Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW2567
2009-10-13 06:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:
DAS RUSSELL'S SEPTEMBER 28 MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN
how-toVZCZCXRO8183 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHMO #2567/01 2860655 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 130655Z OCT 09 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5064 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002567
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG UP MD AM AJ BO
SUBJECT: DAS RUSSELL'S SEPTEMBER 28 MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN
Classified By: DCM Eric S. Rubin for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002567
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG UP MD AM AJ BO
SUBJECT: DAS RUSSELL'S SEPTEMBER 28 MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN
Classified By: DCM Eric S. Rubin for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (C) Summary. Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin told
visiting DAS Dan Russell September 28 that the U.S. decision
on missile defense created trust in the U.S.' "reset"
intentions with Russia, although U.S.-Russia cooperation in
some areas of the post-Soviet space would not be easy. The
Russian approach in Georgia was based on the Russian troops'
and EU monitors' stabilizing presence, and it was futile to
hope that the Geneva talks could recreate Georgia's
territorial integrity. Karasin underscored Russia's
continued cooperation with Ukraine, despite Moscow's refusal
to engage with President Yushchenko. Expressing concern
about Tiraspol's reactions to the new government in Chisinau,
Karasin called for a united, neutral Moldova with a special
status for Transnistria. He saw changes for the better in
Belarus' development, and said that Azerbaijan's reaction to
a normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey
depended on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
End Summary.
--------------
U.S.-Russia relations
--------------
2. (C) In a September 28 meeting with Deputy Foreign
Minister Karasin, DAS Dan Russell reviewed developments in
the former Soviet space and urged more predictability and
transparency in Russia's activities and policies in the
region. Russell noted that as part of the fresh start in
U.S.-Russia relations, the U.S. was trying to take the same
approach and cited transparency over the IR-10 exercise in
Georgia as an example. That said, Russell reiterated that we
have fundamental differences in some areas, most notably over
Georgia, and that the U.S. would never recognize Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. Karasin welcomed the recent U.S. decision on
missile defense, saying it created trust that the reset in
U.S.-Russia relations was more than just words. While the
U.S.' priorities in Central Asia, specifically Afghanistan,
were well-understood in Moscow, Karasin agreed that the U.S.
and Russia cooperation in other areas of the post-Soviet
space would not be easy.
--------------
Georgia
--------------
3. (C) Karasin said that the U.S. and Russian positions on
Georgia differed in principle, stating that the Russian
approach to the situation was based on the "stabilizing
presence" of Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
with EU monitors fulfilling the same function in undisputed
Georgia. One sign of that arrangement's success was the
peaceful anniversary of the August 2008 war, despite Georgian
provocations, but also thanks to U.S. efforts.
4. (C) Karasin described the Geneva talks as a "very useful"
forum for South Ossetian, Abkhaz, and Georgians to talk
directly with one another, but criticized what he called
Georgian attempts to "internationalize" the talks. He stated
that the talks would not produce support for Georgia's
territorial integrity, and said that Russia would not agree
to international observers in Georgia until Tbilisi had
restored good-neighborly relations with the breakaway
regions. It was "naive" to think that Georgia could once
again "dominate" the regions, he added.
5. (C) As with the Geneva talks, Karasin called the Incident
Prevention and Response Mechanisms useful, but insisted the
mechanisms must discuss practical questions and find
practical results. However, he cautioned that the mechanisms
needed to work at their own pace.
6. (C) Karasin expressed his expectation that the EU
Commission for investigating the conflict in the Caucasus in
August 2008 would produce a "balanced" report, but said it
"would be a pity" if it did not send signals to the GOG on
who was at fault for destroying Georgia's territorial
integrity. Karasin blamed Saakashvili for the conflict,
pointing out that Georgia, not Russia, had severed diplomatic
relations, and that the large number of Georgians living in
Russia made it senseless for Russia to seek to destroy
Russia-Georgia ties.
--------------
Ukraine
MOSCOW 00002567 002 OF 002
--------------
7. (C) In view of the upcoming elections in Ukraine, Karasin
said Russia supported no single candidate, but hoped for a
leader who wanted normal relations with Russia. While Moscow
waited for the January elections to replace Yushchenko,
Karasin underscored that Russia remained engaged with
Ukraine, noting that Lavrov would meet Acting Foreign
Minister Khandogiy in Kharkiv on October 6-7. Karasin also
expressed hope that Ambassador-designate Zurabov could soon
be sent to Kyiv and welcomed former Ambassador Viktor
Chernomyrdin's intentions to stay involved in Ukrainian
affairs.
--------------
Moldova
--------------
8. (C) Karasin cautioned that no decisions should be made at
the October 6 "3 plus 2" talks on Transnistria in Vienna
without first consulting the parties to the conflict. In
addition, it was incumbent upon the "3 plus 2" members to
treat the parties as equal partners in the political dialogue.
9. (C) Noting Presidential Administration Head Sergey
Naryshkin's positive assessment of all Moldovan parties'
willingness to work to develop Russian-Moldovan relations,
Karasin expressed concern about Tiraspol's reactions to the
new government in Chisinau. GOM efforts to quickly integrate
into Europe along with Romanian attempts to draw Moldova
closer could cause Transnistria to "go its own way," which
Karasin described as a "regrettable" outcome. He rejected as
"incorrect" any talk of a "quick" resolution that called for
the withdrawal of Russian troops. Instead, Karasin hoped the
new government of Moldova would accept all agreements on
Transnistria since 1992, which foresaw a united, neutral
Moldova with a special status for Transnistria.
--------------
Belarus
--------------
10. (C) Karasin saw changes for the better in Belarus'
development, noting movement on human rights and the prospect
of the customs union with Russia overcoming "emotional
barriers," as Belarus sought to no longer stand aside in the
world arena.
--------------
Armenia
--------------
11. (C) Karasin called on the U.S. to play a positive role
in the Armenia-Turkey rapprochement, noting that Azerbaijan
was concerned about the process. He said that Baku's
reaction to a normalization of relations between Yerevan and
Ankara depended on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. It was incumbent that Baku reacted in the best way
to the Armenia-Turkey developments, Karasin warned.
12. (U) DAS Russell cleared this cable.
Beyrle
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG UP MD AM AJ BO
SUBJECT: DAS RUSSELL'S SEPTEMBER 28 MEETING WITH DFM KARASIN
Classified By: DCM Eric S. Rubin for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (C) Summary. Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin told
visiting DAS Dan Russell September 28 that the U.S. decision
on missile defense created trust in the U.S.' "reset"
intentions with Russia, although U.S.-Russia cooperation in
some areas of the post-Soviet space would not be easy. The
Russian approach in Georgia was based on the Russian troops'
and EU monitors' stabilizing presence, and it was futile to
hope that the Geneva talks could recreate Georgia's
territorial integrity. Karasin underscored Russia's
continued cooperation with Ukraine, despite Moscow's refusal
to engage with President Yushchenko. Expressing concern
about Tiraspol's reactions to the new government in Chisinau,
Karasin called for a united, neutral Moldova with a special
status for Transnistria. He saw changes for the better in
Belarus' development, and said that Azerbaijan's reaction to
a normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey
depended on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
End Summary.
--------------
U.S.-Russia relations
--------------
2. (C) In a September 28 meeting with Deputy Foreign
Minister Karasin, DAS Dan Russell reviewed developments in
the former Soviet space and urged more predictability and
transparency in Russia's activities and policies in the
region. Russell noted that as part of the fresh start in
U.S.-Russia relations, the U.S. was trying to take the same
approach and cited transparency over the IR-10 exercise in
Georgia as an example. That said, Russell reiterated that we
have fundamental differences in some areas, most notably over
Georgia, and that the U.S. would never recognize Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. Karasin welcomed the recent U.S. decision on
missile defense, saying it created trust that the reset in
U.S.-Russia relations was more than just words. While the
U.S.' priorities in Central Asia, specifically Afghanistan,
were well-understood in Moscow, Karasin agreed that the U.S.
and Russia cooperation in other areas of the post-Soviet
space would not be easy.
--------------
Georgia
--------------
3. (C) Karasin said that the U.S. and Russian positions on
Georgia differed in principle, stating that the Russian
approach to the situation was based on the "stabilizing
presence" of Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
with EU monitors fulfilling the same function in undisputed
Georgia. One sign of that arrangement's success was the
peaceful anniversary of the August 2008 war, despite Georgian
provocations, but also thanks to U.S. efforts.
4. (C) Karasin described the Geneva talks as a "very useful"
forum for South Ossetian, Abkhaz, and Georgians to talk
directly with one another, but criticized what he called
Georgian attempts to "internationalize" the talks. He stated
that the talks would not produce support for Georgia's
territorial integrity, and said that Russia would not agree
to international observers in Georgia until Tbilisi had
restored good-neighborly relations with the breakaway
regions. It was "naive" to think that Georgia could once
again "dominate" the regions, he added.
5. (C) As with the Geneva talks, Karasin called the Incident
Prevention and Response Mechanisms useful, but insisted the
mechanisms must discuss practical questions and find
practical results. However, he cautioned that the mechanisms
needed to work at their own pace.
6. (C) Karasin expressed his expectation that the EU
Commission for investigating the conflict in the Caucasus in
August 2008 would produce a "balanced" report, but said it
"would be a pity" if it did not send signals to the GOG on
who was at fault for destroying Georgia's territorial
integrity. Karasin blamed Saakashvili for the conflict,
pointing out that Georgia, not Russia, had severed diplomatic
relations, and that the large number of Georgians living in
Russia made it senseless for Russia to seek to destroy
Russia-Georgia ties.
--------------
Ukraine
MOSCOW 00002567 002 OF 002
--------------
7. (C) In view of the upcoming elections in Ukraine, Karasin
said Russia supported no single candidate, but hoped for a
leader who wanted normal relations with Russia. While Moscow
waited for the January elections to replace Yushchenko,
Karasin underscored that Russia remained engaged with
Ukraine, noting that Lavrov would meet Acting Foreign
Minister Khandogiy in Kharkiv on October 6-7. Karasin also
expressed hope that Ambassador-designate Zurabov could soon
be sent to Kyiv and welcomed former Ambassador Viktor
Chernomyrdin's intentions to stay involved in Ukrainian
affairs.
--------------
Moldova
--------------
8. (C) Karasin cautioned that no decisions should be made at
the October 6 "3 plus 2" talks on Transnistria in Vienna
without first consulting the parties to the conflict. In
addition, it was incumbent upon the "3 plus 2" members to
treat the parties as equal partners in the political dialogue.
9. (C) Noting Presidential Administration Head Sergey
Naryshkin's positive assessment of all Moldovan parties'
willingness to work to develop Russian-Moldovan relations,
Karasin expressed concern about Tiraspol's reactions to the
new government in Chisinau. GOM efforts to quickly integrate
into Europe along with Romanian attempts to draw Moldova
closer could cause Transnistria to "go its own way," which
Karasin described as a "regrettable" outcome. He rejected as
"incorrect" any talk of a "quick" resolution that called for
the withdrawal of Russian troops. Instead, Karasin hoped the
new government of Moldova would accept all agreements on
Transnistria since 1992, which foresaw a united, neutral
Moldova with a special status for Transnistria.
--------------
Belarus
--------------
10. (C) Karasin saw changes for the better in Belarus'
development, noting movement on human rights and the prospect
of the customs union with Russia overcoming "emotional
barriers," as Belarus sought to no longer stand aside in the
world arena.
--------------
Armenia
--------------
11. (C) Karasin called on the U.S. to play a positive role
in the Armenia-Turkey rapprochement, noting that Azerbaijan
was concerned about the process. He said that Baku's
reaction to a normalization of relations between Yerevan and
Ankara depended on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. It was incumbent that Baku reacted in the best way
to the Armenia-Turkey developments, Karasin warned.
12. (U) DAS Russell cleared this cable.
Beyrle