of
U.S.-Russian mutual legacy on arms control. Omission of
such prohibitions could call into question whether the new
treaty was, in fact, effective. A/S Gottemoeller said the
sides agreed that the next round would be decisive and
should include a stocktaking which would determine whether

talks were in the endgame or whether more time would be
needed. She noted that the U.S. team was now in place in
Geneva for the duration of the negotiations.


34. (C) U/S Tauscher said that following the
stock-taking, the sides should compare notes about what
more is needed. She recommended aiming for agreement on
the main Treaty elements by mid-November, to allow time
for completion of drafting by December 5. She also
recommended starting to consider options for a signing
ceremony, such as venue, timing, and format.


35. (C) Ryabkov thanked the U.S. side for its very clear
and precise ideas, which were useful and constructive.
Russia was ready to be flexible, and Ryabkov suggested
another meeting before December 5. Speaking personally
since there had been no consideration yet in Moscow of
signing details, Ryabkov thought a signing ceremony in
Geneva as the negotiating venue might be most
appropriate.
Beyrle