START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW):

S E C R E T MOSCOW 002579 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD (P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO--N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2034 TAGS: JCIC KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW): (U) PLENARY MEETING, OCTOBER 12, 2009 Classified By: Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-MOS-001. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: October 12, 2009 Time: 10:05 A.M. - 12:00 P.M. Place: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The first meeting of the two delegations to the START Follow-on (SFO) Treaty negotiations during the latest round in Moscow was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 12, 2009. A/S Gottemoeller and AMB Antonov discussed the importance of the upcoming negotiating session in Geneva and agreed on the need to intensify work in order to resolve outstanding issues. Antonov confirmed his government's support for work already done by the delegations, noting in particular President Medvedev's approval of these efforts. Gottemoeller noted high level U.S. Government interest and involvement in this work, and stressed the tasking she had received from senior U.S. leaders to finish all work on the treaty before the START expires on December 5. ¶4. (S) Gottemoeller asked Antonov to explain, with regard to both philosophical and substantive grounds, the omission of a number of START provisions from the Russian-proposed SFO Treaty text. Antonov requested a list of those provisions to facilitate a Russian response. Antonov admitted that Russia may have misread the current U.S. Administration's position on disarmament and thus may have to revise the degree to which the Russian-proposed text has simplified START provisions, although this would be only after discussion among the experts. On telemetry, Antonov continued to make the argument that the U.S. proposal on telemetry could be used to the detriment of the Russian Federation and that the U.S. had not yet explained the need for access to the other side's telemetry. He also complained about the U.S. excessive constraints on mobile ICBMs, which he claimed was not based on reciprocity. Finally, the agenda for the remaining two days of meetings was discussed and agreed. End Summary. -------------- - STOCKTAKING OF INTERSESSIONAL WORK IN CAPITALS -------------- - ¶5. (S) AMB Antonov welcomed A/S Gottemoeller and the U.S. delegation to the MFA and offered his congratulations to President Obama for his selection as recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. Widely smiling, he added that this award would likely make things more difficult for the U.S. delegation during the START Follow-on Treaty negotiations. He indicated that the next two weeks of negotiations in Geneva will determine whether it would be possible to conclude a new treaty before START expires, and noted that the results of the previous session had been reported to President Medvedev, who had expressed his support for the results already achieved. Antonov confirmed that the Russian delegation was prepared to intensify its work, commenting that it was very important that approaches that are based on matters of principle be addressed as rapidly as possible. ¶6. (S) Antonov said that Gottemoeller's ten key SFO Treaty issues (provided earlier) had been carefully examined by the Russian side and expressed his hope that the U.S. side had worked as hard to address Russian concerns, adding that without real movement on key points it would be very difficult in Geneva. In order to begin this process, it was necessary to know what was the goal of the U.S. approach. He noted that there were still some "debts" owed by the U.S. side: a draft text on notifications; a U.S. response to the Russian proposed Joint Statement on Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine; and a U.S. response on the proposed JCIC agreement concerning Votkinsk, commenting that, in connection with this third item, Taylor and Koshelev should be instructed to finish work on this agreement very quickly. ¶7. (S) Antonov then turned to "homework" done by the Russian side since the last Geneva round, mentioning that his military experts would be making a presentation later in the week and remarking that he hoped that the U.S. side would be able to make a presentation on the U.S. approach to counting as well. In particular, Antonov remarked that it would be useful to know how the U.S. had evaluated the results of the recent session and what decisions had been made. ¶8. (S) Gottemoeller stated that she generally had the same view as that expressed by Antonov concerning the fundamental importance of their work. She mentioned that, during the past week in Washington, she had found a very significant and high level of interest, including by President Obama, noting that both Secretary Clinton and U/S Tauscher were highly involved and interested in the SFO Treaty effort. She said that she and Antonov should talk about how to prepare for the Clinton-Lavrov and Tauscher-Ryabkov meetings over the next two days, in order to have a coordinated approach. She thanked Antonov for his words of congratulations on President Obama's selection as a Nobel laureate, adding that Antonov had been very timely on Friday morning in making this same comment during their telephone conversation. She recalled that President Obama had made the comment that this award was about the future, which meant that the successful results of these negotiations need to be an important part of that future. Gottemoeller noted that the future has an elastic quality to it: it could be the near, medium, or far distant future, and the quality of that elasticity depends upon the pace of work of their two delegations. ¶9. (S) Gottemoeller remarked that the U.S. delegation had received the same sort of very serious tasking from Washington, which was to complete all of its work on the treaty by December 5. She stressed that the next few weeks of work will be decisive, not only that done in capitals but also during the next round in Geneva. She recounted that the U.S. delegation had made very careful preparation in Washington, and she was glad to hear that the same had occurred in Moscow. She said that the two sides were in agreement as to what should be done during the meetings in Moscow: she intended to talk about the Joint Statement on Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, as well as about Votkinsk, and that, with respect to Votkinsk, she had already talked with Taylor and Brown about final conforming of the respective texts on that matter. Concerning the notifications text, she reported that she had heard from (U.S. delegation member and Notification WG chairman) Siemon that it will still take some input from the U.S. members of the Inspection Protocol and the Elimination Protocol working groups before that text could be finalized. -------------- U.S. OBJECTIVES FOR THE MOSCOW MEETINGS -------------- ¶10. (S) Concerning additional objectives for the Moscow meetings, Gottemoeller said that she wanted to go through the treaty text and raise some questions, adding that the Russian side might have some questions as well to pose to the U.S. side. As to the work of the military experts on both sides, she noted that Dr. Warner would be ready to make a presentation regarding counting rules issues, and it would be good if the military experts could meet separately to do some work on these matters, either on Tuesday morning or in the afternoon during the plenary session, after the meeting between the foreign ministers was over. ¶11. (S) Antonov responded that for twenty years he had been chastised for not having any young diplomats working in the arms control field and joked that he had now brought them in to show them how not to work. He then went through a proposed agenda for the three days in Moscow: a meeting on October 12 from 1000 to 1200; a meeting on October 13 from 1600 to 1800; and a meeting on October 14 from 1000 to 1300, followed by a buffet lunch for the two delegations and for U.S. Embassy officials, until 1430. Returning to Gottemoeller's suggestion about having the military experts meet separately, Antonov acknowledged that, of course, the experts could speak without the participation of the heads of delegation, but he noted that there was a great interest in his delegation to take part in the discussion of counting rules, so he proposed that it be done during the October 13 plenary meeting, although it would probably be in his absence. At the October 14 meeting, his intent was to speak about the results achieved in the course of the two days and to discuss how to structure their joint work for the next round in Geneva. ¶12. (S) Antonov asked whether it was possible to have Taylor and Brown address the Votkinsk issue at this point; Gottemoeller demurred, saying that it could be done on the following day. Antonov then agreed to start with a review of the treaty text, to allow the U.S. side to raise questions, or to start with the Joint Statement, leaving the choice to Gottemoeller, -------------- DISCUSSION OF RUSSIAN "OMISSIONS" -------------- ¶13. (S) Gottemoeller chose the option of going through the SFO Treaty text, emphasizing that she would be interested in any questions the Russian side might have as well. She explained that there were two types of questions that she would raise: the first were more or less of a general, philosophical nature, while the second involved very specific comments, particularly about Article V. Beginning with Article II, Gottemoeller raised the issue of the Russian approach to counting the various items to be limited under the treaty. She noted that the two presidents had agreed to two aggregate limits: a limit on deployed nuclear warheads and a limit on deployed strategic delivery vehicles. The Russians had recently introduced a third limit, on ICBM and SLBM launchers, both deployed and non-deployed. She said that she wanted to understand the rationale for this, and why the Russian side went beyond what the presidents had agreed to in the Joint Understanding issued at the July Summit in Moscow, when there did not appear to be a need to do so. ¶14. (S) Antonov responded that this question dealt with the "homework" that had been undertaken by the Russian side, and that a presentation will be made on this subject later in the week: the U.S. side had asked that the Russian military experts make a presentation, and the experts were prepared to do so on October 13. Turning to the point about "philosophical" questions, he confirmed that what the presidents had decided had to be implemented by the delegations and that those decisions cannot be adjusted in any way. He observed, however, that this question could also be approached in a different way, which would be to say that the delegations may develop those decisions in a creative manner. He asserted that this was what the U.S. side had done with respect to some of the Russian ideas. If the presidents had said something in very concrete language, then that has to be reflected specifically in the text, but that does not mean that the two delegations have to be limited by just what has been said by the presidents. If something that was important for effective implementation is found, then it should be proposed to the leaders. ¶15. (S) Antonov asserted that this principle was the basis of the elaboration of the July 6 Joint Understanding: if something was not included in that document, it did not mean that it cannot be added later. He noted that the principal difference between the two sides prior to agreement on the Joint Understanding concerned counting rules, and that difference still remained. He claimed that the Russian side had taken a step towards the U.S. position in this regard by focusing on deployed warheads rather than attribution of warhead loadings, acknowledging that there were, in fact, different schools of thought within the Russian delegation as to whether this had been the right step to take, but it had been taken, and it would not be walked back. Antonov stressed that the Russian side would continue to move forward and wanted to develop that idea and go further than START: this was the reason for the additional limit on ICBM and SLBM launchers. He acknowledged that there were, of course, other reasons why this limit had been proposed and affirmed that the October 13 presentation would be more specific. But the objective had been to deal with this matter in order to be able to move forward more quickly. ¶16. (S) Gottemoeller confirmed that the U.S. delegation was looking forward to the Russian presentation on Tuesday and to having the chance to elaborate U.S. views. She noted that she had two sub questions that could help steer that discussion: - Could the Russian side clarify the relationship between the launcher limit in Article II and the provisions in paragraph 3 of Article III: the idea that launchers can move easily between being "deployed" and being "non-deployed." Would it not be easier to use the U.S.-proposed concept of "ICBMs and SLBMs with their associated launchers," commenting that the U.S. side foresaw the complicated situation of the requirement to notify changes between "deployed" and "non-deployed": it would be more complicated than it needed to be. She proposed that the Russian side consider using the START concept of a launcher being "considered to contain" a missile when that missile was temporarily removed, even when that system is in effect not operational for a short period. - The second sub question was a bit more straightforward: in the Russian concept, is the relationship between the number of delivery vehicles and the number of launchers constant? In the current Russian proposal, the limit of delivery vehicles is 500, while the number of launchers is 600. Will the limit of ICBM and SLBM launchers always be 100 more than the limit on strategic delivery vehicles? ¶17. (S) Antonov responded that he understood Gottemoeller's question, remarking that she was talking about the limit of 500 on deployed delivery vehicles and on the limit of 600 for both deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers. Turning to Orlov, he stated that this issue will be addressed, and expressed his thanks to Gottemoeller for raising this specific question, commenting that this would permit the MOD to prepare its answer for the coming meeting. Orlov nodded in agreement. ¶18. (S) Gottemoeller then turned to Article IV, noting that this article dealt mostly with issues related to non-deployed mobile ICBMs, and acknowledging that the differences between the two sides were well understood. She added that the previous round in Geneva had been very useful for allowing the U.S. side to understand the Russian position, and stated that the U.S. side was now studying that issue to be able to address it in Geneva. She noted, however, that Article IV had some additional provisions, such as those limiting the number of test heavy bombers and non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and asked for the Russian rationale in omitting them. Orlov expressed some puzzlement as to the question, but Antonov interjected that Gottemoeller's questions were sound and required serious analysis, remarking that it would be best if all of these questions could be provided in writing, and adding that these questions were too serious to be responded to immediately. Antonov promised that answers to these questions would be worked on by the Russian side and that a response would be provided, perhaps at the next meeting. He commented in that connection that several members of the Russian delegation were not present at this meeting because they were still working on these issues for the subsequent meeting. He mentioned that some of Gottemoeller's questions would be answered by the Russian presentation and that others could be discussed during the next round in Geneva. ¶19. (S) Gottemoeller explained that the U.S. side had made a very careful review of U.S.-proposed texts noting provisions that had been omitted in the Russian text, remarking that it might be good to look at the main differences in order to understand the rationales for their omission. She stated that this was the idea behind the U.S. list, and said that she would pass over this list, in unofficial Russian, on the following day. ¶20. (S) Antonov responded that he agreed completely with Gottemoeller's approach, observing that it would help the Russian side understand where the U.S side had problems with the Russian approach. He acknowledged that his delegation had been unable to conduct a similar analysis over the past week, and he expressed his view that once he received this list, it should be possible to make progress quickly in removing differences between the two sides. As an aside, he acknowledged that the most productive times are when the delegations meet outside of capitals, when the experts can work most creatively and can focus on their work. He stated that this type of work will be done, but that it is best done in Geneva. At this point, he turned to his own delegation and announced that they will have the second half of the upcoming Sunday (October 18),to do precisely this in preparation for the upcoming Geneva round. Gottemoeller responded that she was sympathetic, having just had a very busy week in Washington, where there were many issues to deal with, not all of which were related to these negotiations. She noted that the list she would be providing to Antonov had been developed by some of her delegation who had remained in Geneva to do just this sort of detailed work. ¶21. (S) Continuing with the "philosophical" questions, Gottemoeller mentioned that the U.S. draft of Article V contained many prohibitions taken from START, including the ban on rapid reload systems, on production, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles over 600 km range and their launchers on waterborne vehicles other than submarines, and on emplacement of missiles and their launchers on the ocean floor, seabed, or beds of internal waters. She noted that the U.S. had detailed points on why these provisions should be retained, and, commenting that she could begin that discussion later during this meeting, she stressed that she wanted to raise the larger philosophical question that she had also made during the previous round in Geneva. She remarked that several of these prohibitions were first agreed upon in the SALT II Treaty and were part of the two countries' mutual legacy of arms control, and explained that the omission of such provisions could raise questions in the public and among arms control experts as to whether this new treaty regime was, in fact, effective. She acknowledged that there might be some alternative ways of referring to such obligations within the text of the new treaty, but that in any event, neither side wanted to be seen as sliding backwards. Gottemoeller stated that this was the reason she had raised this general question and why she had wanted to hear the Russian views, reiterating that she was prepared to work with the Russian side to simplify this article. Antonov asked whether she could present the U.S. vision of this article, in order to help in its simplification. Gottemoeller noted that the U.S. side had found that the prohibitions contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 of Article V in the U.S. text had been omitted in the Russian text, and the U.S. side was prepared to discuss this in more detail, with specific points. Gottemoeller stated that she intended to conclude her "philosophical" points first and then return to specifics at a later time. -------------- Articles IX - XII -------------- ¶22. (S) Gottemoeller turned to Articles IX through XII, noting Russian omissions in Article IX (ban on concealment measures),X (provisions of telemetry),XI (continuous monitoring and elimination inspections),and XII (cooperative measures with regard to mobile launchers and heavy bombers). She said that the Russian positions on telemetry and on continuous monitoring were clear, and that, in some cases, the Russian text had moved some provisions from one part of the treaty to another, as was the case for elimination inspections. In some cases, however, the provision had been omitted entirely, and this was the case, in particular, for the ban on telemetry encryption, which had been included since the SALT II Treaty, where it was included in the context of non-interference with NTM. She noted that this was another area where the two sides could be viewed as backsliding. On Article XII, the Russian position with respect to cooperative measures for mobile launchers was predictable, but what was not clear was the omission of cooperative measures for heavy bombers. Further, it was not clear why the prohibition on concealment measures during testing, which was contained in U.S.-proposed Article IX, paragraph 3, was omitted, since this also seemed to be beneficial to the Russian side. Gottemoeller stated that this was an example of effective reciprocity: the obligations were reciprocal and benefited the U.S. and Russia alike, just as restrictions would constrain both sides in the same way. With these comments, Gottemoeller concluded her "philosophical" discussion. ¶23. (S) Antonov responded that, of course, the Russian side would study her comments carefully, and he admitted that such comments do lead one to closely examine the differences in their respective approaches. He explained that, in the development of the Russian approach, the attempt had been made to create a vision that responded to Russian national interests. He remarked that once he had the opportunity to fully explain the Russian approach to her, including the assumption that the text should be drastically simplified, he was convinced that the U.S. side would support such a simplification in terms of its impact on verification. The Russian side was also convinced that the U.S. supported a simplification of the financial aspects of verification. Now it appeared that this assumption represented an incorrect assessment of the current U.S. Administration's position on disarmament. Antonov admitted that, for him, it had been unexpected that the current U.S. Administration wanted to retain much of the language and concepts found in START, even under conditions in which both countries had stated that their relationship had dramatically improved. Thus, the Russian side was now very seriously reviewing the U.S. position and revising its views on the U.S. position, while looking to see where U.S. concerns could be met. ¶24. (S) Continuing, Antonov said that it was possible - it was a possibility that he could not discount - that the Russian attempt to simplify the SFO Treaty was perhaps excessive, and that perhaps the Russian proposal should be seen as just an initial vision of the treaty text. He did not exclude the possibility that, in the course of negotiations, some provisions might be re-introduced, but that decision would be made only after detailed and careful discussion by experts. ¶25. (S) Finally, on the issue of telemetry, he noted that while he was working in his office on Sunday he had read the U.S. proposal and had also read the views of the Russian MOD military experts. It turned out that the two sides were talking as though coming from two completely different dimensions. He noted that Russian had been frank about how telemetry could be used to the detriment of the Russian Federation, and still the Russian side had not received U.S. argumentation in support of maintaining telemetry provisions, only that the U.S. was in favor of telemetry - no responses to the Russian concerns that had been raised in the previous round had yet been received. Antonov stated that oftentimes he hears the comment that the U.S. side has directly responded to Russian concerns, and maybe that was the U.S. psychology, likening it to a situation in which one side asks, "Why are tulips so beautiful," and the other side responds, "Because it's lonely and difficult to live in the woods." ¶26. (S) Concerning the question of reciprocity, Antonov noted that he had read some papers concerning mobile launchers of ICBMs that dealt with the data base, and he admitted that he had been prepared to accept their inclusion, but when he looked at verification provisions, he asked himself, how can the U.S. side suggest that this is reciprocal, when only one side has such systems? He noted that this was a philosophical approach as well: there should be the same rights and obligations for both sides. Thus, in reading the papers on mobiles, he now understood why the U.S. was opposed to the principle of "equal security," because, in the U.S. view, there would not be equal security. Stopping himself, and saying that this was just philosophical, and perhaps he was wrong, he stressed that the sides needed to find a way to solve their differences. He proposed that he and Gottemoeller needed to meet one-on-one, at the beginning of the upcoming round, to agree on what they wanted to accomplish. And perhaps they should be pragmatic and even a little bit cynical, because both needed to understand what each wanted to get from the other on concrete issues. He stressed that the work on these issues would be done in the working groups and that the Russian side was prepared to do this work once it received these U.S. documents, in any format, in the plenary or otherwise. ¶27. (S) Gottemoeller responded that she would not sign on to cynicism, and noted, referring to Antonov's allusion to "the difficulty of living in the woods," that it is hard to find mobile launchers in the forest, and that the U.S. concern about mobiles had to do with a covert deployment of such missiles as a form of breakout potential - it was the larger question of strategic stability. She acknowledged that she understood the Russian position and that this issue was being worked in Washington. She said that she was looking forward to presenting the results of this work during the following week, in Geneva, noting that just as the Russian Federation takes into account its national interests, of course the U.S. would take into account its own interests. Antonov joked that this sounded like "equal security." ¶28. (S) Gottemoeller noted that it was true that the previous U.S. administration had taken a simplified approach to the negotiation of the Moscow Treaty, but that treaty benefited from the fact that START was still in force. However, with the impending expiration of START, there was the question of what verification aspects of START should be retained. Thus, the two sides were in complete agreement on the need to simplify, to streamline, and to make the verification measures more effective, just as the presidents agreed in July, but a balance had to be struck between oversimplification and too much reliance on START-like provisions. Therefore, there was still much work yet to do for the two delegations. ¶29. (S) Gottemoeller extended congratulations to the work done by the working groups and noted that the success of completing the treaty by December 5 depended to a great extent on them. However, the two heads of delegation needed to "drive the train." Antonov responded that the two sides had different ways of thinking, even when talking about the Moscow Treaty and START. He agreed that START provisions were available for the Moscow Treaty, but that what had been forgotten was that the ABM Treaty was in force at that time. Thus, the situation was completely different now in terms of strategic stability. If, on the other hand, there were to be a combination of the Moscow Treaty, the ABM Treaty, and START, that would be best. Concluding his thought, Antonov said that the two sides will try to find mutually acceptable solutions, even though one element that previously contributed to strategic stability, the ABM Treaty, had been rejected by the U.S. side. ¶30. (S) Gottemoeller and Antonov concluded by discussing plans to hold a one-on-one meeting about the reports to the foreign ministers and deputy foreign ministers, the agenda for the Tuesday and Wednesday meetings, and the Taylor-Koshelev meeting on JCIC documents relating to the completion of continuous monitoring activities at the monitored facility at Votkinsk. ¶31. (U) Documents exchanged: None. ¶32. (U) Participants U.S. A/S Gottemoeller AMB Ries Mr. Brown Mr. Elliott Ms. Friedt Mr. Taylor Mr. Trout Dr. Warner Mr. Katsakis Mr. Sobchenko(Int) Dr. Hopkins (Int) RUSSIA Amb Antonov Mr. Koshelev Ms. Furzhenkova Mr. Ivanov Ms. Ivanova Col Izrazov Ms. Kotkova Mr. Kuznetsov Mr. Leontiev Mr. Luchaninov Mr. Malyugin Col Novikov Gen Orlov Mr. Pishchulov Mr. Smirnov Mr. Streltsov Mr. Trifonov Mr. Venevtsev Mr. Vorontsov Mr. Yermakov Ms. Zharkikh Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶33. (U) Gottemoeller sends. Beyrle