MEDVEDEV, PUTIN, AND RUSSIA'S IRAN POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002531 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL RS IR SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV, PUTIN, AND RUSSIA'S IRAN POLICY Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Despite Russian President Medvedev's September 24 remarks that sanctions against Iran might be necessary, other government officials and experts here caution that Russia will remain, for the time being, reluctant to pursue a tougher line against Tehran. The consensus among the Russian political elite is that maintaining a dialogue with the Iranians and exhausting diplomatic avenues is preferable to imposing sanctions in the near term. While Medvedev as president is responsible for controlling arms and nuclear technology transfers, Prime Minister Putin remains closely identified with decisions on Iran policy, including the sale of civilian nuclear technology and weapons, which provides a boost to powerful state enterprises. According to Deputy FM Ryabkov, Putin's relative silence on Iran since Medvedev's statements does not signal any difference between them on sanctions. End Summary. Medvedev on Sanctions: Few Official Echoes -------------- ¶2. (C) Russian Government officials, including Prime Minister Putin, have not yet echoed President Medvedev's public statement that Russia would consider the imposition of sanctions on Iran if the world community ran out of other options. Asked about Russian views on the Qom revelation in New York September 25, FM Lavrov adopted a strikingly softer tone than in the just released Kremlin statement. He noted that Iran had acted positively by notifying the IAEA about its plans to construct a new nuclear facility, and complained that some of Russia's "partner countries" in the P5-plus-1 had not shared information about the Qom facility earlier. Lavrov stressed that Iran's cooperation with the world community as a member of the NPT with non-nuclear status could prove the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. ¶3. (C) Before the most recent P5-plus-1 meeting in Geneva, PM Putin said that Russia would not support "significant" changes to its approach on Iran. Ariel Cohen, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, said Putin and Lavrov told him in early September that they are opposed to tougher sanctions and the use of force against Iran. Russian Deputy Foreign Minster Sergei Ryabkov said September 29 that Iran's recent proposals presented a "broad field for dialogue." Ryabkov added that whether sanctions against Iran might �00A;become inevitable was a "completely separate issue, one that we are not yet ready to address." He stressed Russia's position was to do everything possible to find a "diplomatic, political solution to the Iranian nuclear problem." ¶4. (SBU) While expressing concern over Iran's missile program, Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitriy Rogozin stressed September 29 that Russia preferred political dialogue over tough measures that could trigger an "arms race in the region." Russian Ambassador to the United States Sergey Kislyak said September 24 that sanctions were not the way to resolve the problem; rather, the point was how to find a "political solution that would eliminate this problem." The priority was to "start a serious dialogue with our Iranian partners in seeking a way out of the situation." ¶5. (C) Russia's message to domestic audiences also remains unchanged. Despite Medvedev's carefully worded comments on sanctions in New York (called by one analyst here "a jewel of diplomatic casuistry"),even prominent Russians with ties to the Kremlin's domestic propaganda machine believe Russian support for Western sanctions is highly unlikely. Medvedev advisor Gleb Pavlovskiy, President of the Effective Policy Foundation, and Maksim Shevchenko, President of the Russian World Foundation, even spoke in favor of completing Russia's frozen S-300 surface-to-air missile deal with Iran. Interpreting Putin's Silence -------------- ¶6. (C) PM Putin's lack of public comment on the possibility of Iran sanctions after President Medvedev's public statement does not indicate disagreement between them on Iran, DFM Ryabkov told Ambassador Beyrle October 3. Ryabkov repeated his comments, made in Geneva during P5-plus-1 talks, that Russia had not ruled out the possibility of sanctions, but would begin to contemplate them only as an absolute last resort. ¶7. (C) Most political commentators and analysts here have been echoing the same statements. Tatyana Stanovaya of the Center for Political Technologies thought that Medvedev's seemingly more positive statement indicates no real rapprochement with the U.S. on Iran. Rather, she said, his words are carefully calibrated to indicate a welcoming of U.S. willingness to use the P5-plus-1 format and engage in actual discussions with Iranian officials. ¶8. (C) Nevertheless, Medvedev's New York comments and the September 25 Kremlin statement mark a definite toughening of Russian rhetoric on Iran. Pravoe Delo co-Chairman Georgiy Bovt told us October 5 that Medvedev's use of the word "sanctions" represents a policy change. Boyt cautioned that Medvedev's words would probably resonate with only a distinct minority of Russian society. He believes it will be hard for Medvedev to sell Iran sanctions to the Russian bureaucracy without the full support of Putin. At the Sochi Economic Forum, Putin blasted the U.S. for not allowing the export of certain high technology to Russia. Boyt thinks Russia might ask for an easing of these restrictions in exchange for supporting sanctions. Sanctions: Economic Implications -------------- ¶9. (C) Despite Medvedev's presidential authority over arms transfers, Putin undoubtedly retains a critical, if not decisive role over an issue with such significant domestic economic implications as the transfer of nuclear technology and armaments to Iran. Russia and Iran currently have limited military cooperation, so the effect of any lost revenue from arms sales to Iran would be small. While the sale of S-300s to Iran, for example, would only net Russia from USD 750 million to USD one billion, future military sales could be considerably larger. ¶10. (C) Several years ago Iran was a stable source of hard currency and this cash flow helped Russia preserve its nuclear construction sector. The importance of Russia's trade with Iran has decreased, but Russian exports to Iran last year still exceeded USD 3 billion. In the currently depressed Russian economy, that is not an insignificant amount. In addition, great potential for future economic gain to Russia exists via civilian nuclear technology sales and increased military cooperation. ¶11. (C) As the world's largest exporter of oil and gas, Russia also benefits significantly from the "instability premium" embedded in world oil prices due to tensions with Iran. Even a USD 5 per barrel instability premium would net Russia almost USD 9 billion per year for oil and approximately USD 2-4 billion from its gas exports. Finally, given Iran's position as the second largest owner of gas reserves, Russia's gas sector clearly benefits from the lack of international investment in the development of Iran's natural gas sector. Life without Iran -------------- ¶12. (C) Russia could profit from alternatives to its continued support for Iran. For example, news reports indicate that Saudi Arabia has offered to purchase the Russian S-400 system for USD two billion in an effort to force Moscow to back out of the S-300 deal with Iran. Medvedev cited Arab League concerns about Russia's close relationship with Iran when he stated that Russia's stance on Iran might be changing. ¶13. (C) Israel also is clearly pushing Russia to take a firmer stance towards Tehran, in light of recent press reports that PM Netanyahu personally delivered a list of Russian scientists who contributed to Iran's nuclear program. Conversations with Israeli diplomats in Moscow indicate that Israel believes there may be even more to Iran's program than is now known to the GOR and Russian decision makers. They hint that Israeli disclosures on Russian participation could force Moscow into taking a harder line. COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (C) Success in moving Russia to support tougher actions against Iran will require a coordinated strategy involving our friends and allies, including Israel and Saudi Arabia. The strategy may need to include the continuation of diplomatic efforts like the P5-plus-1 process and perhaps include new ways of engaging in dialogue with Iran. A strategy created by a broad international consensus must offer Moscow a series of options that will challenge the stubborn mentality here that instinctively opposes common cause with the West on Iran. Sanctions would have a major impact on the Russian economy, and especially to the domestic constituencies like RosOboronexport and RosAtom. The fact that the economy and these key state-controlled enterprises are part of Putin's portfolio only reinforces the certainty that he will remain the key decision maker on any imposition of sanctions. Key to the GOR's calculations would be any politically salable alternatives that benefit them both economically and politically. End comment. Beyrle