U/S BURNS' OCTOBER 12 MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002611

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG UP MD AM AJ TU AF TI KG KZ
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' OCTOBER 12 MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN

REF: A. SECSTATE 105770

B. MOSCOW 2529

Classified By: Political M/C Susan M. Elliott for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary. Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin told Under
Secretary Burns October 12 that Presidents Sargsian and
Aliyev had made little progress in their recent talks on
Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia does not consider a joint statement
on the recent Turkey-Armenia protocol necessary. The Minsk
Group co-chairs now have to assess the new circumstances for
the resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh created by the signing of
the protocol. Karasin accused Georgia of "torpedoing" the
Geneva Talks and attempting to "foment U.S.-Russia discord."
Georgia needs to sign non-use of force agreements with the
breakaway regions, while the OSCE or UN could provide the
decision-making authority the Incident Prevention Mechanisms
lacked. Karasin rejected calls for international observers
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and said the time was "not
right" to discuss humanitarian access to the regions. Noting
that the Russia issue "polarized" voters in Ukraine, Karasin
said Medvedev's open letter had achieved positive results,
but listed Russian language use, the Black Sea Fleet, and
natural gas as open issues. Other topics discussed included
Moldova and Central Asia. End Summary.

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Turkey-Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh
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2. (C) In an October 12 meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister
Karasin, U/S Bill Burns, EUR DAS Dan Russell, and NSC Senior
Director for Russia and Eurasia Mike McFaul said that the
U.S. appreciated the complementary efforts of Russia to
advance the Turkey-Armenia rapprochement, and considered it
imperative to continue working together. Moscow played a
pivotal role in the process. Burns reiterated the
Secretary's interest in issuing a joint statement in support
of the protocol signed by the GOT and GOAM, noting
Azerbaijan's concern over what the signing meant in relation
to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.


3. (C) Karasin said that the signing of the protocol was
"badly needed for the region," given that "certain people" in
the region were not pleased with a normalization of
Turkish-Armenian relations without a simultaneous solution to
Nagorno-Karabakh. The U.S. and Russia needed to "calmly and
persistently" prove that the rapprochement did not threaten
Nagorno-Karabakh. FM Lavrov's comments to the press October
10 contained the important details of the proposed joint
statement: no threat to third parties, promotion of a speedy
ratification of the protocols, and the need to continue the
process. Therefore, Russia does not consider a joint
statement necessary. He agreed that the Secretary and Lavrov
could refer to the Turkey-Armenia protocol signing in their
joint press availability in Moscow October 13.


4. (C) Karasin said that the October 8 meeting of Presidents
Sargsian and Aliyev focused on the questions of status and
the referendum/plebiscite. Karasin suggested no progress was
made on the latter issue because Sargsian was influenced by
the Armenian diaspora's opposition to a compromise on the
referendum. Karasin expected Medvedev would discuss the
situation in his October 12 meeting with Sargsian in Moscow.
Russia was also monitoring the reactions of the various
"peaceful or tough" factions in Baku. Karasin said that
although Aliyev belonged to the peaceful faction, he would
have been pleased with the difficulties that emerged in
Zurich at the signing of the Turkey-Armenia protocol. These
enabled Aliyev to play to public opinion in Azerbaijan.


5. (C) Karasin considered the next steps on Nagorno-Karabakh
to be visits to the region by the Minsk Group co-chairs to
assess the new circumstances created by the signing of the
Turkey-Armenia protocol. Also, Sargsian and Aliyev needed to
meet again. Karasin did not expect any further progress on
Turkey-Armenia in the near future, but said that it was a big
task to reinforce international support for that process in
the Islamic world and Middle East. He agreed that Turkey
might have greater problems ratifying the protocol than
Armenia.

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Georgia
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Geneva Talks
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6. (C) Burns underscored the U.S. commitment to the Geneva
Process. Karasin agreed with Burns' assessment that the
Geneva talks should continue, as they "stabilized the
atmosphere" in the region and built confidence. However, he
accused Georgia of torpedoing the talks by unrealistically
insisting on the return to the status before the August 2008
conflict, and warned that Tbilisi must not be allowed to
think that the U.S. supported Georgia in that demand. He
criticized Georgia's "backhanded machinations" with regard to
international peace monitors in the breakaway regions, and
its unsuccessful attempts to "foment U.S.-Russian discord."
NSC Director McFaul stressed that Vice President Biden had
been very "blunt" with President Saakashvili about the need
for stability and confidence-building measures.

Non-use of force agreement
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7. (C) Karasin said that the next steps on Georgia were to
stabilize the situation in the region, in particular through
confidence-building measures. The return of refugees, many
in Russia, was one such measure. He stressed that Russia
would not sign a non-use of force agreement with Georgia.
Although the status question complicated the matter, he
insisted Georgia must sign such agreements with Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, in the interest of living side by side.
Russia is pressing Abkhazia and South Ossetia to create open,
multicultural societies, and not to see Georgia as a threat
to their "sovereign existence."

Incident Prevention Mechanisms
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8. (C) McFaul welcomed Russia's support for the Incident
Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) that the President
had called for during his July visit to Moscow. Karasin said
he would meet Pierre Morel, Charalambos Christopoulos, and
Johan Verbeke of the EU, OSCE, and UN, respectively, on
October 13 to discuss the IPRMs. Karasin considered the
IPRMs to be confidence-building institutions that were
beginning to work on concrete problems, such as the recent
seizure by Georgia of a Turkish ship bound for Abkhazia. The
mechanisms should continue to meet, despite problems such as
disagreement over who should chair the meetings, who should
set the agenda, or who should "fixate" decisions. On the
latter point, Karasin asked what role the UN and OSCE might
play in the mechanisms, absent a mandate for making binding
decisions. UN Permrep Vitaly Churkin was raising this
question in New York.

Humanitarian assistance
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9. (C) Karasin demurred on U/S Burns' call for increased
access by NGOs and humanitarian organizations to South
Ossetia and Abkhazia from undisputed Georgian territory,
saying that South Ossetian and Abkhaz authorities were the
decision makers. Apart from that, Karasin did not think it
was "the right time" to discuss humanitarian access. Russian
soldiers and border guards were already providing medical and
humanitarian aid to the breakaway regions. The Red Cross and
other organizations had sufficient access from Russia.
Karasin charged that Georgia was not allowing regular
cross-border traffic.

Observers
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10. (C) Karasin praised the "stabilizing" work of the EU
monitoring mission (EUMM) and its contact with Russian FSB
border guards. Karasin disagreed with McFaul's proposal that
the EUMM be given access to the breakaway regions, arguing
that the West had rejected Russia's earlier "flexible"
proposals in the UN and OSCE for international monitoring
missions in the regions. The Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement
defined the "zones adjoining South Ossetia and Abkhazia" as
the EUMM's responsibility and excluded the breakaway regions
themselves from that mission's mandate.

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Ukraine
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11. (C) Karasin termed it "counterproductive" for Russia to
support a specific candidate in the upcoming elections in
Ukraine, saying the Russia issue "polarized" voters. Russia
sought stable and normal political and economic relations
with its neighbor. Although all Ukrainian candidates agreed
with that, he said some did not take appropriate action,
while others, including at the highest level, took opposing
actions. However, as a result of Medvedev's August 11 open
letter to Yushchenko, "all parameters" of cooperation --
including humanitarian, technical, and economic -- were
improving. Ambassador Zurabov was now "preparing" to depart
for Kyiv.


12. (C) Karasin reiterated Russia's concerns about Ukrainian
plans to forbid the use of Russian as an official language.
He described problems with the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) as
"solvable," as long as they were not politicized. Russia and
Ukraine had appropriate mechanisms to discuss any problems
that arose from the BSF's presence in Sevastopol. Although
Yushchenko was causing a "delicate" situation on natural gas
deliveries, Karasin acknowledged Ukraine was paying its gas
debts now, and expressed hope there would be no gas crisis in
the coming winter. He criticized the March 23, 2009
EU-Ukraine agreement on modernizing the gas pipelines, saying
it would have been a matter of courtesy to involve in the
deal the gas supplier, Russia. However, "some people" in
Ukraine did not want to take such "stabilizing" measures.

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Moldova
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13. (C) With reference to earlier statements by Moldovan
politicians calling for the speedy withdrawal of Russian
troops from Transnistria, Karasin suggested that the new
Moldovan government would need some time to "understand its
international responsibilities." Moldova could not "throw
out" Russia's peacekeepers and soldiers. The "5 plus 2"
process needed to continue, in lieu of "adventurism" to speed
up the resolution process. A "dangerous" situation could
arise if Moldova pursued EU and NATO accession while ejecting
Russian troops. Karasin agreed that the U.S. and Russia were
close in their view that the international Transnistria
resolution framework must be kept alive while the new
government attacked domestic, economic problems first.

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Central Asia
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14. (C) In response to U/S Burns' overview of U.S. activity
in the region, Karasin reiterated his request (ref B) for
detailed information about the staffing levels of Manas air
base, noting that Russia was receiving divergent information
from the Kyrgyz. Like the U.S., Russia had offered its help
to Kazakhstan regarding its upcoming OSCE chairmanship.
Moscow thought it would be unrealistic for Kazakhstan to
launch too many initiatives, and should ensure the ones it
did launch meshed with existing international agreements.


15. (C) Karasin welcomed Burns' comment that General
Petraeus might visit Moscow, and said he himself might meet
U.S. Ambassador Gross in Dushanbe soon, to demonstrate to the
GOT that Russia and the U.S. maintained independent direct
contact. Russia is concerned about the increase in
narcotrafficking, and welcomed the U.S. presence in the
region, although Karasin asked that the U.S. discuss with
Russia the conditions of its presence. DAS Russell passed
the Russians a copy of the September 21 Joint Staff letter to
Russian Deputy Chief of the General Staff Nogovitsyn,
alerting Russia to the upcoming U.S.-Georgian "Immediate
Response 2010" exercises to prepare Georgia's ISAF contingent
for deployment (ref A).


16. (U) U/S Burns has cleared this message.
Beyrle