START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW):

S E C R E T MOSCOW 002658

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW):
(U) DISCUSSIONS, OCTOBER 12-14, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator
. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-MOS-004.


2. (U) Meeting Dates: October 12 and 14, 2009
Times: 6:00 - 8:00 p.m.; 1:00 - 2:30 p.m.
Place: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Osobnyak,
Moscow

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SUMMARY
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3. (S) During two receptions - October 12 and October 14 -
members of the U.S. and Russian delegations to the START
Follow-on Negotiations held informal conversations on missile
defense, conventionally armed missiles, and unanswered
Russian concerns in the START Follow-on negotiations. End
Summary

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Missile Defense
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4. (S) During the reception on October 12 at the MFA
Osobnyak, Vladimir Yermakov of the MFA said to U.S. SFO
delegation member Trout that President Obama provided a very
clever way to continue to do what the previous administration
wanted to do - that is putting a missile defense system into
Poland. This plan provides the United States the ability to
put more missile defense capability into Poland than
previously planned at a time, only a little later than the
Bush administration had scheduled. This new flexible,
adaptive, and phased approach is another way to cover up the
fact that the U.S. continues to expand its global missile
defense systems. That is why Russia needs to have clauses in
the START Follow-on treaty about the expansion of U.S.
missile defense and the relationship between offensive and
defense strategic forces.

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Conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs
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5. (S) While discussing conventionally armed ICBMs and
SLBMs, Yermakov said to Trout that Russia would never accept
JDEC as long as the U.S. insisted on having conventional
warheads on its ICBMs and SLBMs. JDEC would seem to imply
that Russia accepted the U.S. proposal that the U.S. would
notify Russia prior to or simultaneous with the launch of a
conventionally armed ICBM or SLBM. Yermakov initially said
Russia would never accept non-nuclear armed ICBMs or SLBMs.
When asked was there any circumstance that Russia would
accept non-nuclear armed ICBMs or SLBMs, Yermakov said that
if non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs were limited to only a few
missiles, than Russia could consider that approach.


6. (S) Sergey Luchaninov of the Federal Security Service
asked U.S. SFO delegation legal adviser Brown during the
reception on October 14 at the at the MFA Osobnyak whether
the U.S. side had understood Antonov's point concerning the
proliferation implications of long-range missiles, based on

the U.S. position that non-nuclear-armed ICBMs and SLBMs
would not count under the START Follow-on Treaty. He claimed
that this would be perceived by the NAM as contributing to
the arms race between the United States and Russia, and would
encourage other countries to develop such systems.

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Russian concerns not being addressed
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7. (S) Yermakov said to Trout that Russia felt like it had
provided the U.S. with its concerns but the U.S. was not
responding to those concerns. In particular, President
Medvedev had said the U.S. had to leave Votkinsk, but the
U.S. has continued to insist on staying at the facility.


8. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
Beyrle