POPULAR PUTIN CAN'T HELP GOVERNOR AND UNITED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002619 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PMAR PHUM PINR ECON EFIN RS SUBJECT: POPULAR PUTIN CAN'T HELP GOVERNOR AND UNITED RUSSIA IN SARATOV Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Susan M. Elliott; reasons 1 .4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: A two-day visit to the upper Volga city of Saratov gave us the opportunity to hear about the "power vertical," by which federal government and United Russia political party authorities exercise control over oblast-level activities. The very top-down approach to decision-making has created immense frustration among city officials, party and NGO leaders with regional officials. They universally denounced the haughty manner in which regional officials ignore opposition voices. City of Saratov authorities have managed to build broad networks of consultation with opposition parties and NGO's, earning them respect from those groups. Even United Russia leaders acknowledged that the malfeasance of the current governor has been so damaging that only his replacement (expected in March, 2010) could possibly change public perceptions. The change in leadership should allow city and oblast leaders to benefit from the overwhelming regional popularity of PM Putin (and to a lesser extent, President Medvedev). End Summary. Moscow's Influence Strongly Felt -------------- ¶2. (C) Meetings with government, opposition and NGO leaders during a September 30-October 1 visit to the upper Volga River region city of Saratov revealed little concern for the economic crisis. They painted a picture of frustration with the control national government and political authorities from Moscow exercise over regional decision making. The legacy of Saratov's past status as a closed Soviet city with a concentration of defense industries whose interactions with other Soviet regions was minimized means that, even 18 years after the USSR ceased to exist, the city has few business connections with other Russian cities, and has been passed over for investment by a number of foreign firms. ¶3. (C) Saratov resident contacts we met bemoaned the inability of regional authorities to take decisions that would enhance the oblast's prospects. "Week in Saratov" deputy editor Olga Kopsheva told us that no entrepreneurs, least of all from Saratov itself, were interested in investment while the current, corrupt leadership remained in power, and while it was clear that a political transition was starting. Saratov Governor Pavel Ipatev, appointed by Putin 
in 2005, has been incapable of placing the oblast's interests ahead of his own financial ones. The icing on the cake came when the city's sewer and water delivery systems imploded during the summer, leaving residents without safe drinking water or waste disposal options for weeks. Public anger boiled over at Ipatev, whose administration had received substantial federal funding for such infrastructure improvement projects. Citizens demanded accountability for money spend on clearly shoddy work. Even for United Russia, this was the last straw after years of mismanagement, signaling the opening of local, intra-party competition to replace Ipatev. ¶4. (C) Moscow's influence is keenly felt in Saratov. United Russia National Presidium Secretary Vyacheslav Volodin hails from Saratov and remains involved in oblast-level personnel decisions. With Governor Ipatev focused on his financial interests in Russia and abroad, including in Abkhazia, Volodin's influence is at times considered positive, but is generally resented. A few local newspapers, including "Week in Saratov," write extensively on the governor and regional corruption. They have not encountered difficulties from security forces for doing so, also indicating intra-party disapproval with the governor. Local government and political party officials argued that Volodin has been upset by the fact that high approval ratings in the oblast for Putin and Medvedev have not helped United Russia, whose popular support hovers at 40 percent. He has therefore taken to intervening from Moscow to try to keep the local party organization from splintering. United Russia: Taking No Chances -------------- ¶5. (C) United Russia official Artur Zabbarov told us that tensions are palpable between regional and city, and regional and national, party officials, which he ascribed to shortcomings of the governor's leadership and to resentment over Volodin's long-distance involvement in local matters. The oblast, he said, was now quietly preparing for the MOSCOW 00002619 002 OF 003 post-Ipatev period. When the governor goes, the new team will be assembled by Volodin, he claimed. Local United Russia officials resent that their influence locally/regionally is limited by Volodin's involvement, he confided. He also noted that Volodin has lent his private support to increasing the stature and resources available to "Molodaya Gvardia" in the oblast to the detriment of "Nashi" there. Molodaya is playing a key role in putting forth a public image of United Russia as committed to modern development of Russian interests and to helping citizens in need. ¶6. (C) The local party has devoted itself to preparing for regional-level inter-party debates that they expect to be started after the United Russia party congress in November. Confirming what we've heard from national leaders in Moscow, Zabbarov told us that the debates were necessary to infuse at least some competition into an otherwise stagnant political environment, but that they carried a risk for United Russia. Speaking frankly, he said that no one in United Russia's Saratov branch is able to present a coherent argument or to address the kind of criticism or attacks that are to be expected in a constructive debate. A major effort has been launched at coaching senior officials, including the Speaker of the Oblast Duma, who he contended was the favorite to replace Ipatev. Opposition: Going Nowhere Fast -------------- ¶7. (C) In spite of the limited opportunities to engage with the oblast administration, opposition parties work closely at the city level with United Russia officials and civil servants, and have their respect. Pravoe Delo leader Igor Tanatin is a case in point. He has a long track record of working in the liberal opposition, and currently serves as an aide to one of the last Union of Right Forces (SPS) deputies in the regional Duma. He was praised for his constructiveness by United Russia and other local and regional government leaders. But he told us that the disarray within Pravoe Delo (successor to SPS) at the national level had hurt his chances of any local electoral success. He also bemoaned a growing apathy on the part of citizens who were more focused on personal lives than on public service or on organizing to try to translate their dissatisfaction into political representation and policy change. ¶8. (C) Yabloko in Saratov is saddled with the legacy of the 1990's. It no longer has any elected representatives in the oblast or city legislatures. Rather, Saratov regional party Chief of Staff Mariya Sazonova has focused on bringing together a range of special interests, ranging from environmental to human rights (including every member of the local branch of Soldiers' Mothers group). Solidarity local organizer Aleksey Bityutskiy told us that he and other activists are working at the grass roots to help citizens challenge government or business decisions that adversely affect housing, environmental or educational conditions. They have engaged lawyers to offer free legal services to low income citizens. He described any direct political confrontation with regional authorities as futile in the short term, hoping that over time citizens would turn against United Russia. Local Authorities Focus on Results -------------- ¶9. (C) Saratov City officials painted a positive picture of the town's prospects. Head of the Department of NGO, Political Party, and Religious Organization Cooperation Pavel Grishchenko, who has visited the U.S. three times in the last 5 years (Dallas, Texas is Saratov's sister city),spoke of the importance of working with any group ready to contribute to improving life in Saratov. His views were echoed by Public Chamber Chairman Mikhail Shmyrev and several of his Chamber members, who told us that they worked hard to build networks among different kinds of organizations. Their work in the city of Saratov was praised by activists, including those from Solidarity. And their comments outlining an inclusive approach to problem solving confirmed comments from NGO and party officials, including United Russia, contrasting local and regional administrations. Contacts told us that city-level bureaucrats seem to be selected more on the basis of their qualifications, while oblast-level bureaucrats get their jobs on the basis of connections or recommendations. MOSCOW 00002619 003 OF 003 That difference further influences public perceptions of effective government (at the city level) versus incompetent government at the oblast level, which citizen's link back to corrupt Governor Ipatev. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Saratov is in a holding pattern until March of 2010, uncertain who will lead it after that point, and uncertain whether, and to what extent, United Russia's Volodin will continue to be involved with local and regional matters from Moscow. United Russia expects their approval ratings to jump once Ipatev is replaced and they are preparing to take on the opposition in public debates, hoping that Putin's (and Medvedev's) popularity will help them. Beyrle