U/S BURNS' OCTOBER 12 MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002611 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG UP MD AM AJ TU AF TI KG KZ SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' OCTOBER 12 MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN REF: A. SECSTATE 105770 ¶B. MOSCOW 2529 Classified By: Political M/C Susan M. Elliott for reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin told Under Secretary Burns October 12 that Presidents Sargsian and Aliyev had made little progress in their recent talks on Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia does not consider a joint statement on the recent Turkey-Armenia protocol necessary. The Minsk Group co-chairs now have to assess the new circumstances for the resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh created by the signing of the protocol. Karasin accused Georgia of "torpedoing" the Geneva Talks and attempting to "foment U.S.-Russia discord." Georgia needs to sign non-use of force agreements with the breakaway regions, while the OSCE or UN could provide the decision-making authority the Incident Prevention Mechanisms lacked. Karasin rejected calls for international observers in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and said the time was "not right" to discuss humanitarian access to the regions. Noting that the Russia issue "polarized" voters in Ukraine, Karasin said Medvedev's open letter had achieved positive results, but listed Russian language use, the Black Sea Fleet, and natural gas as open issues. Other topics discussed included Moldova and Central Asia. End Summary. -------------- Turkey-Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh -------------- ¶2. (C) In an October 12 meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin, U/S Bill Burns, EUR DAS Dan Russell, and NSC Senior Director for Russia and Eurasia Mike McFaul said that the U.S. appreciated the complementary efforts of Russia to advance the Turkey-Armenia rapprochement, and considered it imperative to continue working together. Moscow played a pivotal role in the process. Burns reiterated the Secretary's interest in issuing a joint statement in support of the protocol signed by the GOT and GOAM, noting Azerbaijan's concern over what the signing meant in relation to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. ¶3. (C) Karasin said that the signing of the protocol was "badly needed for the region," given that "certain people" in the region were not pleased with a normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations without a simultaneous solution to Nagorno-Karabakh. The U.S. and Russia needed to "calmly and persistently" prove that the rapprochement did not threaten Nagorno-Karabakh. FM Lavrov's comments to the press October 10 contained the important details of the proposed joint statement: no threat to third parties, promotion of a speedy ratification of the protocols, and the need to continue the process. Therefore, Russia does not consider a joint statement necessary. He agreed that the Secretary and Lavrov could refer to the Turkey-Armenia protocol signing in their joint press availability in Moscow October 13. ¶4. (C) Karasin said that the October 8 meeting of Presidents Sargsian and Aliyev focused on the questions of status and the referendum/plebiscite. Karasin suggested no progress was made on the latter issue because Sargsian was influenced by the Armenian diaspora's opposition to a compromise on the referendum. Karasin expected Medvedev would discuss the situation in his October 12 meeting with Sargsian in Moscow. Russia was also monitoring the reactions of the various "peaceful or tough" factions in Baku. Karasin said that although Aliyev belonged to the peaceful faction, he would have been pleased with the difficulties that emerged in Zurich at the signing of the Turkey-Armenia protocol. These enabled Aliyev to play to public opinion in Azerbaijan. ¶5. (C) Karasin considered the next steps on Nagorno-Karabakh to be visits to the region by the Minsk Group co-chairs to assess the new circumstances created by the signing of the Turkey-Armenia protocol. Also, Sargsian and Aliyev needed to meet again. Karasin did not expect any further progress on Turkey-Armenia in the near future, but said that it was a big task to reinforce international support for that process in the Islamic world and Middle East. He agreed that Turkey might have greater problems ratifying the protocol than Armenia. -------------- Georgia -------------- MOSCOW 00002611 002 OF 003 Geneva Talks -------------- ¶6. (C) Burns underscored the U.S. commitment to the Geneva Process. Karasin agreed with Burns' assessment that the Geneva talks should continue, as they "stabilized the atmosphere" in the region and built confidence. However, he accused Georgia of torpedoing the talks by unrealistically insisting on the return to the status before the August 2008 conflict, and warned that Tbilisi must not be allowed to think that the U.S. supported Georgia in that demand. He criticized Georgia's "backhanded machinations" with regard to international peace monitors in the breakaway regions, and its unsuccessful attempts to "foment U.S.-Russian discord." NSC Director McFaul stressed that Vice President Biden had been very "blunt" with President Saakashvili about the need for stability and confidence-building measures. Non-use of force agreement -------------- ¶7. (C) Karasin said that the next steps on Georgia were to stabilize the situation in the region, in particular through confidence-building measures. The return of refugees, many in Russia, was one such measure. He stressed that Russia would not sign a non-use of force agreement with Georgia. Although the status question complicated the matter, he insisted Georgia must sign such agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in the interest of living side by side. Russia is pressing Abkhazia and South Ossetia to create open, multicultural societies, and not to see Georgia as a threat to their "sovereign existence." Incident Prevention Mechanisms -------------- ¶8. (C) McFaul welcomed Russia's support for the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) that the President had called for during his July visit to Moscow. Karasin said he would meet Pierre Morel, Charalambos Christopoulos, and Johan Verbeke of the EU, OSCE, and UN, respectively, on October 13 to discuss the IPRMs. Karasin considered the IPRMs to be confidence-building institutions that were beginning to work on concrete problems, such as the recent seizure by Georgia of a Turkish ship bound for Abkhazia. The mechanisms should continue to meet, despite problems such as disagreement over who should chair the meetings, who should set the agenda, or who should "fixate" decisions. On the latter point, Karasin asked what role the UN and OSCE might play in the mechanisms, absent a mandate for making binding decisions. UN Permrep Vitaly Churkin was raising this question in New York. Humanitarian assistance -------------- ¶9. (C) Karasin demurred on U/S Burns' call for increased access by NGOs and humanitarian organizations to South Ossetia and Abkhazia from undisputed Georgian territory, saying that South Ossetian and Abkhaz authorities were the decision makers. Apart from that, Karasin did not think it was "the right time" to discuss humanitarian access. Russian soldiers and border guards were already providing medical and humanitarian aid to the breakaway regions. The Red Cross and other organizations had sufficient access from Russia. Karasin charged that Georgia was not allowing regular cross-border traffic. Observers -------------- ¶10. (C) Karasin praised the "stabilizing" work of the EU monitoring mission (EUMM) and its contact with Russian FSB border guards. Karasin disagreed with McFaul's proposal that the EUMM be given access to the breakaway regions, arguing that the West had rejected Russia's earlier "flexible" proposals in the UN and OSCE for international monitoring missions in the regions. The Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement defined the "zones adjoining South Ossetia and Abkhazia" as the EUMM's responsibility and excluded the breakaway regions themselves from that mission's mandate. -------------- Ukraine -------------- MOSCOW 00002611 003 OF 003 ¶11. (C) Karasin termed it "counterproductive" for Russia to support a specific candidate in the upcoming elections in Ukraine, saying the Russia issue "polarized" voters. Russia sought stable and normal political and economic relations with its neighbor. Although all Ukrainian candidates agreed with that, he said some did not take appropriate action, while others, including at the highest level, took opposing actions. However, as a result of Medvedev's August 11 open letter to Yushchenko, "all parameters" of cooperation -- including humanitarian, technical, and economic -- were improving. Ambassador Zurabov was now "preparing" to depart for Kyiv. ¶12. (C) Karasin reiterated Russia's concerns about Ukrainian plans to forbid the use of Russian as an official language. He described problems with the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) as "solvable," as long as they were not politicized. Russia and Ukraine had appropriate mechanisms to discuss any problems that arose from the BSF's presence in Sevastopol. Although Yushchenko was causing a "delicate" situation on natural gas deliveries, Karasin acknowledged Ukraine was paying its gas debts now, and expressed hope there would be no gas crisis in the coming winter. He criticized the March 23, 2009 EU-Ukraine agreement on modernizing the gas pipelines, saying it would have been a matter of courtesy to involve in the deal the gas supplier, Russia. However, "some people" in Ukraine did not want to take such "stabilizing" measures. -------------- Moldova -------------- ¶13. (C) With reference to earlier statements by Moldovan politicians calling for the speedy withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria, Karasin suggested that the new Moldovan government would need some time to "understand its international responsibilities." Moldova could not "throw out" Russia's peacekeepers and soldiers. The "5 plus 2" process needed to continue, in lieu of "adventurism" to speed up the resolution process. A "dangerous" situation could arise if Moldova pursued EU and NATO accession while ejecting Russian troops. Karasin agreed that the U.S. and Russia were close in their view that the international Transnistria resolution framework must be kept alive while the new government attacked domestic, economic problems first. -------------- Central Asia -------------- ¶14. (C) In response to U/S Burns' overview of U.S. activity in the region, Karasin reiterated his request (ref B) for detailed information about the staffing levels of Manas air base, noting that Russia was receiving divergent information from the Kyrgyz. Like the U.S., Russia had offered its help to Kazakhstan regarding its upcoming OSCE chairmanship. Moscow thought it would be unrealistic for Kazakhstan to launch too many initiatives, and should ensure the ones it did launch meshed with existing international agreements. ¶15. (C) Karasin welcomed Burns' comment that General Petraeus might visit Moscow, and said he himself might meet U.S. Ambassador Gross in Dushanbe soon, to demonstrate to the GOT that Russia and the U.S. maintained independent direct contact. Russia is concerned about the increase in narcotrafficking, and welcomed the U.S. presence in the region, although Karasin asked that the U.S. discuss with Russia the conditions of its presence. DAS Russell passed the Russians a copy of the September 21 Joint Staff letter to Russian Deputy Chief of the General Staff Nogovitsyn, alerting Russia to the upcoming U.S.-Georgian "Immediate Response 2010" exercises to prepare Georgia's ISAF contingent for deployment (ref A). ¶16. (U) U/S Burns has cleared this message. Beyrle