ASD/ISA VERSHBOW'S SEPTEMBER 30 VISIT TO MOSCOW:

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002529 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR RS IR AF UP GG SUBJECT: ASD/ISA VERSHBOW'S SEPTEMBER 30 VISIT TO MOSCOW: BILATERAL COOPERATION, IRAN, AFGHANISTAN, MISSILE DEFENSE, MILITARY/DEFENSE COOPERATION Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Susan Elliott for reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During consultations with GOR officials on September 30, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for International Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow discussed ways to implement bilateral cooperation in a number of key areas of mutual interest. Both sides praised progress since the "reset" in U.S.-Russian relations during the first Obama-Medvedev meetings, though both agreed that concrete actions are necessary to realize true cooperation. ASD Vershbow emphasized that the reset needs to be reciprocal and noted that Iran would be a critical test case. Both sides expressed interest in further cooperation on Afghanistan, especially in the sphere of counternarcotics. While the Administration's missile defense announcement has met with a generally positive reaction in the Russian media, Duma and Security Council representatives made clear they had questions about the later phases of the new U.S. plan and questioned whether the U.S. would be prepared for cooperation going beyond information exchange. Russian interlocutors acknowledged the dangers posed by Iran's nuclear program, but stressed Moscow's skepticism about sanctions. Throughout the meetings, ASD Vershbow emphasized that Russia's efforts to assert a regional sphere of influence posed a threat to the reset in bilateral relations, and reiterated the U.S. commitment to the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Georgia, Ukraine and other partners in the region. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) OVERVIEW OF MEETINGS: ASD Vershbow met with the following GOR officials: Viktor Mikhaylovich Zavarzin (Defense Committee Chairman of the State Duma),Aleksandr A. Gorbunov (Chief of the Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation of the Ministry of Defense),General Yuriy Nikolayevich Baluyevskiy (Deputy Secretary of the Security Council and former Chief of Defense),Aleksey Nikolayevich Borodavkin (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs), and Grigoriy Borisovich Karasin (First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and State Secretary). He also met informally with academic experts and pundits and gave an interview to Interfax. -------------- --- U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION -- WORDS ARE NOT ENOUGH �A; -------------- --- ¶3. (C) At all meetings, ASD Vershbow and his Russian interlocutors noted that U.S.-Russia relations since the "reset" have been moving in the right direction, with opportunities for increased bilateral cooperation in areas of mutual interest. The Bilateral Presidential Commission and associated working groups will be useful to inject momentum into our work. However, ASD Vershbow stressed that words alone or mere information exchanges are not enough, and the reset must be reciprocal. Both sides need to take action to implement agreements already concluded and to pave the way for additional areas of work and to identify concrete projects for cooperation. Mechanisms for enabling these efforts need to be established (e.g., the Ministry of Defense is currently undergoing a major organizational reform, which has hampered efforts for implementing the previously approved 2009 military-to-military work plan, and both sides need to ensure that planned events are conducted). ¶4. (C) ASD Vershbow agreed that next steps must be taken in other areas where we have agreed to cooperate previously (e.g., implementing a ballistic missile joint threat assessment, a Joint Data Exchange Center, and the lethal transit overflight in support of efforts in Afghanistan that was agreed to at the July summit). The U.S. and Russia must be united in addressing common threats, such as the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of Iran and North Korea. ¶5. (C) During his meeting with MOD International Military Cooperation Chief Gorbunov, ASD Vershbow emphasized that transparency should be a major aspect of cooperation. Vershbow observed that DoD has been very open with the Russians about sensitive issues. For example, DoD has shared information about efforts to help prepare Georgian troops for deployment to Afghanistan in support of ISAF efforts; however, the Russians have not reciprocated in this vein (e.g., their Zapad 2009 and Ladoga exercises). ¶6. (C) Both Duma Defense Committee Chair Zavarzin and Security Council Deputy Secretary Baluyevskiy stressed that they are ready to work on all areas of mutual interest on the BILATERAL COOPERATION, IRAN, AFGHANISTAN, MISSILE DEFENSE, MILITARY/DEFENSE COOPERATION condition that Russia's voice be heard. In particular, Zavarzin cited the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (1997-2002) in which Russia claims its views were ignored, the NATO-Russia Council (the PJC's successor) in which Russia "still did not have a full say," and Russia's interest in working on anti-missile defense since 2000 which "did not pan out." ASD Vershbow acknowledged that both NATO and Russia bore responsibility for areas where cooperation was not successful, but suggested that we need to look ahead rather than debate the past. -------------- -------------- RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY REFORM POSES CHALLENGES TO MIL-TO-MIL COOPERATION -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) is in the midst of major reform. International Military Cooperation Chief Gorbunov described the main goal of the reform as the creation of the "most effective military force in the world," despite existing limitations (e.g., demographics, large landmass and borders, resources, and various threats along the borders). He identified two distinct processes as part of the reform -- building of the armed forces and control of the forces. Today, Russia is focusing on building the forces, including a large influx of civilian personnel in management and specialist roles, improving pay/benefits of service members, improving quality of equipment, and trying to change decision-making processes at all levels. Gorbunov emphasized that these changes are intended to make Russia a strong competitor, but also a reliable partner. ¶8. (C) Gorbunov explained that the reform process is having a significant impact on the Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation (GUMVS) at the MOD. The Foreign Liaison Directorate (UVS) is being closed on October 1, and a new International Liaison Directorate is being created. Because of these changes, correspondence will be slow over the next six weeks or so, which will impact the Attache Corps in Moscow. Gorbunov offered his personal assistance during this period. ¶9. (C) ASD Vershbow raised the Bilateral Defense Consultations (BDC) which the U.S. had proposed for November, and suggested the possibility of a broader dialogue between the MOD and DoD on policy and strategy issues to complement State-MFA exchanges. Vershbow explained that DoD's proposed BDC topics (including confidence-building measures and transparency, risk reduction and notification procedures, expanded military technical cooperation, etc.) were carefully considered, but we welcomed Russia's suggestions for additional topics. Gorbunov responded that the MoD agrees with the general notion of the BDC, but stipulated that the General Staff needs to identify the right experts to address topics to be discussed, and they plan to propose other topics for consideration. He gave no indication as to when a response would be provided. -------------- -------------- AFGHANISTAN: NARCO-TRAFFICKING, TERRORISM, ILLICIT FINANCE -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) ASD Vershbow's meetings with Deputy Foreign Minister Borodavkin and MOD International Cooperation Chief Gorbunov particularly focused on Afghanistan. Borodavkin mentioned that Russia views Afghanistan not only as a threat, but as an opportunity for cooperation with the U.S. and other countries (e.g., NATO),and suggested that ISAF could play an important role in fighting illegal drug trafficking. He recalled that the U.S. and NATO had participated in the March 2009 conference held in Moscow at which counternarcotics was a top priority. ¶11. (C) When asked by Borodavkin about whether more U.S. troops will be sent to Afghanistan, ASD Vershbow explained that General McChrystal's assessment is being reviewed at the highest levels. He noted that while the situation in Afghanistan has not gone as well as hoped over the past six months, the U.S. cannot allow the Taliban to regain control. Expansion and training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF),improving governance, and economic assistance are all still essential components of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan and we will continue to seek cooperation in these areas. ¶12. (C) Borodavkin introduced a number of proposals for increased Russian contribution. He said that Russia would like to launch cooperation with the U.S. on the economic rehabilitation of Afghanistan and referred to a clause in the July Summit Joint Statement that without economic improvement, terrorism and other threats cannot be eliminated. Borodavkin suggested tripartite cooperation (Russia-U.S.-Afghanistan) to reconstruct the Soviet-era Salang Tunnel to provide a much needed reliable transportation route. The Russians have already undertaken a technical study on this project and Borodavkin said that with adequate resources, it would be a useful cooperative effort. (Note: Borodavkin's staff confirmed that the MFA has submitted a proposal to the State Department on the Salang Tunnel.) ¶13. (C) Russia considers narco-trafficking to be its highest priority vis-a-vis Afghanistan. Borodavkin said Russia is ready to help the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Interior Ministry in these efforts. He noted that Russia is already providing counternarcotics training to the Afghans at the Domodedovo Center, and mentioned Russian counter-narcotics chief Ivanov's statement that he is ready to provide increased assistance on bilateral and multilateral levels such as NATO and the OSCE. Both Borodovkin and Vershbow agreed that while the U.S. and Russia are currently working together on this and the related issue of threat financing through the Bilateral Presidential Commission, we need to address these problems more forcefully. Illicit financing has been raised at Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and OSCE meetings, offering one area of possible cooperation. ¶14. (C) At his meetings at the MOD and MFA, ASD Vershbow expressed appreciation for Russia's expression of interest in providing weapons and equipment to the ANSF, and requested that any such help be made in the form of donations with no fees attached, as those charges would have to be paid for by the U.S. He underscored that some of the equipment/weapon donation requests provided to Russia are intended to support counter-narcotics efforts, so the U.S. hopes Russia will be able to provide this support. ASD Vershbow also asked that Russia work with the Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) to ensure that ANSF priority requirements are met and provided a list of requirements. ¶15. (C) Borodavkin said that Russia will be able to supply limited numbers of weapons to the ANP as aid and will consider selling more weapons to the ANP and the Afghan National Army (ANA). He also expressed concern that there are unlicensed (counterfeit) Russian weapons on the market, which are of inferior quality. Gorbunov explained that donating equipment and weapons to Afghanistan is a presidential decision, which would entail President Medvedev asking the military services to donate items from current stocks. ¶16. (C) Borodavkin also asked ASD Vershbow's perspectives on the European proposal for a conference on Afghanistan after the new Afghan government is established. ASD Vershbow said the U.S. saw merit in this idea as a means of seeking additional international support for Afghanistan, but noted that the timing of the initiative will depend on Afghanistan's domestic politics; given the problems with the Presidential elections, conditions were not yet right. ¶17. (C) Borodavkin mentioned the work of the Afghanistan sub-working group under the Bilateral Presidential Commission and stated that the Foreign Ministry is hoping that Amb. Holbrooke can reschedule his planned visit to Moscow. Borodavkin requested that ASD Vershbow pass on the invitation to Amb. Holbrooke. ¶18. (C) ASD Vershbow also raised the lethal transit agreement signed at the July summit in his meetings with Gorbunov, Borodavkin, and Zavarzin. He underscored the importance of a timely Duma decision now that the General Authorization has been delivered. ASD Vershbow expressed hopes that the inaugural flight of the agreement could take place prior to Secretary of State Clinton's visit to Moscow on October 12-14. Zavarzin thought the Duma would approve the agreement without any problem; Borodavkin confirmed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is working on the request, but warned that they do not have the sole voice on this matter. -------------- MISSILE DEFENSE DECISION: NEITHER CONCESSION NOR THREAT TO RUSSIA -------------- ¶19. (C) ASD Vershbow discussed the recent U.S. missile defense decision during each of his consultations. In his meeting with Duma Defense Committee Chairman Zavarzin, ASD Vershbow observed that the Russian press may have been overly positive in its assessment of the September 17 announcement, focusing on the cancellation of the Program of Record rather than the new MD architecture. While the new phased adaptive approach to MD does not pose a threat to Russia, there will likely continue to be missile defense elements in central-eastern Europe, with an SM-3 site in Poland if the Government of Poland agrees. However, the physical characteristics of the new system are different from the old, and the U.S. believes Russia has no basis for concern that the system could threaten its strategic forces. The new architecture will be more effective and be able to provide protection to vulnerable parts of Europe more quickly. Vershbow emphasized that the U.S. intends to be open about the new architecture, citing information available through congressional testimony and other open sources. The U.S. aim is to make this a project for NATO because the system is designed to protect all of NATO's territory (starting in southeastern Europe, where the current threat is, but eventually covering all of NATO). ¶20. (C) ASD Vershbow affirmed the U.S. also views missile defense as an opportunity for cooperation with Russia against a common threat, noting Secretary of Defense Gates' support for cooperation on missile defense. Vershbow emphasized to Zavarzin and Security Council Deputy Secretary Baluyevskiy that we should begin by implementing the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC),on which the Russians had postponed a decision until after the U.S. missile defense announcement. Vershbow told Zavarzin and Baluyevskiy that linking radars could follow, which could then lead to broader areas of cooperation that could be implemented either bilaterally or within the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) framework. He suggested that U.S. and Russian experts explore concrete ways to implement military technical cooperation, noting that such cooperation would be mutually beneficial and would send a strong signal to Iran that could help in resolving the nuclear issue. ¶21. (C) Zavarzin acknowledged that the Russian political elite has no illusions about missile defense and understands this was a U.S. decision with no quid pro quo expected from Russia. Security Council Deputy Secretary Baluyevskiy noted that the system's planned capability to intercept ICBMs does raise some of the same concerns Russia has had before. Zavarzin agreed that we need to identify specific projects to work on together, but that Russia wants to ensure its voice will be heard. Both Zavarzin and Baluyevskiy stressed the need to develop bilateral cooperation methods, potentially by linking existing U.S. and Russian early warning systems to gather and share information about threats. They also asked whether the U.S. was prepared to go even farther, to include joint technology projects, which would of greater interest to Russia than information exchange. -------------- U.S.-RUSSIAN UNITY ON IRAN? -------------- ¶22. (C) ASD Vershbow discussed the serious test that Iran's nuclear program will pose to both Russia and the U.S. in the coming months, noting that our interests coincide in many ways, even if they are not identical. The U.S., he stated, wants to see if diplomacy can succeed, but we need to be realistic and be prepared for tougher measures if diplomacy fails. Citing the recently exposed covert nuclear facility and the recent missile tests, Vershbow described the situation as urgent, and said that the U.S. was encouraged by President Medvedev's recent comment that sanctions might become necessary. ¶23. (C) ASD Vershbow mentioned that the Islamic world is very concerned about Iran's nuclear program (e.g., several of its Arab neighbors have asked the U.S. for Patriot missiles and other measures to protect them against Iranian attack). The ability of the U.S. and Russia to work together on the Iran challenge over the next few months will be just as important as our work on missile defense will be over the next few years. ASD Vershbow stressed that if we fail to stop Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, we could have a "volatile, possibly explosive," situation in the Middle East. ¶24. (C) In their respective meetings, Duma Defense Committee Chairman Zavarzin and Security Council Deputy Secretary Baluyevskiy agreed that Iran is a concern, but said that Russia continues to work closely with them and that sanctions cannot be pursued until after diplomatic efforts have been made. Deputy Foreign Minister Borodavkin expressed concern that sanctions could be ineffective (citing past experience in Iraq) and could have a negative impact on the wider Islamic world. -------------- RUSSIA'S "SPHERE OF PRIVILEGED INTEREST" -------------- ¶25. (C) ASD Vershbow stated in several meetings that our interaction in the post-Soviet space continues to be a sensitive issue and, if not handled carefully, could undermine recent gains in bilateral relations. In this regard, President Medvedev's proposed amendment to the law on use of Russian forces overseas has raised many questions. Duma Defense Committee Chairman Zavarzin said that Russia will not interfere with the U.S. as it engages with nations in the region, and that there is no cause for concern regarding the legislation about use of Russian forces -- it is intended to protect Russian citizens living in those countries and that other countries have similar provisions. ¶26. (C) UKRAINE: ASD Vershbow spoke of his visit to Ukraine immediately preceding his arrival in Moscow, and cited Ukrainian concerns about Russian respect for Ukraine's sovereignty and borders. Vershbow stated that the U.S. continues to support the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances and Ukraine's freedom to choose its security relationships, and encourages Russia to reaffirm its adherence as well. He suggested that President Medvedev's open letter to Ukraine had been counter-productive. The U.S. favors close and mutually beneficial Russian-Ukrainian relations -- this is not a zero-sum game. ¶27. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin said that Ukraine is Russia's closest neighbor, and is a "key partner" in international activities. Russia is not trying to influence Ukraine, but wants a stable Ukraine and a secure neighborhood. He also said that Russia cannot ignore attempts to depict it as a major threat to Ukraine. Foreign Minister Lavrov will be visiting Ukraine this week to meet with Ukrainian Acting Foreign Minister Khandogiy and there even is a possibility that Medvedev and Ukrainian President Yushchenko will meet at a summit of CIS countries shortly after that. Karasin said that Russia wants to deal with Ukraine in a normal way and that Ukrainian citizens are the ones to decide what they want. ¶28. (C) GEORGIA: Security Council Deputy Secretary Baluyevskiy, Zavarzin, and Karasin asked why the U.S. is providing military assistance to Georgia when it threatens stability in the Caucasus region. This causes concern and Russia cannot allow renewed aggression against Abkhazia and South Ossetia. ASD Vershbow explained that as a matter of principle, the U.S. will help Georgia protect its sovereignty and independence, but stated that the U.S. is not rearming Georgia, as Russia has repeatedly alleged. Since the August 2008 war, there has been no U.S. lethal assistance to Georgia; DoD funds were transferred to the State Department for humanitarian purposes. In the short term, the U.S. is proceeding with great care and focusing on training, education, and helping prepare Georgia to participate in Afghanistan under the command of U.S. Forces. At the same time, Georgia is a sovereign state with the right to self-defense. We do not accept any arms embargo, and we may provide weapons to Georgia in the future. ¶29. (C) Zavarzin made a point of saying that Russia does not dispute Georgia's sovereignty, but it cannot allow new acts of aggression; a regional consensus is necessary. Karasin said that, in Russia's view, the current Georgian leadership is irresponsible. ASD Vershbow reiterated that the U.S. had made clear to Georgia that there is no military option regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia and that the Georgians need to take a long view on reintegration of the territories. Karasin noted some successes in repairing relations since last August, including the Geneva talks that enable the Georgians to talk directly to the Abkhaz and Ossetians. Vershbow said that stability in the Caucasus and creating conditions to help improve Georgian-Russian relations is very important to the U.S. ¶30. (C) Karasin mentioned the EU independent report on the August 2008 conflict in Georgia, which had just been released on the afternoon of September 30. ASD Vershbow mentioned that he looked forward to reading the report and stressed that even if we do not agree completely on the report's findings, we need to look ahead and promote stability in the region, including an international presence in the territories. Karasin said that international presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia must be discussed with the Abkhaz and the Ossetians (not the Russians). Russia has "bilateral agreements" with them, and Russian border guards are protecting them to help restore stability. ¶31. (C) Karasin asked whether the U.S. intends to establish a military presence in Georgia by contributing personnel to the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM). This would be a serious problem for Russia, as they believe it would send the wrong message to President Saakashvili that he could use force again. ASD Vershbow said there has been lots of speculation on this subject that was not based on fact. If the EUMM did make such a request in the future, the U.S. would consider it, but this would likely involve civilian monitors. Vershbow added that Russia needs to fully withdraw its forces from positions beyond the line of the outbreak of hostility, per the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement, since this non-compliance was a continuing source of tension. Karasin insisted that Russia was in compliance, while acknowledging that the U.S. does not see it that way. -------------- OTHER ISSUES -------------- ¶32. (C) EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY: In response to Baluyevskiy's inquiry about President Medvedev's proposed European Security Treaty, ASD Vershbow acknowledged there could be ways to improve the effectiveness of existing conflict-prevention mechanisms, but that the U.S. and most of our allies did not see a need for new structures or a new treaty. However, the U.S. is ready to engage with Russia on this issue in the Corfu process and other fora. ¶33. (C) CENTRAL ASIA: Karasin inquired about the Manas Transit Center and the numbers of U.S. military personnel that would be deployed under the new arrangement. ASD Vershbow said that he did not have precise figures. However, in contrast with the previous agreement, security for the facility is now being provided by the Kyrgyz, which reduced the U.S. presence somewhat. ¶34. (U) ASD Vershbow has cleared this cable. Beyrle