MFA ON RUSSIA-GEORGIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002551 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG SUBJECT: MFA ON RUSSIA-GEORGIA REF: MOSCOW 2446 Classified By: Acting Political M/C David Kostelancik for reasons 1.4 ( b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. MFA 4th CIS Deputy Director Dvinyanin told visiting EUR/RUS desk officer that the Geneva talks on South Ossetia and Abkhazia need to become more productive and produce recommendations that the UN or OSCE could approve. Georgia needs to sign non-use of force agreements with the breakaway republics, where Russian forces might remain for "the next 10-30 years." No Abkhaz had applied for U.S. visas to attend UN sessions yet, while Russian protection of shipping lanes to Abkhazia did not extend to international waters. End Summary. -------------- Geneva Talks -------------- ¶2. (C) MFA 4th CIS Deputy Director Alexey Dvinyanin told visiting EUR/RUS desk officer October 1 that Russia was content with the Geneva talks and Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meetings, even though they were not producing many concrete results yet. If the talks did not become more productive in future, Russia would no longer consider them successful. Therefore, the future of the Geneva talks was open. Results would take the form of recommendations, as the forum had no stronger mandate. The OSCE or UN could approve those recommendations. ¶3. (C) Dvinyanin stressed that the success of the second working group on humanitarian issues depended on the results achieved in the first working group on security. Not only was security necessary for IDPs to be able to return, but South Ossetia had also linked its willingness to allow IDPs to return to the signing of a non-use of force agreement (NUF) with Georgia. Russia "did not know" how to overcome the differences in opinion, but suggested that the EU or UNHCR might help. Dvinyanin said South Ossetia had already shown flexibility by agreeing to come to Geneva, and then again by starting the IPRM, so now it was Georgia's turn to be flexible and sign an NUF. The West needed to convince Georgia and urge it to pursue "ethnic rehabilitation." ¶4. (C) Russia had submitted draft NUFs in the past three rounds of meetings in Geneva, and would do so again. Dvinyanin said he expected the draft to be ready by October ¶8. He reiterated that a Russia-Georgia NUF was out of the question, given Georgia's condition of a Russian withdrawal of troops. That could only happen "within the next 10-30 years," Dvinyanin asserted, while South Ossetia built up its defensive forces. -------------- Visas -------------- ¶5. (C) Russia was displeased with the U.S. refusal several years ago to issue visas to Abkhaz and South Ossetian officials, Dvinyanin said. Now, the USG had told the Russian embassy it was impossible to discuss issuing visas without communicating the date, time, and purpose of travel. Russia had passed this information to the South Ossetians and Abkhaz, who reacted "pessimistically." They had not yet applied for visas to attend UN sessions, Dvinyanin said. -------------- Ship seizures -------------- ¶6. (C) Dvinyanin underscored that Russia's protection of Abkhaz waters was part of the Russia-Abkhazia defense agreement. However, Russia would not interfere with seizures that occurred in international waters. To avoid that, Russia was advising shipping companies to enter Abkhaz waters via Russian territorial waters. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) A Russian vision of ongoing talks on Georgia shifting to the OSCE or UN is beginning to take shape, while the GOR reduces its efforts to rein in South Ossetian and Abkhaz demands in the Geneva forum. MOSCOW 00002551 002 OF 002 Beyrle