Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09MOSCOW2527
2009-10-05 14:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:
RUSSIA SUPPORTIVE ON BOSNIA (C-RE9-01807)
how-toVZCZCXRO1861 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHMO #2527 2781408 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 051408Z OCT 09 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4992 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 3646 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2128 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 4296
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002527
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019
TAGS: PREL BK EU RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA SUPPORTIVE ON BOSNIA (C-RE9-01807)
REF: A. STATE 102233
B. MOSCOW 308
C. MOSCOW 562
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002527
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019
TAGS: PREL BK EU RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA SUPPORTIVE ON BOSNIA (C-RE9-01807)
REF: A. STATE 102233
B. MOSCOW 308
C. MOSCOW 562
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) The Ambassador on October 2 delivered reftel points
to Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Titov, who said that he
had already heard broad outlines of the proposal from EU
representatives and supported the overall approach. Titov
appreciated that the U.S. and Russia shared the same
strategic goal, i.e.,the closure of OHR and its transition to
the EU. While supportive of using incentives, he cautioned
that Russia might not have the same positive view of NATO
membership. The GOR shared the same position as the U.S. on
territories, and Russia did not oppose packaging reforms with
constitutional amendments as a means to break the impasse,
especially since the amendments did not go beyond compromises
made in 2006. However, Titov asked for greater detail on
state property disposal and constitutional reform, and he
also requested a read-out of the October 8-9 session with the
BiH authorities.
2. (C) Titov agreed that the situation in Bosnia was not yet
stable and that the presence of EUFOR assisted in diffusing
potential crises. He acknowledged that EUFOR's presence was
an EU decision that might hinge on available resources.
3. (C) Titov commented that the GOR was disappointed with HR
Valentin Inzko, whom he called "high-strung" (nervniy).
Saying "you were more right than we were" about his abilities
during appointment deliberations, he quipped that Inzko
"wielded Bonn authority without authority" (Refs B and C).
Titov also urged us to view Republika Srpska PM Milorad Dodik
more favorably, calling him the U.S.' "best friend" in moving
the reform process forward. He said that Dodik had the
support of "his public," and the public wanted to move beyond
their limbo status.
4. (C) Titov informed the Ambassador that, due to
administrative reforms, Aleksandr Botsan-Karchenko, recently
appointed Russian Ambassador to Bosnia, would not be replaced
as Special Representative. Instead, Fourth European
Department Director Aleksandr Alekseyev would represent the
GOR at future PIC sessions. Titov revealed that FM Lavrov
was tentatively planning on traveling to Sarajevo in early
November, as part of a planned visit to Cyprus, and would
press for BiH movement on "5 plus 2" conditions.
Beyrle
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019
TAGS: PREL BK EU RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA SUPPORTIVE ON BOSNIA (C-RE9-01807)
REF: A. STATE 102233
B. MOSCOW 308
C. MOSCOW 562
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) The Ambassador on October 2 delivered reftel points
to Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Titov, who said that he
had already heard broad outlines of the proposal from EU
representatives and supported the overall approach. Titov
appreciated that the U.S. and Russia shared the same
strategic goal, i.e.,the closure of OHR and its transition to
the EU. While supportive of using incentives, he cautioned
that Russia might not have the same positive view of NATO
membership. The GOR shared the same position as the U.S. on
territories, and Russia did not oppose packaging reforms with
constitutional amendments as a means to break the impasse,
especially since the amendments did not go beyond compromises
made in 2006. However, Titov asked for greater detail on
state property disposal and constitutional reform, and he
also requested a read-out of the October 8-9 session with the
BiH authorities.
2. (C) Titov agreed that the situation in Bosnia was not yet
stable and that the presence of EUFOR assisted in diffusing
potential crises. He acknowledged that EUFOR's presence was
an EU decision that might hinge on available resources.
3. (C) Titov commented that the GOR was disappointed with HR
Valentin Inzko, whom he called "high-strung" (nervniy).
Saying "you were more right than we were" about his abilities
during appointment deliberations, he quipped that Inzko
"wielded Bonn authority without authority" (Refs B and C).
Titov also urged us to view Republika Srpska PM Milorad Dodik
more favorably, calling him the U.S.' "best friend" in moving
the reform process forward. He said that Dodik had the
support of "his public," and the public wanted to move beyond
their limbo status.
4. (C) Titov informed the Ambassador that, due to
administrative reforms, Aleksandr Botsan-Karchenko, recently
appointed Russian Ambassador to Bosnia, would not be replaced
as Special Representative. Instead, Fourth European
Department Director Aleksandr Alekseyev would represent the
GOR at future PIC sessions. Titov revealed that FM Lavrov
was tentatively planning on traveling to Sarajevo in early
November, as part of a planned visit to Cyprus, and would
press for BiH movement on "5 plus 2" conditions.
Beyrle